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No. 20-1094

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**UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS  
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT**

BRANDON SODERBERG; BAYNARD WOODS; OPEN JUSTICE  
BALTIMORE; BALTIMORE ACTION LEGAL TEAM;  
QIANA JOHNSON; LIFE AFTER RELEASE,

*Plaintiffs-Appellants*

v.

HON. AUDREY J. S. CARRION, Administrative Judge for Maryland's  
Eighth Judicial Circuit; HON. SHEILA R. TILLERSON ADAMS, as  
Administrative Judge for Maryland's Seventh Judicial Circuit,

*Defendants-Appellees.*

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ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND  
The Honorable Richard D. Bennett  
Case No. 1:19-cv-01559-RDB

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**BRIEF OF *AMICUS CURIAE* FLOYD ABRAMS INSTITUTE FOR  
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN SUPPORT OF APPELLANTS**

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## **RULE 26.1 DISCLOSURE STATEMENT**

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Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 29(a)(4), amicus certifies that no party's counsel authored this brief in whole or in part, no party or party's counsel contributed money that was intended to fund preparing or submitting this brief, and no person—other than amicus or its counsel—contributed money that was intended to fund preparing or submitting this brief.

This brief is filed with the consent of all parties pursuant to Rule 29(a).

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES.....	iii
INTEREST OF AMICUS .....	1
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT .....	1
ARGUMENT .....	4
I. MARYLAND’S RECORDINGS OF PUBLIC JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS ARE JUDICIAL RECORDS SUBJECT TO THE PUBLIC’S FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT OF ACCESS.....	4
A. <i>Warner Communications</i> Does Not Foreclose A First Amendment Right of Access to the Recordings.....	5
B. Maryland’s Audio Recordings Are Judicial Records Subject to the First Amendment Public Access Right .....	11
C. The First Amendment Access Right Includes the Right To Copy and Disseminate a Judicial Record .....	16
II. MARYLAND’S BLANKET PROHIBITION AGAINST DISSEMINATION OF ITS AUDIO TRANSCRIPTS VIOLATES THE FIRST AMENDMENT ACCESS RIGHT .....	18
A. The First Amendment Access Right Can Only Properly Be Limited Based On a Case-by-Case Determination That The Constitutional Standards Have Been Satisfied.....	19
B. No Justification Exists for Applying Section 1-201 To Bar Dissemination of All Audio Recordings.....	23
CONCLUSION .....	29
CERTIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE .....	31
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE.....	32

## TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

<b>Cases</b>	<b>Page(s)</b>
<i>Application of Nat'l Broad. Co., Inc.</i> , 635 F.2d 945 (2d Cir. 1980).....	17
<i>Ashcraft v. Conoco, Inc.</i> , 218 F.3d 282 (4th Cir. 2000).....	19
<i>In re Associated Press</i> , 172 F. App'x 1 (4th Cir. 2006).....	13
<i>Baltimore Sun Co. v. Goetz</i> , 886 F.2d 60 (4th Cir. 1989).....	19, 21
<i>Branzburg v. Hayes</i> , 408 U.S. 665 (1972).....	7
<i>CBS, Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Ct.</i> , 765 F.2d 823 (9th Cir. 1985).....	11
<i>Chandler v. Florida</i> , 449 U.S. 560 (1981).....	24
<i>In re Charlotte Observer</i> , 882 F.2d 850 (4th Cir. 1989).....	10
<i>Columbus-America Discovery Group v. Atlantic Mut. Ins.</i> <i>Co.</i> , 203 F.3d 291 (4th Cir. 2000).....	14
<i>Conway v. United States</i> , 852 F.2d 187 (6th Cir. 1988) (per curiam).....	28
<i>Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn</i> , 420 U.S. 469 (1975).....	18
<i>Craig v. Harney</i> , 331 U.S. 367 (1947).....	16

*Doe v. Public Citizen*,  
749 F.3d 246 (4th Cir. 2014)..... *passim*

*El Vocero de Puerto Rico v. Puerto Rico*,  
508 U.S. 147 (1993)..... 9

*Estes v. State of Tex.*,  
381 U.S. 532 (1965)..... 23, 24

*Fisher v. King*,  
232 F.3d 391 (4th Cir. 2000)..... 10, 13

*Globe Newspaper Co. v. Super. Ct.*,  
457 U.S. 596 (1982)..... *passim*

*Hartford Courant Co. v. Pellegrino*,  
380 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 2004) ..... 15

*Hicklin Eng’g, L.C. v. Bartell*,  
439 F.3d 346 (7th Cir. 2006)..... 14

*KFMB-TV Channel 8 v. Mun. Court*,  
221 Cal. App. 3d 1362 (Ct. App. 1990) ..... 29

*In re Knight Pub. Co.*,  
743 F.2d 231 (4th Cir. 1984)..... 19

*Level 3 Communs., LLC v. Limelight Networks, Inc.*,  
611 F. Supp. 2d 572 (E.D. Va. 2009) ..... 13

*Murphy v. Florida*,  
421 U.S. 794 (1975)..... 24

*In re N.Y. Times Co.*,  
828 F.2d 110 (2d Cir. 1987) ..... 10

*Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart*,  
427 U.S. 539 (1976)..... 18, 24

*Nixon v. Warner Communications*,  
435 U.S. 589 (1978)..... *passim*

*Press-Enterprise Co. v. Super. Ct.*,  
464 U.S. 501 (1984)..... 8, 9

*Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court*,  
478 U.S. 1 (1986)..... *passim*

