DEFINING “SUBSTANTIAL BURDENS” ON RELIGION AND OTHER LIBERTIES

Sherif Girgis

Abstract. The Supreme Court seems poised to restore free exercise exemptions from neutral laws that burden religion. But pivotal Justices have asked how to narrow religious exemptions. This Article proposes answers with wide-ranging implications for the future—and limits—of free exercise, and for the doctrine on other liberties, from abortion to guns to speech.

To date, courts applying exemptions from “substantial burdens” on religion have tended to narrow protections to the detriment of religious minorities. But many fear that expanding exemptions would over-protect Christians in culture-war cases.

Striking a balance will require a sound definition of “substantial burdens.” But the current, strongly pro-religion Court won’t impose real limits unless it’s given a way to do so that avoids forcing judges to second-guess claimants’ beliefs about what’s important in religious matters. And here legal texts, history, and precedent don’t shed much light.

For answers, this Article looks to how our law handles the same issue for other liberties—when legal burdens on them trigger scrutiny. (It’s the first article to pursue this approach, which has support in case law on other liberties.) The Article offers, in the process, the most comprehensive theory to date of how other liberties guard against incidental burdens. Each liberty is shaped by what I call an “adequate alternatives” principle: A law that burdens the liberty will trigger heightened scrutiny if the law leaves no adequate alternative way to exercise that liberty. And an alternative is adequate if it lets someone realize the interests served by that liberty to the same degree, and at no greater cost. This principle can guide doctrine on those liberties in new circumstances and inform debates about which liberties to constitutionalize in the first place.

And applying the principle to define “substantial burdens” on religious liberty would resolve many issues that have vexed courts. The resulting test would urge deference to believers on religious questions but not on what “substantial” means, thus limiting this liberty. Yet the test would expand protection for religious minorities harmed by existing doctrines biased toward mainstream religions. And it would offer cogent answers to a range of cases discussed here, involving inmates, street preachers, and protesters; government contractors raising conscience claims, churches challenging zoning laws, and tribes challenging public works projects.


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INTRODUCTION

Does the Free Exercise Clause entitle people to exemptions from general laws that happen to burden their religion? For decades, the Supreme Court said yes. 1 Then in Employment Division v. Smith (1990), 2 it said no. Now, in Fulton v. City of Philadelphia (2021), 3 five Justices have signaled a willingness to reverse Smith and say yes again. 4 That would restore heightened scrutiny of—and exemptions from—neutral laws that incidentally burden religion. But two pivotal Justices in Fulton said that if and when the Court reverses Smith, it will face several questions about what to replace Smith with. This Article proposes answers, with wide-ranging implications for the future—and limits—of free exercise rights. Its framework also provides a method for developing doctrines on other liberties, from abortion to guns to speech—and for telling which liberties a system ought to constitutionalize at all.

Under the pre-Smith regime, which exists now in more limited contexts under some federal and state statutes, courts would ask if a law had “substantially burdened” a person’s religious exercise. If so, courts would apply heightened scrutiny, granting her an exemption from the law unless doing so would have harmed a compelling interest. 5 But how to test for substantial burdens? That is, when should heightened scrutiny kick in? 6

This Article develops answers based on how our law handles the same issue as it arises for other constitutional liberties—when legal burdens on them are serious enough to trigger heightened scrutiny. 7 Courts have developed large bodies of case law on that question. And in answering this issue for one liberty, courts have often drawn on the doctrines defining the trigger for heightened scrutiny under other liberties. 8 Some Justices have hinted that borrowing from other liberties might be the best way to limit religious liberty, too (and one circuit has already gestured vaguely in this direction). 9 This method promises to provide a practical way for courts to

4 See id. at 1882 (Barrett, J., concurring, joined by Kavanaugh, J.) (finding “textual and structural arguments against Smith more compelling”); id. at 1883 (Alito, J., joined by Thomas and Gorsuch, J.J.) (calling for Smith to be overruled).
5 Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406, 407.
6 See infra Section II.A.
7 Ibid.
8 See infra notes 229–232.
9 Ibid.
limit religious liberty. But this Article is the first to pursue this approach—offering, in the process, the most comprehensive theory to date of how constitutional liberties in general guard against incidental burdens.

As shown below, courts have relied on what I call an adequate alternatives principle. This principle triggers heightened scrutiny of a law that burdens a civil liberty if the law leaves no adequate alternative means of exercising the liberty at issue. And an alternative is adequate if it allows people to pursue the interests served by that liberty to the same degree and at no greater cost.

This Article shows that applying that principle to religion offers easy-to-implement answers to several questions about the scope of religious liberty. The answers are especially timely as critics fear that if and when this particular Court reinstates free exercise exemptions, it will fail to impose sensible limits on exemptions. The concern not to over-protect has arisen especially in politically charged cases raising Christian claims in the “conscience wars.” These include *Fulton* itself, which involved a Catholic agency declining to work with same-sex couples as foster parents.

There and elsewhere, if courts found a “substantial burden” anytime someone claimed one, however trivial the burden in fact was, courts would be doing what skeptics of exemptions—and several Justices in *Fulton*—oppose: replacing *Smith*’s categorical denial of exemptions with “an equally categorical strict scrutiny regime,” as Justice Barrett put it. This would give religious claimants carte blanche. To avoid doing so, courts must insist, as Justice Sotomayor once wrote of a statutory religious exemptions regime, that merely “thinking one’s religious beliefs are substantially burdened” does not “make it so.”