*In re Providence Journal Co., Inc.*,  
293 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2002) ..... 10

*Rice v. Kempker*,  
374 F.3d 675 (8th Cir. 2004)..... 28

*Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia*,  
448 U.S. 555 (1980)..... *passim*

*Rushford v. New Yorker Magazine Inc.*,  
846 F.2d 249 (4th Cir. 1988)..... 10, 13

*In re Search Warrant for Secretarial Area Outside Office of  
Gunn*,  
855 F.2d 569 (8th Cir. 1988)..... 10

*Shelton v. Tucker*,  
364 U.S. 479 (1960)..... 20

*Sheppard v. Maxwell*,  
384 U.S. 333 (1966)..... 24

*United States v. Antar*,  
38 F.3d 1348 (3d Cir. 1994) ..... 13, 14, 20

*United States v. Appelbaum*,  
707 F.3d 283 (4th Cir. 2013)..... 13

*United States v. DeJournett*,  
817 F.3d 479 (6th Cir. 2016)..... 10

*United States v. Edwards*,  
672 F.2d 1289 (7th Cir. 1982)..... 17

*United States v. Edwards*,  
785 F.2d 1293 (5th Cir. 1986)..... 28

*United States v. Edwards*,  
823 F.2d 111 (5th Cir. 1987)..... 13

*United States v. Hastings*,  
695 F.2d 1278 (11th Cir. 1983)..... 27

*United States v. Kerley*,  
753 F.2d 617 (7th Cir. 1985)..... 28

*United States v. Martin*,  
746 F.2d 964 (3d Cir. 1984) ..... 17

*United States v. Mitchell*,  
551 F.2d 1252 (D.C. Cir. 1976), *rev'd on other grounds sub  
nom. Nixon v. Warner Commc'ns, Inc.*, 435 U.S. 589  
(1978)..... 17

*United States v. Moussaoui*,  
205 F.R.D. 183 (E.D. Va. 2002) ..... 28

*United States v. Ochoa-Vasquez*,  
428 F.3d 1015 (11th Cir. 2005)..... 10

*United States v. Peters*,  
754 F.2d 753 (7th Cir. 1985)..... 11

*United States v. Smith*,  
123 F.3d 140 (3d Cir. 1997) ..... 10

*United States v. Valenti*,  
987 F.2d 708 (11th Cir. 1993)..... 13

*Va. Dep't of State Police v. Washington Post*,  
386 F.3d 567 (4th Cir. 2004)..... 20

*In re Washington Post Co.*,  
807 F.2d 383 (4th Cir. 1986)..... *passim*

*Washington Post v. Robinson*,  
935 F.2d 282 (D.C. Cir. 1991) ..... 10

*Westmoreland v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.*,  
752 F.2d 16 (2d Cir. 1984) ..... 28

**Statutes**

1981 Md. Laws ch. 748..... 26, 27  
 2001 Md. Laws ch. 10..... 26  
 Md. Code, Crim. Proc. § 1-201..... *passim*  
 Presidential Recordings Act, 44 U.S.C § 2201 *et seq.*..... 6

**Rules**

Fed. R. Crim. P. 53 ..... 3, 27  
 Md. Rule 16-109 ..... 25  
 Md. Rule 16-502 ..... 11  
 Md. Rule 16-504(h), (i) ..... 4, 12  
 Rules Order of Nov. 10, 1980, 7 Md. Reg. 2252 (Nov. 28,  
1980)..... 25

**Constitutional Provisions**

U.S. Const. amend. I ..... *passim*  
 U.S. Const. amend. XIV ..... 23

**Other Authorities**

Christopher C. Spencer, *Public Right of Access to Criminal  
Trials: Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia*, 94 Harv.  
L. Rev. 149 (1980) ..... 8  
 CD Order Form, PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY CIR. CT.,  
<https://www.princegeorgescourts.org/DocumentCenter/View/74/CD-Transcript-Order-Form-PDF>..... 15

David C. Fuellhart, *Editorial*, WPOC/FM93 Nationwide Communications Inc. (Jan. 17, 1981) (on file with the Thurgood Marshall State Law Library) ..... 26

*Digital Recording*, BALTIMORE CITY CIR. CT., <http://www.baltimorecitycourt.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/Audio-Request-Form.pdf> ..... 15

Letter from Stephen H. Sachs, Attorney General, Maryland, to Harry Hughes, Governor, Maryland (May 14, 1981) (on file with the Thurgood Marshall State Law Library) ..... 26

*Public*, New Oxford American Dictionary, Oxford University Press, 3 ed. (2010) ..... 16

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Public Awareness Committee of the Maryland Judicial Conference, *Report on the Proposed Modification of the Maryland Canons of Judicial Ethics To Permit Extended Media Coverage of Court Proceedings* (1980) ..... 25

*Transcripts and Recordings*, DISTRICT CT. MD., <https://www.courts.state.md.us/district/selfhelp/transcript/srecordings> ..... 12

## **INTEREST OF AMICUS**

The Floyd Abrams Institute for Freedom of Expression at Yale Law School promotes freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and access to government information as critical safeguards of our democratic system. Its interest in this case is to preserve and protect the First Amendment right of access to judicial proceedings and records. This access both ensures the proper functioning of the judicial system through public accountability, and upholds civic values by promoting understanding and trust in the judiciary. The legitimacy and transparency of judicial proceedings is of paramount importance to the press, whose institutional role is to serve as a watchdog and check on government.