But as Part I shows, a single fear has stopped the Court from setting real limits on “substantial burdens,” including in culture-war-related cases like *Burwell v. Hobby Lobby*. The Court has worried that any attempt to limit...

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10 See infra Part II.


12 Justice Barrett wrote an opinion, joined in full by Justice Kavanaugh, that indicated a willingness to revisit *Smith*. (Both Justices may be needed for a majority to reverse *Smith* since only three Justices called for reversal outright. See *Fulton*, 141 S. Ct. at 1883 (Alito, J., joined by Thomas and Gorsuch, JJ.)). Justice Breyer joined the portion of Justice Barrett’s opinion raising questions about what would replace *Smith*. Justice Breyer himself had previously joined an opinion arguing that *Smith* was wrongly decided. See *City of Boerne v. Flores*, 521 U.S. 507, 544, 545 (1997) (O’Connor, J., dissenting, joined by Breyer, J.).

13 *Fulton*, 141 S. Ct. at 1883.


successful claims would require judges to play theologians, deciding for themselves what is true or important in religious matters.\textsuperscript{16} (The risk of forcing judges into this role also concerned the Justices in \textit{Fulton} who held off on reversing \textit{Smith} pending more clarity on how to limit exemptions.\textsuperscript{17})

So for any “substantial burdens” test to have a \textit{shot} at appealing to this strongly pro-religion Court, it will have to avoid forcing judges to do theology. This Article offers a practical test that does so while still imposing real limits on religious claims in culture-war cases. But as seen in many other applications below, this test is also well-suited “the vast majority of claims brought under” religious liberty statutes, which “have nothing to do with topics like contraception, gay rights, or abortion.”\textsuperscript{18}

The substantial burden test proposed here also aims to avoid a \textit{second} problem, which has plagued lower courts’ substantial burden doctrines: By relying on concepts drawn from mainstream religions, courts have harmed religious minorities.\textsuperscript{19} So for minorities and also (as seen below) inmates, the substantial burden test has been “the most difficult doctrinal hurdle” to clear.\textsuperscript{20} (One study found that courts hearing “Muslim prisoner claims” often second-guessed the prisoners’ religious views and “summarily d[e]n[ied]” their claims.\textsuperscript{21}) Because minorities bring the majority of claims (under existing statutes),\textsuperscript{22} refining the “substantial burden” test would meet a pressing need whether or not \textit{Smith} is reversed. That need arises in cases involving Apache Indians wearing headdresses with eagle feathers, Sikhs carrying kirpans to work, Santería priests performing sacrifices, black churches using inner-city spaces, Muslim prisoners growing beards, and

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\textsuperscript{16} \textit{Burwell}, 573 U.S. at 725. The risk of forcing judges into this role also concerned the \textit{Smith} Court, see 494 U.S. at 888–89,
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\textsuperscript{17} \textit{Fulton}, 141 S. Ct. at 1883 (Barrett, J., concurring, joined by Breyer and Kavanaugh, JJ.) (citation omitted).
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\textsuperscript{19} See infra Section III.D.1.
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\textsuperscript{22} Over five years in the Tenth Circuit, “half of all decisions involve[d]” prisoners or asylum seekers, “over half of whom were non-Christians. Luke W. Goodrich & Rachel N. Búsick, \textit{Sex, Drugs, and Eagle Feathers: An Empirical Study of Federal Religious Freedom Cases}, 48 SETON HALL L. REV. 353, 356 (2018). Among non-prisoner and non-asylum cases, Muslims were overrepresented by a ratio of 11.86:1, Native Americans 6.78:1, Fundamentalist Mormons 5.08:1, and Hindus 3.39:1. Id. at 374.
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Jewish inmates keeping kosher.\textsuperscript{23} This Article’s substantial burden test aims to offer protection in such cases, without over-protecting in others.

But as Part II reveals, this basic problem—developing a balanced but limited trigger for exemptions from incidental burdens—isn’t unique to religious liberty. Courts face the same challenge in implementing other constitutional liberties. For example, this exact issue arose regarding abortion in \textit{Planned Parenthood v. Casey}.\textsuperscript{24} In fact, it’s an underappreciated fact that the changes \textit{Casey} made to \textit{Roe v. Wade} were \textit{entirely} about limiting which incidental burdens on pre-viability abortion would require a compelling justification and which would not.\textsuperscript{25} And \textit{Casey}'s express reason for introducing this distinction into abortion law was to bring abortion in line with all other constitutional liberties, under which “not every law which makes [the liberty] more difficult to exercise is, \textit{ipso facto}, an infringement of that right.”\textsuperscript{26} Specifically, \textit{Casey} held, only laws imposing an “undue burden” on abortion should require a compelling justification. And while this test was criticized as novel, its substance resembled doctrines playing the same narrowing role for other liberties. Bringing out the resemblance here will show how to extend those other liberties’ doctrines to new circumstances—and how to fashion a well-supported “substantial burden” test for religion, in the absence of textual or historical guidance for doing so.

To that end, Part II draws a principle from the law of speech, abortion, and other liberties. These liberties not only forbid state action that targets protected conduct. They also guard against incidental burdens from neutral laws—but only some. Which? The law’s answer is given by what I call an \textit{adequate alternatives} principle. This principle triggers heightened scrutiny of a law burdening a civil liberty \textit{if the law leaves us no adequate alternative means of exercising the liberty}. But courts have said little on what makes an alternative “adequate.” To derive an answer, Part II extrapolates from case law and rights theory. Ultimately, the adequate alternatives principle


\textsuperscript{25} It is sometimes supposed that \textit{Casey} did away with \textit{Roe}'s heightened scrutiny—\textit{Roe}'s demand for a compelling justification for abortion laws—altogether. See, \textit{e.g.}, Mark D. Rosen, Christopher W. Schmidt, \textit{Why Broccoli? Limiting Principles and Popular Constitutionalism in the Health Care Case}, 61 UCLA L. REV. 66, 95 (2013) (\textit{Casey} “rejected \textit{Roe v. Wade}'s test of strict scrutiny, adopting in its place the new and unique undue burden standard”). But in fact \textit{Casey} did not “disturb” but rather “reaffirm” what it called \textit{Roe}'s “essential holding” on when the state interest in fetal life was and wasn’t constitutionally sufficient to support laws preventing abortion—and thus also reaffirmed, implicitly, \textit{Roe}'s demand that such laws serve a compelling interest. 505 U.S. at 879.

\textsuperscript{26} \textit{Id.} at 874 (plurality opinion).
ensures that laws curbing some liberty will leave people other ways to pursue the interests served by that liberty to the same degree, at no greater cost. This account can be used to clarify the scope of any number of liberties.

Finally, Part III applies the account to limit findings of “substantial burdens” on religion.\textsuperscript{27} It offers a unified resolution of dozens of cases and several unsettled questions. The cases addressed involve prisoners and death row inmates; street preachers and protesters; government contractors raising conscience claims, churches challenging zoning laws, and tribes challenging public works projects. And the legal questions addressed include several other puzzles raised by Justices in \textit{Fulton}—about what questions judges should ask in assessing “substantiality,” whether to subject all “garden-variety laws”\textsuperscript{28} to review, whether to treat “indirect and direct burdens on”\textsuperscript{29} religion differently, what forms of religious exercise to count in the first place, when to defer to claimants’ beliefs about a burden’s significance and when not to. The test will ensure that heightened scrutiny applies only when the religious claimant really is worse off than others subject to the same law, allaying concerns about over-protecting religion. But the test will also avoid the constitutional landmines of having judges do theology or giving short shrift to less familiar, minority religious claims.

\section{I. The Challenge}

Both pre-\textit{Smith} free exercise protections against incidental burdens on religion, and some current statutory protections, limit relief to cases involving a substantial burden on religion. This Part reviews the challenges that courts and commentators face in defining “substantial burden.”

It helps to have background about the test’s place in our scheme of civil liberties. (By “civil liberties” I simply mean rights to freedom from state interference in private conduct. These include many constitutional rights, but not all.\textsuperscript{30}) In our system, a constitutional liberty to do X—engage in

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\item[\textsuperscript{27}] Other scholars have discussed the adequate alternatives principle in the context of religion but to opposite effect—arguing that because such alternatives are hard to come by in the case of religion, religious burdens should trigger \textit{stricter} protection. \textit{See} Douglas Laycock and Thomas C. Berg, \textit{Protecting Free Exercise under Smith and after Smith}, 2020 \textit{CATO SUP. CT. REV.} 33, 47.
\item[\textsuperscript{28}] \textit{Fulton}, 141 S. Ct. at 1883 (Barrett, J., concurring, joined by Breyer and Kavanaugh, JJ.) (citation omitted).
\item[\textsuperscript{29}] \textit{Ibid.}
\item[\textsuperscript{30}] Contrast such liberties with rights that are entitlements to government resources—to counsel, a fair trial, a vote—which aren’t addressed here except insofar as the government might deny one of these resources in a way that penalizes the exercise of a liberty. Of course, this private conduct/public resources dichotomy is not sharp or
\end{itemize}
speech, travel, keep and bear arms, exercise religion, obtain an abortion—has two jobs. Not only does a civil liberty prohibit laws whose purpose is to forbid X (what I’ll call “targeted” laws). It also protects against some laws that have only the side effect of burdening X (“non-targeted” laws).31

This Article focuses on this second protection—from non-targeted laws. When it comes to such laws, as seen below, most constitutional liberties require a two-step inquiry from courts. The first concerns the burden on the individual’s conduct, and the second is about the public benefits of imposing that burden. A court reaches the second step only if it finds a weighty burden on private conduct, at step one. It’s that first step that is governed by the “substantial burden” test in the case of religion. The test’s job, then, is to identify when enough is at stake for the religious believer that courts should weigh the costs of granting her an exemption.

Something that does this job is needed for review of laws incidentally burdening religion, but not for review of laws targeting religion. Targeted laws, as courts and commentators agree, are unlawful whether or not the burden they impose is “substantial.”32 The law should, and can afford to, bar targeted laws across the board, because there is never a good reason to target religion for the sake of targeting religion.33

By contrast, non-targeted laws aim at legitimate interests; any harm to religion is incidental. Heightened scrutiny of non-targeted laws is sometimes needed, because incidental burdens can be just as harmful to constitutional liberties as targeted laws.34 But guarding against all incidental burdens might drown courts and cripple the state’s pursuit of what are, after all, legitimate interests. The doctrine meant to hold back the flood (and prevent the crippling) under pre-Smith free exercise law was the “substantial burden” test: Only substantial burdens on free exercise would trigger strict scrutiny and thus, potentially, exemptions.