## **SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT**

I. Section 1-201 of Maryland's Criminal Procedure Code states that individuals may not "record or broadcast" criminal proceedings in that State. Maryland applies this law to prohibit the use in podcasts, documentaries and other educational materials of audio transcripts of judicial proceedings that are routinely made by Maryland trial courts, maintained in public court files, and expressly made available to the public by court rules. The district court erred as a matter of law in

failing to determine whether this permanent prohibition against public dissemination of the audio transcripts violates the First Amendment right of access that attaches to certain judicial records. The court misread *Nixon v. Warner Communications*, 435 U.S. 589 (1978), as rejecting any constitutional right of access to court records, and upheld the Maryland prohibition as a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction on the use of the audio tapes. The holding in *Warner Communications* is not so broad as the district court concluded, and subsequent controlling precedent of both the Supreme Court and this Court make clear that the audio transcripts of criminal proceedings at issue are judicial records subject to the public's First Amendment right of access. This constitutional access right includes the right to inspect, copy and disseminate the judicial records to which it attaches, and Section 1-201 substantially abridges this right.

II. Because the public has a First Amendment right of access to the audio transcripts, Section 1-201's limitation of that right must survive scrutiny under the strict standards that govern the constitutional access right. Among other things, these standards require that a restriction of the First Amendment right is only proper to

prevent a demonstrated threat to a compelling governmental interest and must be no broader than necessary to protect that interest. Section 1-201 fails to satisfy these standards.

Section 1-201 was enacted to bar cameras from the courtroom and prohibit electronic media coverage of ongoing proceedings. The district court observed that similar restrictions exist in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 53 and cited cases upholding the constitutionality of that rule. But in each instance cited, the Rule 53 restrictions were upheld in the context of an *ongoing* proceeding. While there can be a compelling interest in preventing electronic coverage where necessary to protect the integrity of the proceedings and a defendant's fair trial rights, these interests are not advanced by Section 1-201's blanket prohibition on the public dissemination of any electronic recordings of any completed proceeding. At a minimum, the First Amendment requires a case-by-case assessment before Maryland can properly prevent the dissemination of an audio transcript of a past criminal proceeding, as *Globe Newspaper Co. v. Super. Ct.*, 457 U.S. 596 (1982), instructs.

## ARGUMENT

### **I MARYLAND’S RECORDINGS OF PUBLIC JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS ARE JUDICIAL RECORDS SUBJECT TO THE PUBLIC’S FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT OF ACCESS**

Section 1-201 of Maryland’s Criminal Procedure Code (“Section 1-201”) provides that “a person may not record or broadcast any criminal matter, including a trial, hearing, motion, or argument, that is held in trial court or before a grand jury.” Md. Code, Crim. Proc. § 1-201.

Maryland courts construe this law to prohibit not only electronic media coverage of ongoing court proceedings, but also to bar public dissemination of any previously made recording of past court proceedings—including recordings that are routinely made by Maryland’s trial courts, maintained in public court files, and expressly made available to the public by court rules. *See* Md. Rule 16-504(h), (i).

Appellants correctly object that this broad application of Section 1-201 to prohibit the use of audio files from past court proceedings in podcasts, documentaries, and other educational productions constitutes an impermissible restriction on their right to publish true newsworthy information. But the affront to the First Amendment is compounded here because Maryland is not prohibiting the publication of just any true newsworthy information. Maryland is prohibiting the

dissemination of judicial records that are themselves subject to an affirmative right of public access—a qualified First Amendment right to inspect, copy, and disseminate Maryland’s audio recordings.

The district court mistakenly concluded that Maryland need not demonstrate a governmental interest of the highest order to justify its rule barring the press and public from disseminating the court-made audio recordings. It found *Warner Communications* to “foreclose[]” the existence of a First Amendment right to access, copy, and disseminate the audio recordings, and thus failed to consider the strict standards governing the imposition of any limitation on the First Amendment access right. Appellants’ Joint Appendix (JA) 84. *Warner Communications*, however, contains no such broad rejection of the First Amendment interests at stake in this case. The district court failed to perceive the limited continuing vitality of that holding, and failed to apply the heightened scrutiny required to restrict access to judicial records subject to the First Amendment access right.

**A. *Warner Communications* Does Not Foreclose A  
First Amendment Right of Access to the Recordings**

The district court misperceived the limited holding of *Warner Communications*. Decided in 1978, the case rejected a petition to copy

and sell audio recordings made in the Oval Office by President Richard Nixon that were subsequently used in the criminal prosecution of some of his associates. The Court focused on the long-recognized “common-law right of access to judicial records,” and concluded that Congress abrogated that right with respect to the specific records at issue when it passed the Presidential Recordings Act shortly after President Nixon resigned from office. 435 U.S. at 603-08. The Court declined in *Warner Communications* to address the constitutionality of any restrictions on access imposed under that Act, holding only that the Presidential Recordings Act displaced any common law claim of right to copy and sell the recordings used in court. *Id.* at 607.

The Court then turned briefly to the separate question of whether the petitioner had a constitutional right to copy and sell the court records. As the Court saw it,

[T]he issue presented in this case is not whether the press must be permitted access to public information to which the public generally is guaranteed access, but whether these copies of the White House tapes—to which the public has never had physical access—must be made available for copying.

*Id.* at 609. It then held that the First Amendment conferred no access rights on the press “greater than those of any other member of the

public,” and that the Sixth Amendment’s public trial right similarly conferred no “special benefit on the press.” *Id.* at 609-10.

The significance of the First Amendment discussion in *Warner Communications* was substantially limited just two years later. In *Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia*, 448 U.S. 555 (1980), the Court squarely held for the first time that the First Amendment’s express protections of free speech, freedom of the press, and the right to petition the government carry with them an implied right of *public* access to certain government proceedings and records.