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32 See, e.g., Tenafly Eruv Ass’n, Inc. v. Borough of Tenafly, 309 F.3d 144, 170 (3d Cir. 2002) (“[T]here is no substantial burden requirement when government discriminates against religious conduct.”) (citing Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531–47 (1993)).

33 Cf. Brown v. Borough of Mahaffey, 35 F.3d 846, 849–50 (3d Cir. 1994) (“Applying such a burden test to non-neutral government actions would make petty harassment of religious institutions and exercise immune from the protection of the First Amendment.”).

34 See generally Dorf, supra note 31.
That crucial role makes it all the more important to define “substantial burdens” well. This Part will show why that’s a challenge and survey problems with existing “substantial burden” tests, to motivate Part III’s defense and application of a new test.

A. Gaps in Legal Sources

The usual sources of legal authority offer little help in shaping a “substantial burden” doctrine.

First, neither the text nor the original understanding of the First Amendment sets the scope of the “substantial burdens” test. After all, the test didn’t appear until the Court’s 1968 decision inaugurating religious exemptions from neutral laws, in Sherbert v. Verner. Even the leading originalist defenders of free exercise exemptions do not claim that original understandings tell us which burdens on religion were thought significant enough to require special justification. At most history tells us what sort of justification was thought sufficient to override a free exercise claim: according to “early colonial charters” and “State constitutions,” only the need to preserve “peace and safety.”

So at most, history speaks to the question raised at step two of the inquiry under civil liberties doctrines today: how to apply heightened scrutiny. History is silent on the prior question of when there is a sufficient clash between a law and someone’s religion to trigger scrutiny. That question really encompasses several issues: Which conduct is protected except when it would undermine peace and safety? (All religiously motivated conduct? Only religious obligations? Something in between?) And what is that conduct protected against? (Criminal penalties? Civil? The indirect pressure of losing otherwise available public benefits?) History draws a blank on these questions about defining “substantial burdens.”

Second, precedent on the “substantial burden” test was conflicted and underdeveloped. While Sherbert found a substantial burden when a state banned nothing and just incidentally raised the cost of religious exercise, Sherbert also officially left in place a then-recent precedent blessing laws that make “religious practices” “not unlawful” but merely “more expensive.” Or again, while Sherbert looked askance at laws increasing the “expense” of religion, a later Sherbert-era case allowed state action that the Court

36 See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Freedom from Persecution or Protection of the Rights of Conscience: A Critique of Justice Scalia’s Historical Arguments in City of Boerne v. Flores, 39 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 819, 824–25 (1997) (offering evidence only on the question of when a burden on religion would be constitutionally tolerated).
37 Fulton, 141 S. Ct. at 1902 (Alito, J., concurring).
admitted might “virtually destroy” a native American tribe’s ability to practice their faith.\textsuperscript{39} Indeed, Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Court in \textit{Smith} effectively abolishing the \textit{Sherbert} regime did so on the ground that it was “utterly unworkable.”\textsuperscript{40}

Third, besides tensions in the precedents, there were gaps. The Court gave little or no guidance on several questions that have become pressing and contentious\textsuperscript{41}: whether to look at the theological burden of compliance with a law as well as the material burden for non-compliance; when to defer to claimants’ views about those matters and when not to; what range of state actions to regard as candidates for review, and which forms of religious exercise to count as candidates for protection.

Fourth, the same questions (and lack of guidance) have arisen under the statutes Congress enacted when the Supreme Court in \textit{Smith} scrapped the constitutional entitlement to exemptions. Like pre-\textit{Smith} cases, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA)\textsuperscript{42} provided for strict scrutiny of only “substantial” burdens on religion (whether imposed by state or federal action). And when RFRA was invalidated as applied to the states,\textsuperscript{43} Congress restored some protection against state action (where jurisdictional hooks existed) with the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA).\textsuperscript{44} RLUIPA, too, demands strict scrutiny only in case of “substantial” burdens on religion (in the context of zoning laws and policies affecting prisoners).

And in passing both statutes, RFRA and RLUIPA, Congress added no clarity on “substantial burdens.” The text and legislative history simply point back to the Court’s \textit{Sherbert}-era cases,\textsuperscript{45} which are spotty and conflicted. And since then, Congress’s one amendment of the statutory “substantial burden” test clarified only what is not required for such a burden (namely, that the affected conduct be “compelled by or central to” one’s faith\textsuperscript{46}).

Fifth, dictionaries won’t help much in interpreting the “substantial burden” language as it appears in RFRA and RLUIPA because the term “substantial” is vague. That’s why the term takes on different senses in

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{40} 494 U.S. at 887 n.4; see also id. at 889 n.5.
\item \textsuperscript{41} See infra Section I.C.
\item \textsuperscript{42} 42 U.S.C. §2000bb \textit{et seq.} (2012).
\item \textsuperscript{43} City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
\item \textsuperscript{44} 42 U.S.C. §2000cc \textit{et seq.} (2012).
\item \textsuperscript{45} 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(2).
\item \textsuperscript{46} 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–5(7)a.
\end{itemize}
different areas of law, based on bodies of cases peculiar to each context.\(^47\) Yet any such body of cases here is, as noted, unhelpful.

So religious liberty’s scope—before *Smith*, after *Smith’s* reversal, and under RFRA and RLUIPA now—is fixed by the substantial burden test. But there is little to guide courts in applying that test.

### B. Existing Answers (and Their Dilemmas)

To fill the gap, courts and commentators have hazarded a range of substantial burden tests. But none does everything that most agree the test should do. As noted earlier, no one wants courts to take theological positions by second-guessing a plaintiff’s own judgments about what is true or valuable in religious matters. (This is sometimes called the “religious questions doctrine.”)\(^48\) But to avoid that risk, some would have courts lurch to the other extreme of always deferring to a plaintiff’s claim that the burden is “substantial.” This reads the limitation to “substantial” burdens out of the law. To avoid this bind, some theories give the “substantial burden” inquiry only the thinnest content. Or they reach for bright-line tests that work better for more familiar and mainstream religions. But in doing so, these tests end up with too narrow a scope of protection, especially for minorities. Part II will suggest that courts can avoid these difficulties—and answer a range of ongoing controversies—by using a test derived from a principle implicit in other constitutional liberties.

#### 1. Conduct-Focused Tests

One set of proposals focuses on the link between religious belief and the burdened conduct. It urges that courts protect (1) all conduct motivated by religion,\(^49\) or (2) only conduct central to it,\(^50\) or (3) only conduct required by it. None works.

The first is too broad because a person can be motivated by religion in doing anything—even when she would consider another available activity just as religiously valuable. You might have a religious motivation for taking a walk in the park—as a quiet setting for prayer—without seeing any religious advantage to praying there, not elsewhere. Your mere religious

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\(^47\) *See* Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2505 (2019) (noting that the term “substantial,” in several areas of law, takes its meaning from a distinctive “common law confining and guiding the exercise of judicial discretion”).

\(^48\) *See* Presbyterian Church in the U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969) (judicial decisions must not “turn on the resolution by civil courts of controversies over religious doctrine and practice”); *see also* Christopher C. Lund, *Rethinking the ‘Religious Question’ Doctrine*, 41 Pepper L. Rev. 1013, 1028 (2014).

\(^49\) *See*, e.g., *Jolly v. Coughlin*, 76 F.3d 468, 476–77 (2d Cir. 1996).

\(^50\) *See*, e.g., *Thiry v. Carlson*, 78 F.3d 1491 (10th Cir. 1996).
motive shouldn’t entitle you to exemptions from regulations about when walking in the park is allowed. Likewise, it isn’t obvious that speech should get more protection when it’s engaged in for religious versus other reasons. Simply put, a motives-only test would allow believers to get an exemption from the law just by adopting a religious motive for any ordinary activity the law might forbid. They could do so without showing that they would be worse off than others absent an exemption. This would give believers an arbitrary privilege. And it would effectively “read out of [the law] the condition that only substantial burdens” trigger heightened scrutiny.

Yet a focus on religious duties is too narrow. It might have left exposed the peyote use that the plaintiffs in Smith claimed the right to engage in, contrary to local drug laws. Peyote use in worship was central to the plaintiffs’ Native American religion, almost the whole extent of it: a path to contact with God. But the claimants professed no duty to use the drug. Thus, to protect only duties would allow even heavy burdens on minority religions that draw no sharp line between what’s spiritually valuable and required. Even for religions that do draw that line, some non-obligatory conduct is important enough that a burden on the conduct would seem to be substantial. So motivation is too broad, and duty too narrow.

And both are underspecified. Whatever conduct receives protection, one must decide what to protect it against. A law might burden a religious duty, for example, by criminalizing some means of carrying out that duty, or all. Or the law might merely raise the cost of some means, or all. Or the law might entirely disable you from discharging the duty (by denying you needed resources, as in prison). Not all these burdens are necessarily substantial. As Professor Hamilton writes, a fine for speeding to church should not trigger heightened scrutiny even if making it to services on time is, for you, a solemn duty.

Perhaps foreseeing these problems, Judge Posner adopted a hybrid test. It covers some mandatory and some non-mandatory conduct and specifies the relevant form of burden on each. Under this test, substantial burdens

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51 See infra Section III.D.3.
52 Mahoney v. Doe, 642 F.3d 1112, 1121 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
56 Mark v. O’Leary, 80 F.3d 1175 (7th Cir. 1996).
include absolute conflicts of legal and religious duties: laws that ban what the religion requires or require what the religion bans. Also covered are mere “inhibitions” of conduct or expression that is “central” to religion even if not commanded by it. But even this test is over- and under-inclusive, and the vagueness of “centrality” might raise constitutional concerns, not least by inviting judges to gainsay plaintiffs’ views on what really matters in religion. These problems with the centrality and duty criteria make it no surprise that Congress has repudiated both by specifying that RFRA and RLUIPA protect some conduct not “compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.” So the obstacles to this hybrid test are not only normative and constitutional, but statutory.