As it had in *Warner Communications*, the Court said that “media representatives enjoy the same right of access as the public,” but held for the first time that the First Amendment affirmatively conveys a right of access in some situations. *Id.* at 573. The specific issue presented was the right to attend a criminal trial, which the Court found protected by the First Amendment because “without the freedom to attend such trials, which people have exercised for centuries, important aspects of freedom of speech and ‘of the press could be eviscerated.’” *Id.* at 580 (quoting *Branzburg v. Hayes*, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972)).

The recognition of a First Amendment access right was hailed at the time as a “watershed” event, *id.* at 582 (Stevens, J., concurring), that affirmed the structural role the First Amendment plays in our democracy. *See, e.g.*, Christopher C. Spencer, *Public Right of Access to Criminal Trials: Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia*, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 149 (1980). In three subsequent cases, taken and decided in short order following *Richmond Newspapers*, the Supreme Court developed an analysis for identifying when the First Amendment access right exists. *See Globe Newspaper*, 457 U.S. at 606-07; *Press-Enterprise Co. v. Super. Ct.*, 464 U.S. 501, 505-11 (1984) (*Press-Enterprise I*); *Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court*, 478 U.S. 1, 8-10 (1986) (*Press-Enterprise II*).

These seminal decisions define the scope of the constitutional access right in two ways. First, they articulate a test to identify the existence of the access right based on “experience and logic,” considering whether a type of proceeding has traditionally been open to the public and whether public access contributes to the proper functioning of the governmental process at issue. *See Press-Enterprise II*, 478 U.S. at 9; *Press-Enterprise I*, 464 U.S. at 505; *Globe Newspaper*,

457 U.S. at 605; *Richmond Newspapers*, 448 U.S. at 582-84 (Stevens, J., concurring); see also *El Vocero de Puerto Rico v. Puerto Rico*, 508 U.S. 147, 149-50 (1993). Second, two of these decisions hold that the First Amendment access right applies to the transcripts of proceedings that are themselves subject to the constitutional access right, without separately considering the “experience and logic” of access to the transcripts. In *Press-Enterprise I*, the Court found a constitutional violation in the sealing of the transcript of closed jury selection proceedings without the factual findings required to overcome the First Amendment access right. 464 U.S. at 513. In *Press-Enterprise II*, the Court held that the trial court violated the First Amendment access right by refusing to unseal the transcript of a closed hearing. 478 U.S. at 13-14.

Since these decisions defined the constitutional access right, this Court has also held that the right extends to certain judicial records as well as judicial proceedings. The same year *Press Enterprise II* was handed down, this Court held that “the First Amendment right of access *applies to documents* filed in connection with plea hearings and sentencing hearings in criminal cases, as well as to the hearings

themselves.” *In re Washington Post Co.*, 807 F.2d 383, 390 (4th Cir. 1986). Over the subsequent decades, this Court repeatedly reaffirmed the holding that judicial records are subject to a constitutional right of public access. *See, e.g., Doe v. Public Citizen*, 749 F.3d 246, 267 (4th Cir. 2014) (First Amendment access rights extend to judicial opinions); *Fisher v. King*, 232 F.3d 391, 396 (4th Cir. 2000) (First Amendment access rights apply to “documents submitted in [criminal] trials”); *In re Charlotte Observer*, 882 F.2d 850, 852 (4th Cir. 1989) (First Amendment access rights apply to closure and sealing orders); *Rushford v. New Yorker Magazine Inc.*, 846 F.2d 249, 253 (4th Cir. 1988) (First Amendment access rights apply to documents submitted in connection with summary judgment motions). Since *Richmond Newspapers*, other circuits have also uniformly held that the First Amendment right of access does indeed apply to a variety of judicial records.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> *See, e.g., United States v. DeJournett*, 817 F.3d 479, 484-85 (6th Cir. 2016) (plea agreements); *United States v. Ochoa-Vasquez*, 428 F.3d 1015, 1030 (11th Cir. 2005) (plea colloquies, sentencing memoranda, and downward-departure motions); *In re Providence Journal Co., Inc.*, 293 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2002) (constitutional right generally applies to documents submitted in the prosecution and defense of criminal proceedings); *United States v. Smith*, 123 F.3d 140, 146 (3d Cir. 1997) (records of a criminal proceeding); *Washington Post v. Robinson*, 935 F.2d 282, 287-88 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (plea agreement); *In re Search*

These holdings all recognize the existence of a constitutional right of public access that *Warner Communications* did not contemplate and did not squarely address. The district court plainly erred in reading that case as eliminating any need for it to consider whether Maryland's restrictions on the dissemination of audio transcripts of court proceedings can be squared with the public's right of access to judicial records under the First Amendment.

**B. Maryland's Audio Recordings Are Judicial Records Subject to the First Amendment Public Access Right**

Once the insignificance of *Warner Communications* to this case is recognized, the existence of a First Amendment right of access to Maryland's audio recordings cannot seriously be questioned. Almost all proceedings held in open court before a trial judge in Maryland are electronically recorded. *See* Md. Rule 16-502 (in district courts, which oversee lower-level civil and criminal proceedings, "all trials, hearings,

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*Warrant for Secretarial Area Outside Office of Gunn*, 855 F.2d 569, 573 (8th Cir. 1988) (documents filed in support of search warrant applications); *In re N.Y. Times Co.*, 828 F.2d 110, 114 (2d Cir. 1987) (suppression motion papers); *United States v. Peters*, 754 F.2d 753, 763 (7th Cir. 1985) (trial exhibits); *CBS, Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Ct.*, 765 F.2d 823, 825 (9th Cir. 1985) (documents filed in pretrial proceedings and post-trial sentencing records).

testimony, and other proceedings before a judge in a courtroom shall be recorded verbatim in their entirety”); 16-503 (same in circuit courts). These recordings are created and maintained by the Maryland courts, and court officials are required to “make a copy” of any audio recording “available to any person upon written request.” Md. Rule 16-504(h) (“Right to Obtain Copy of Audio Recording”).