2. Cost-Focused Tests

Professor Helfland fears that any effort to interrogate the religious substantiality of conduct on a theological metric runs afoul of core Establishment Clause prohibitions. So he would bracket the kind of religious exercise at stake and look only to the extent of the penalty for engaging in it. But this approach—by requiring religious exercise of any kind, not exercise that clears a certain threshold of significance—effectively collapses into the “motivation” test mentioned above. So the approach runs into all the same problems of overbreadth. Simply put, high material costs are not sufficient for a substantial burden. The steepest fine for speeding to Mass is no substantial burden on religion if you could’ve left a few minutes earlier. Nor is a crippling fine for preaching by bullhorn at midnight, if you could’ve spoken the same message at another time. And so on.

3. Claimant-Focused Tests

If not the nature of the religious claim or extent of the penalty, perhaps courts should look to the regulation’s impact on the claimant more directly. Professor Flanders would ask if the state action “puts some kind of pressure on

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57 Id. at 1179.
58 See GREENAWALT, supra note 53, at 204 (“One could have a ‘substantial burden’ if a forbidden practice is ‘only’ ‘moderately significant,’” and conversely, even for mandatory conduct, “a slight impairment” might be “less than substantial. For example, members of a particular church might regard communion as mandatory and central and hymn singing as neither mandatory nor central. Yet a ban on all singing might constitute a substantial burden, whereas a ban on all use of wine might not, if the members believed they could use grape juice for communion without loss of religious effect.”).
59 See infra Section III.C.1.
someone to act contrary to his religious beliefs.” 62 But this has the surprising result that a prison imposes no substantial burden on Muslim inmates by denying them access to Friday services, halal meals, and Korans. After all, the prison hasn’t pressured the inmates at all. It’s simply denied them needed resources. Indeed, Flanders seems to embrace this result when he calls his view the “major lesson” of Lyng.63 That case found no substantial burden from the government’s choice to run a road through a forest held sacred and used for rituals by Native American tribes. As Flanders notes approvingly, the Court relied on the fact that the state “did not put pressure on them to violate their beliefs or change their religion. The action of the government was not of the form ‘do this, or else pay a price.’” 64

Professor Lupu plausibly finds Lyng “disturbing” because it “blocks at the threshold all Indian free exercise claims involving tribal use of public lands for ritual observance.” 65 More to the point, it’s a stretch to say that “moderate discouragement of religious practice, such as the denial of unemployment benefits, counts as ‘prohibiting’ the exercise of religion but that total destruction of a sacred site does not.” 66 Below I’ll give a more general and fully theorized objection to Lyng’s narrow “pressure” test, plus grounds to distinguish Lyng from the defensible precedent it relied on. 67

While Lupu rightly objects to the Lyng-favorable implications of Flanders’ focus on coercion, he joins Flanders in offering a claimant-centered account of substantial burdens. Lupu would ask if a regulation causes “significant psychic distress.” 68 But if this criterion is asking about emotional impact on the objectively reasonable adherent of a given religion, the criterion invites courts to make their own assessments of religious importance. If the criterion is directing courts instead to the claimant’s actual emotional response, it’s missing the target. Intensity of distress,

64 Flanders, supra note 62, at 28.
66 GREENAWALT, supra note 53 at 279.
67 See infra notes 191–199. The Lyng majority offered a narrower basis for its decision, too: that recognizing claims against the government’s use of its property could lead to incoherence, by requiring two incompatible uses of the same property, to meet the conflicting demands of different claimants. We needn’t settle whether this narrower concern provides better support for Lyng’s result.
68 Ira C. Lupu, To Control Faction and Protect Liberty: A General Theory of the Religion Clauses, 7 J. CONTEMPO. LEGAL ISSUES 357, 379 (1996). This seems to represent a revision of Lupu’s earlier-expressed view that a “coercion-based test” or any other “focused on impact,” Lupu, supra note 65, at 962, 964, would be riddled with problems and should give way to a test focused on analogies to actionable private harms under the common law.
turning on things like your temperament and your last meal, won’t track what I’ll suggest below is really relevant: the realization of interests served by religion that are not reducible to psychological states.

4. Common Law-Focused Tests

The tension between the various criteria that any definition of “substantial burden” should satisfy come to a head in Professor Gedicks’ approach. Gedicks doesn’t want a court blindly accepting every plaintiff’s claim that her religion has been substantially burdened. But he also doesn’t want courts second-guessing plaintiffs’ religious beliefs—e.g., a Catholic’s belief that paying for insurance coverage of a drug she deems sinful makes her complicit in the drug’s use (and thus guilty herself). The theology of complicity, Gedicks plausibly argues, is off-limits to courts. Judges shouldn’t be deciding whether Catholic teachings are too lax or too scrupulous, or even simply whether those teachings are plausible or beyond the pale. That would require courts to take theological positions.

But how would Gedicks avoid the other extreme—of blind deference to plaintiffs? He would assess substantiality using a secular body of principles, the common law—at least when it speaks to the topic addressed by the religious belief at issue. Thus, suppose a plaintiff contends that a legal burden on her religion is substantial because it makes her complicit in (what she regards as) someone else’s sinful action. She’s relying on a religious belief about when it is wrong to contribute to another’s wrongdoing. But as it happens, that same subject (complicity) is also addressed by tort doctrines on proximate causation. So in assessing the substantiality of the plaintiff’s religious concern, Gedicks would consult the tort doctrines. If the plaintiff’s forced contribution to the sinful activity is significant enough to count as proximate causation in tort law (supposing the sin were an injury), then the burden on her religion is substantial. But if tort law would deem the connection too attenuated for liability, the religious burden is insubstantial.

Gedicks’ goal is admirable, but his proposal is self-defeating. His aim is to avoid second-guessing a plaintiff’s religious views, but his approach would require just that. The second-guessing would simply be masked. True, courts would not be reasoning from theological first principles; they would not be rifling through sacred texts. But courts would be picking theological winners and losers based on whether the underlying religious beliefs fit some independent standard of plausibility. It’s just that the standard would happen to come not from another theological source, but from

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69 See infra Section III.B.
a secular one. A religion would win if its test for immoral proximity to sin tracked the common law’s test for unlawful proximity to injury. And the religion would lose if it happened to be more scrupulous than the common law. But whether the common law agrees with your religion on complicity has nothing to do with what I’ll suggest below matters here: whether your pursuit of religious interests has been hampered. That depends simply on what you believe, not on how well your belief matches the common law’s take on a vaguely related topic. The common law is neither here nor there.

C. The Hole in Hobby Lobby and Fulton

The points above offer more detail on why it’s hard to find a coherent “substantial burden” test. Courts face a dilemma. On the one hand, they can’t avoid taking account of the religious significance of the burdened form of exercise. (While the extent of the material penalty for violating a law is also relevant, it isn’t enough, as seen in connection with cost-focused tests.) But on the other hand, no way of measuring religious significance seems quite right. First, bright-line tests prove inadequate: Religious duty is too narrow a standard, and religious motivation too broad. Second, attempts to get at religious significance indirectly—by asking if the plaintiff has been coerced or has suffered distress—turn out to be either too narrow themselves, or circular, or not on point. And finally, measuring a religious teaching against the most similar-sounding common law doctrines faces the same problem as questioning the “centrality” of religious exercise: it would have courts stand in judgment over plaintiffs’ own views on what is religiously true or reasonable. But then what is left, besides blindly deferring to plaintiffs’ allegations that a burden on their religion is “substantial”? The Supreme Court seemed to do just that in its most important (and most recent and extended) case on the “substantial burden” test, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby. That case involved a RFRA challenge to the “contraception mandate” embodied in guidelines (and ultimately rules) issued under the Affordable Care Act. The mandate required covered employer-provided insurance plans to include contraceptives. Plaintiffs including Hobby Lobby

71 Ibid.
72 See supra Section I.A.2.
73 See supra Section I.A.1.
74 See supra Section I.A.3.
75 See supra Section I.A.4.
Stores, Inc., and its owners sought an exemption under RFRA from having to cover some of the 20 specified contraceptives. They objected to the four that (according to the FDA) had the potential to prevent the implantation of an embryo. The owners said that having to cover those four drugs would substantially burden their religion by making them complicit in the destruction of a new human being.

The Court agreed that the mandate’s burden on religion was “substantial.” Without offering a general analysis of that term, the Court focused on the steep fines or penalties attached to flouting the mandate (or to sidestepping the mandate by dropping insurance plans altogether). But the government’s response to these points about material costs required the Court to say something as well about the religious side of the burden. The government argued that even if the material penalties for violating the mandate were high, the religious cost of obeying the mandate was low—because the link between what the law required of the employers (insurance) and what their religion forbade (embryo-destruction) was “too attenuated.” The Court replied that accepting this argument would effectively require rejecting as “flawed” the plaintiffs’ religious beliefs on complicity—on when it’s wrong to cooperate in another’s wrongdoing.

But the Court never said what it can and should do to determine if the religious significance of the compelled conduct makes the legal burden overall a “substantial” one, and indeed suggested that courts had no role to play at all, declaring that “it is not for us to say that [the plaintiffs’] religious beliefs are mistaken or insubstantial.” But if courts always defer on whether burdens are substantial, they risk giving believers carte blanche, rendering the “substantial burden” test a dead letter. Besides, no one has a religious belief about “what constitutes a substantial burden for RFRA purposes.” Or at any rate, no one is entitled to judicial deference on that. As Justice Sotomayor has put it, “thinking one’s religious beliefs are substantially burdened—no matter how sincere or genuine that belief may be—does not make it so.”

Critics charged that Hobby Lobby read the “substantiality” requirement out of the statute, and they were half-right. The Hobby Lobby Court was
happy to specify the material costs that counted as substantial, but only that. (It did the same in another RFRA case a few years earlier.\textsuperscript{84}) And as noted above, that isn’t enough. Courts need to say something about when a plaintiff’s religious concern about an activity is acute enough to make the loss of that activity a “substantial” burden on her religion.

Most recently, \textit{Fulton} made no progress on this issue. In one sentence, \textit{Fulton} declared it “plain that the City’s actions” sufficiently “burdened” a Catholic agency’s religious exercise “by putting it to the choice of curtailing its mission” of care to foster children or certifying same-sex couples as foster parents and thus “approving relationships inconsistent with its beliefs.”\textsuperscript{85} As seen below,\textsuperscript{86} this was too quick, and potentially misdescribed the impact of the City’s requirements on the agency. As a result, the \textit{Fulton} Court jumped over, rather than clarifying, the questions facing courts in identifying substantial burdens for themselves, without deciding religious questions.

Any sound resolution will have two key features. It will leave it ultimately to courts to determine whether a burden is substantial, but it won’t require or allow courts, in the course of answering that question, to rely on anyone’s religious beliefs but the plaintiffs’. What would such a test look like, and what legal support or pedigree could it claim?