In the district courts, these audio recordings are the *only* verbatim record of what transpired in a proceeding that is available to a non-party. An individual may obtain a written transcript “*only* when the person making the request has appealed a District Court judgment in a civil case where the amount of the claim is more than \$5,000,” but “[a]nyone may request a copy of an audio recording of a case, regardless of whether the individual making the request was a party in that case.”<sup>2</sup>

Maryland does not consider these audio recordings “official” transcripts for certain purposes, but the recordings nonetheless constitute judicial records subject to the First Amendment access right. While this Court has “never explicitly defined ‘judicial records,’ it is

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<sup>2</sup> *Transcripts and Recordings*, DISTRICT CT. MD., <https://www.courts.state.md.us/district/selfhelp/transcriptsrecordings> (emphasis in original).

commonsensical that judicially authored or created documents are judicial records.” *United States v. Appelbaum*, 707 F.3d 283, 290 (4th Cir. 2013). And this Court repeatedly has recognized that records actually used during or reflecting the results of judicial proceedings qualify as judicial records because the right of access to such documents is “a necessary corollary of the capacity to attend the relevant proceedings.” *Doe v. Public Citizen*, 749 F.3d at 267 (right applies to judicial opinions); *see also In re Associated Press*, 172 F. App’x 1, 3 (4th Cir. 2006) (right applies to records filed in connection with criminal proceedings); *Rushford*, 846 F.2d at 253 (right applies to documents filed in connection with summary judgment motion); *In re Washington Post Co.*, 807 F.2d at 390 (right applies to documents filed in connection with plea and sentencing hearings).

This Court and others courts of appeal have repeatedly held that the First Amendment right of access extends specifically to transcripts of public judicial proceedings. *See Fisher*, 232 F.3d at 397; *United States v. Antar*, 38 F.3d 1348, 1360 (3d Cir. 1994); *U.S. v. Valenti*, 987 F.2d 708, 714 (11th Cir. 1993); *United States v. Edwards*, 823 F.2d 111, 113 (5th Cir. 1987); *see also Level 3 Communs., LLC v. Limelight*

*Networks, Inc.*, 611 F. Supp. 2d 572, 573 (E.D. Va. 2009). As one court put it, “[i]t would be an odd result indeed were we to declare that our courtrooms must be open, but that transcripts of the proceedings occurring there may be closed, for what exists of the right of access if it extends only to those who can squeeze through the door?” *Antar*, 38 F.3d at 1360.

The constitutional right of access to verbatim records of what transpires in court is important because it “facilitates the openness of the proceeding itself by assuring the broadest dissemination.” *Id.* “Publicity of such records, of course, is necessary in the long run so that the public can judge the product of the courts in a given case.” *Columbus-America Discovery Group v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co.*, 203 F.3d 291, 303 (4th Cir. 2000). Public access to transcripts of proceedings also protects the legitimacy of the legal system, because “[a]ny step that withdraws an element of the judicial process from public view makes the ensuing decision look more like a fiat and requires rigorous justification.” *Doe v. Public Citizen*, 749 F.3d at 266 (quoting *Hicklin Eng’g, L.C. v. Bartell*, 439 F.3d 346, 348 (7th Cir. 2006)).

The audio recordings of criminal proceedings routinely made by Maryland courts, preserved by the court clerk and made available to the public like any other record on the docket, are judicial records subject to this First Amendment access right. Indeed, the audio transcripts made by the Maryland courts are often the only record available to a non-party that discloses exactly what occurred in a district court proceeding. *See* pp. 11-12, *supra*. Even when a written transcript is available, it is significantly less expensive to obtain a copy of the court-made audio transcript, at around \$20 to \$40 for each ninety-minute CD compared to over \$1,000 for the typical written transcript of a full-day proceeding.<sup>3</sup>

Just as with a written transcript, access to these audio transcripts functions as a “a necessary corollary of the capacity to attend the relevant proceedings.” *Doe v. Public Citizen*, 749 F.3d at 267 (quoting *Hartford Courant Co. v. Pellegrino*, 380 F.3d 83, 93 (2d Cir. 2004)). The audio recordings are thus subject to the same First Amendment access rights as written transcripts.

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<sup>3</sup> *See CD Order Form*, PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY CIR. CT., <https://www.princegeorgescourts.org/DocumentCenter/View/74/CD-Transcript-Order-Form-PDF> (\$20 per CD); *Request for Copy of Digital Recording*, BALTIMORE CITY CIR. CT., <http://www.baltimorecitycourt.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/Audio-Request-Form.pdf> (\$40 per date).

**C. The First Amendment Access Right Includes the Right To Copy and Disseminate a Judicial Record**

When the First Amendment access right attaches to a court record it becomes a *public* record. This necessarily means it can be copied and disseminated publicly—attributes inherent in the very meaning of “public.” *See, e.g., Public*, Merriam-Webster Dictionary, <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/public> (defining “public” as “1. exposed to general view: open”); *Public*, New Oxford American Dictionary, Oxford University Press, 3 ed. (2010) (defining “public” to mean “open to or shared by all the people of an area or country”). Consistent with this meaning, the Supreme Court explained long ago that transcripts of public judicial proceedings can be published to the world at large, as a matter of right:

A trial is a public event. What transpires in the court room is public property. If a transcript of the court proceedings had been published, we suppose none would claim that the judge could punish the publisher for contempt.

*Craig v. Harney*, 331 U.S. 367, 374 (1947) (reversing order of contempt for publishing news reports about a trial that cast the judge in an unfavorable light).

While courts since *Richmond Newspapers* have had little need to address the rights to copy and disseminate that are inherent in the constitutional right of access to judicial records, even at common law judicial records can freely be copied and disseminated absent findings that a proper justification exists to limit the right. *See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell*, 551 F.2d 1252, 1260 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (tape recorded evidence subject to the public's common law right to inspect judicial records), *rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Nixon v. Warner Commc'ns, Inc.*, 435 U.S. 589 (1978). Thus, for example, both the Second and Third Circuits have held that the common law right of access to judicial records conveys a qualified right to copy and broadcast videotape evidence, without addressing the implications of the First Amendment right. *See United States v. Martin*, 746 F.2d 964, 973 (3d Cir. 1984); *Application of Nat'l Broad. Co., Inc.*, 635 F.2d 945, 950 (2d Cir. 1980). The common law, they recognized, itself requires a "strong presumption in favor of public inspection and copying" that allows the media also to

broadcast judicial records when they are in videotape format.

*Application of Nat'l Broad. Co., Inc.*, 635 F.2d at 952.<sup>4</sup>

In short, because Maryland's audio recordings are subject to the First Amendment right of public access, their public dissemination can only be properly limited when the standards governing the constitutional access right are satisfied.

## **II. MARYLAND'S BLANKET PROHIBITION AGAINST DISSEMINATION OF ITS AUDIO TRANSCRIPTS VIOLATES THE FIRST AMENDMENT ACCESS RIGHT**

As Appellants demonstrate, Section 1-201 cannot survive the strict scrutiny required whenever a state actor seeks to prevent the press from disseminating true newsworthy information. *See* Appellants' Br. at 41-43; *see e.g.*, *Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn*, 420 U.S. 469 (1975). Indeed, when Section 1-201 is applied to prevent the press from disseminating audio tapes lawfully in their possession, it constitutes a prior restraint in violation of their First Amendment rights. *See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart*, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976).

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<sup>4</sup> Some courts have concluded that the right to copy and disseminate judicial records is only a common law right, by misreading *Warner Communications* the same manner as the district court did here. *See, e.g.*, *Belo Broad. Corp.*, 654 F.2d at 427; *Beckham*, 789 F.2d at 408; *United States v. Edwards*, 672 F.2d 1289, 1292 (7th Cir. 1982).

Viewed through either lens, the law is patently unconstitutional. It also violates the public's First Amendment right of access to judicial records.

Strict constitutional standards must be satisfied before imposing any limitation on the public's First Amendment access right. Because the audio transcripts at issue are subject to that constitutional right, Maryland cannot simply decide that it will no longer make them available to the public. Nor can it prevent their public use and dissemination without a case-by-case showing of a substantial probability of harm to a compelling governmental interest.

**A. The First Amendment Access Right Can Only Properly Be Limited Based On a Case-by-Case Determination That The Constitutional Standards Have Been Satisfied**

The Supreme Court has made clear that the First Amendment access right, while not absolute, can be limited only where there exists a substantial probability that public access will harm an overriding governmental interest and no alternative to closure will protect against that harm. *See, e.g., Press Enterprise II*, 478 U.S. at 13-14; *Press Enterprise I*, 464 U.S. at 10. To satisfy this constitutional standard, this Court requires three steps to be taken before any limitation of the access right can be upheld:

First, the public must be given notice of any request to limit the access right and afforded a reasonable opportunity to voice objections. *In re Washington Post Co.*, 807 F.2d at 390; *see also Ashcraft v. Conoco, Inc.*, 218 F.3d 282, 288 (4th Cir. 2000); *In re Knight Pub. Co.*, 743 F.2d 231, 234 (4th Cir. 1984).

Second, “less drastic alternatives” to a denial of the access right must be considered in every case. *Doe v. Public Citizen*, 749 F.3d at 272; *Baltimore Sun Co. v. Goetz*, 886 F.2d 60, 66 (4th Cir. 1989); *In re Knight Pub. Co.*, 743 F.2d at 234; *see also Press-Enterprise II*, 478 U.S. at 13-14 (faulting the California Supreme Court for failing to consider “alternatives short of complete closure”).

Third, any limitation of the access right must be based on factual findings sufficient to justify the limitation and that explain why less drastic alternatives would not work. *In re Washington Post Co.*, 807 F.2d at 392; *see also Richmond Newspapers*, 448 U.S. at 580-81 (closure unconstitutional where there were no findings to support closure and no inquiry into alternative solutions).

The factual findings required to justify a limitation of the constitutional access right must demonstrate a *substantial probability* that openness will cause harm to a *compelling* governmental interest. *In re Washington Post Co.*, 807 F.2d at 392-93; *see also, e.g., Richmond Newspapers*, 448 U.S. at 581; *Press-Enterprise II*, 478 U.S. at 13-14; *Antar*, 38 F.3d at 1359-60 (3d. Cir. 1994). They must also show that the access restriction is *narrowly tailored*—even “legitimate and substantial” governmental interests “cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties, when the end can be more narrowly achieved.” *Shelton v. Tucker*, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960). Any

access limitation must thus be no broader than necessary to protect the threatened interest. *See, e.g., Globe Newspaper*, 457 U.S. at 606-07; *Press-Enterprise II*, 478 U.S. at 13-14; *Va. Dep't of State Police v. Washington Post*, 386 F.3d 567, 575 (4th Cir. 2004); *Goetz*, 886 F.2d at 60; *In re Washington Post Co.*, 807 F.2d at 390.

This governing standard must be met before the public's right to access, copy and disseminate the audio recordings of Maryland trials can be limited. As applied to Section 1-201, these standards plainly are not met:

- Section 1-201 affords no notice and no opportunity to be heard before banning the broadcasting of any specific audio recording, even of a matter completed long ago.
- No less-restrictive alternative to a flat prohibition on any dissemination of any part of the recording of a judicial proceeding is considered.
- As applied to all audio recordings Section 1-201 does not materially protect any compelling interest—Maryland defends the rule as protecting “fair criminal trials,” *see* Defendants’ Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss at 14, but makes no showing of how this interest is threatened by a broadcast of a completed proceeding.

Section 1-201 fundamentally violates the First Amendment right of access because it applies on a blanket basis to *all* recordings of any proceedings—a fact that, alone, renders it unconstitutional. In *Globe*

*Newspaper*, the Supreme Court struck down a Massachusetts law that similarly restricted access rights on a blanket basis, requiring a courtroom to be closed any time a minor victim of a sex crime was called to testify. *See* 457 U.S. at 602. The Court acknowledged that the State's interest in "safeguarding the physical and psychological well-being of a minor" was "a compelling one," but found mandatory closure insufficiently protective of the constitutional access right. *Id.* at 607.

The *Globe Newspaper* Court identified a number of factors that might be relevant to the decision to limit access to a sex victim's testimony, such as the "victim's age, psychological maturity and understanding, the nature of the crime, the desires of the victim, and the interests of parents and relatives." *Id.* at 608. Given the range of factors to be assessed and the competing interests served by the access right, the Court held that a limitation of the access right must generally be imposed on a "case-by-case basis" to ensure that the constitutional access right is abridged only where actually "necessary to protect the State's interest." *Id.* at 609; *see also Press Enterprise II*, 478 U.S. at 9-10 (First Amendment access right can only be limited based on the

particularized facts of an individual case); *In re Washington Post Co.*, 807 F.2d at 392.

Section 1-201 violates the First Amendment access right for much the same reasons as the Massachusetts law in *Globe Newspaper*—it may be intended to protect compelling interests that are often present, but Maryland is protecting those interests in an overbroad, constitutionally impermissible manner.

**B. No Justification Exists for Applying Section 1-201 To Bar Dissemination of All Audio Recordings**

Section 1-201 was enacted for a specific and limited purpose: to bar press cameras from the courtroom and prohibit electronic media coverage of ongoing proceedings. As the district court recognized, the law emerged amid concerns that “[t]here would be a real threat to the integrity of the trial process if the television industry and trial judges were allowed to become partners in the staging of criminal proceedings.” JA 78 (quoting *Estes v. State of Tex.*, 381 U.S. 532, 573 (1965) (Warren, C.J., concurring)).

In *Estes*, the Supreme Court overturned a prominent financier’s swindling conviction on the grounds that the dramatic and intrusive televising of his trial violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process

rights. *Estes*, 381 U.S. at 535. The Court’s plurality opinion emphasized the “untoward situation” of a pretrial hearing “televised live and repeated on tape in the same evening, reaching approximately 100,000 viewers,” a courtroom that “was a mass of wires, television cameras, microphones, and photographers,” and a trial that “resulted in a public presentation of only the State’s side of the case.” *Id.* at 550-51; *see also Sheppard v. Maxwell*, 384 U.S. 333, 352-55 (1966) (discussing the deprivation of proper judicial decorum at issue in *Estes* caused by cameras in the courtroom); *Murphy v. Florida*, 421 U.S. 794, 798-99 (1975) (same); *Nebraska Press Ass’n*, 427 U.S. at 552 (noting that the due-process violation found in *Estes* was based in part on the volume of publicity during the trial).

In *Chandler v. Florida*, 449 U.S. 560, 562 (1981), the Court revisited the *Estes* ruling in holding that states could permit camera coverage of trials under proper conditions. *Chandler* upheld an experimental program for televising trials in Florida and indirectly affirmed a 1978 resolution by the Conference of State Chief Justices that “allow[ed] the highest court of each state to promulgate standards

and guidelines regulating radio, television, and other photographic coverage of court proceedings.” *Id.* at 564.

It was in this context that the Maryland courts began considering whether to permit broadcast coverage of their proceedings. After collecting information about electronic coverage of trials in Florida and other states, the Public Awareness Committee of the Maryland Judicial Conference in April 1980 recommended that Maryland also begin experimenting with camera coverage of trial proceedings.<sup>5</sup> In November 1980, the Maryland Court of Appeals accepted that recommendation, and suspended the canons of judicial conduct and ethical rules that prohibited the use of cameras in the courtroom. *See* JA 43-46 (Rules Order (Md. Nov. 10, 1980)). At the same time, it launched an eighteen-month experiment permitting pooled microphone and camera coverage for certain court proceedings. JA 47-52 (Maryland Rule of Procedure 1209 (Michie 1977, 1983 supp.) (now Md. Rule 16-109)).

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<sup>5</sup> *See* Public Awareness Committee of the Maryland Judicial Conference, *Report on the Proposed Modification of the Maryland Canons of Judicial Ethics To Permit Extended Media Coverage of Court Proceedings*, at 1-2 (1980) (on file with the Thurgood Marshall State Law Library).

Pushback from the Maryland Legislature was swift and clear. Maryland lawmakers promptly passed what is now codified as Section 1-201 specifically to halt the courts' experiment with camera coverage of ongoing proceedings. *See* 1981 Md. Laws ch. 748, at 2782.<sup>6</sup> As the Maryland Attorney General explained to the Governor, the law was “intended to supersede Rule 1209” and was permissible because there was no constitutional right to electronically record or televise trials. Letter from Stephen H. Sachs, Attorney General, Maryland, to Harry Hughes, Governor, Maryland (May 14, 1981) (on file with the Thurgood Marshall State Law Library); *see also* David C. Fuellhart, *Editorial*, WPOC/FM93 Nationwide Communications Inc. (Jan. 17, 1981) (on file with the Thurgood Marshall State Law Library) (describing the legislation as an effort to “ban cameras and microphones from state courtrooms”).

It bears emphasis that the clear legislative purpose was to prevent media cameras in the courtroom and electronic media coverage of

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<sup>6</sup> As the enacted legislation explained, its purpose was “prohibiting the recording or broadcasting, by the use of certain equipment, of certain trial court proceedings . . . .” 1981 Md. Laws ch. 748, at 2782. In 2001, this statute was recodified, without substantive change, as Section 1-201. *See* 2001 Md. Laws ch. 10, at 85.

ongoing proceedings, not to prevent the recording of trials for other purposes. The statute itself affirmatively authorized the courts to make electronic recordings. *See* 1981 Md. Laws ch. 748, at 2783 (exempting from the prohibition “the use of electronic or photographic equipment approved by the court for the perpetuation of a court record”).

The district court recognized this focus of the drafters of Section 1-201. It identified the governmental interests the law sought to protect as “(1) ensuring fair trials for the accused; (2) preserving order and decorum in the courtroom; and (3) ‘an institutional interest in procedures designed to increase the accuracy of the essential truth-seeking function of the trial.’” JA 86 (quoting *United States v. Hastings*, 695 F.2d 1278, 1283 (11th Cir. 1983)). Each of these interests may be furthered by prohibiting cameras and electronic media coverage of an ongoing proceeding; none is advanced in any meaningful way by a rule barring the subsequent dissemination of audio recordings of completed proceedings.

The district court pointed to cases upholding Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 53 as support for the constitutionality of Section 1-201, because Rule 53 similarly prohibits photographic, radio, and

camera coverage of criminal proceedings. JA 60, 79. Tellingly, every decision upholding the constitutionality of Rule 53 cited by the district court involved an application to provide camera coverage of an *ongoing* proceeding. See *Conway v. United States*, 852 F.2d 187 (6th Cir. 1988) (per curiam); *United States v. Edwards*, 785 F.2d 1293 (5th Cir. 1986); *United States v. Kerley*, 753 F.2d 617 (7th Cir. 1985); *United States v. Hastings*, 695 F.2d 1278 (11th Cir. 1983); *United States v. Moussaoui*, 205 F.R.D. 183 (E.D. Va. 2002), see also *Rice v. Kempker*, 374 F.3d 675 (8th Cir. 2004) (constitutional challenge to Missouri Department of Corrections' prohibition on videotaping or recording executions referenced in district court opinion); *Westmoreland v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.*, 752 F.2d 16 (2d Cir. 1984) (court rule prohibited cable news network from recording and distributing live televised coverage of civil libel trial). None involved the application of the rule to prevent the use of recorded material from closed proceedings.

At least one state court has construed its rule regarding the broadcasting of court proceeding as addressing electronic media coverage of ongoing proceedings, but not authorizing restrictions on the

later use of previously recorded material. *See, e.g., KFMB-TV Channel 8 v. Mun. Court*, 221 Cal. App. 3d 1362, 1367-68 (Ct. App. 1990).

The district court was wrong to conclude that the interests Maryland says are protected by Section 1-201 justify its blanket limitation on the dissemination of audio recordings that are subject to the First Amendment access right. Just as in *Globe Newspaper*, a number of factors need to be assessed to conclude that the media's use of the electronic recording of a specific case would create a substantial probability of harm to a compelling interest. Maryland has not justified its blanket ban and Section 1-201, as it is being applied, violates the public's First Amendment right of access to judicial records.

### CONCLUSION

Beyond its failure to apply the well-established constitutional protection for the publication of true, newsworthy information, the district court's decision should be reversed because Section 1-201 violates the First Amendment right of access.

Dated: April 13, 2020

Respectfully submitted,

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<sup>7</sup> This brief was prepared largely by Yale Law School students Sasha Dudding, Julu Katticaran, and Zoe Rubin. The brief does not purport to express the school's institutional views, if any.

## CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

I hereby certify that this brief complies with the type-volume, typeface, and type-style requirements of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32(a). This brief contains 6,099 words, excluding the parts of the document exempted by Rule 32(f), and was prepared in fourteen-point Century Schoolbook font, a proportionally spaced typeface, using Microsoft Word.

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## CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on April 13, 2020, I caused the foregoing brief to be electronically filed with the Clerk of the Court for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit by using the appellate CM/ECF system. Participants in the case are registered CM/ECF users, and service will be accomplished by the appellate CM/ECF system.

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