\section*{II. The Solution for Other Liberties: The Adequate Alternatives Principle}

Start with the question of legal pedigree. Without guidance from text, history, precedent, and dictionaries,\textsuperscript{87} a good place to turn is the law of other civil liberties. Time and again, courts have drawn material from one liberty’s doctrines to fill in gaps or resolve tensions in another’s.

Thus, the D.C. Circuit has borrowed from free speech doctrine to fashion doctrines to implement the clean slate that is the Second Amendment.\textsuperscript{88} So did the Second Circuit, in an opinion expressly defending the legitimacy of drawing such parallels:

``The practice of applying heightened scrutiny only to laws that ‘burden’ the Second Amendment right substantially is . . . broadly consistent with our approach to other fundamental constitutional rights, including

\textsuperscript{84} In \textit{Holt v. Hobbs}, 135 S. Ct. 853, 862 (2015), the Court found a substantial burden based only on the claimant’s sincerity and the secular costs of non-compliance.

\textsuperscript{85} \textit{Fulton}, 141 S. Ct. at 1876.

\textsuperscript{86} See infra Section III.D.1.

\textsuperscript{87} See supra Section I.A.

\textsuperscript{88} See infra note 132 and accompanying text.
those protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. . . . [In implementing the Second Amendment, we readily consult principles from other areas of constitutional law, including the First Amendment.”

The Supreme Court echoed these parallels in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, which revised Roe’s abortion doctrine precisely to bring it more in line with the doctrines of “all” other constitutional “liberties.” While Roe had imposed heightened scrutiny on any law so much as “touching on” abortion access, Casey observed that “not every law which makes [a constitutional right] more difficult to exercise is, ipso facto, an infringement of that right.” And as seen below, the test Casey used to sort out which incidental burdens on abortion are substantial enough to require a compelling justification had roots in the doctrine of other liberties.

Closer to home for present purposes, in fashioning a test for religious exemptions in Sherbert, the Court justified its substantial burden test by appeal to a similar test in a free speech case. And most relevant of all, there is the implicit support for this approach provided by the Justices in Fulton who asked for clarifications on how to apply free exercise exemptions. They, too, drew analogies to other liberties—not in fleshing out doctrines on free exercise exemptions, but in making the case that such exemptions should exist at all. On that question, while the Justices found the “historical record” relatively “silent,” they found analogies to other liberties more compelling: “As a matter of text and structure, it is difficult to see why the Free Exercise Clause—lone among the First Amendment freedoms—offers” no protection from incidental burdens. Likewise, those Justices cited the law on other liberties as a reason to reject a “categorical” right to exemptions from absolutely all incidental religious burdens: “[T]his Court’s resolution of conflicts between generally applicable laws and other First Amendment rights—like speech and assembly—has been much more nuanced.”

In short, if the case for granting religious exemptions from neutral laws, and the case for limiting such exemptions, both depend on analogies to other liberties, courts should also draw on other liberties to settle the scope of any free exercise protection from incidental burdens.

89 New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, 804 F.3d 242, 259 (2d Cir. 2015).
90 Casey, 505 U.S. at 873.
91 505 U.S. at 874 (plurality).
92 See infra Section II.A.2.
93 374 U.S. at 403 (citing NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963)).
94 Fulton, 141 S. Ct. at 1892 (Barrett, J., concurring, joined by Breyer and Kavanaugh, JJ.).
95 Ibid.
Across a range of civil liberties, the Court’s doctrine about when laws that burden them will trigger heightened scrutiny has reflected two concerns. First, non-targeted burdens on a liberty can be more onerous, and so more harmful to the associated interests, than many targeted burdens are. But second, opening the courts to litigation of just any incidental burden, however minor, would drown the courts and destroy the state’s ability to regulate. So the Court’s solution—for many different liberties—has been to limit heightened scrutiny to a certain subset of non-targeted burdens: those that are undue or substantial.

A. Tracing the Principle Elsewhere

In the abortion context, as noted, the Court tackled this question in Planned Parenthood v. Casey. Revising Roe v. Wade’s broad application of heightened scrutiny to any law so much as “touching upon” abortion, Casey limited the right to guard against laws imposing an “undue burden” on, by creating a “substantial obstacle” to, pre-viability abortions. But while that test’s language may have been novel, as the dissents protested, its substance was not. Professor Brownstein has traced the overlap between Casey’s “undue burden” test and the doctrinal tests for heightened-scrutiny-triggering burdens on speech, travel, and at least some free exercise cases before Smith. In a similar vein, Professor Dorf has shown that when it comes to free speech, abortion rights, and free exercise before Smith, the law has closely scrutinized non-targeted burdens, but only when the burdens are

96 See generally Dorf, Incidental Burdens, supra note 31. Note that this limitation of heightened scrutiny to substantially burdensome laws does not constrain the antidiscrimination components of free exercise, equal protection, free speech, and the like, because the constitutional infirmity in such governmental discrimination lies in the intent, not primarily in the magnitude of the effects.

97 Ibid.

98 Casey, 505 U.S. at 871 (plurality).

99 Id. at 874, 877.

100 It is sometimes suggested that the “undue burden” test was novel because it didn’t simply demand heightened scrutiny of certain regulations, but imposed a per se bar. That is misleading. Casey required laws imposing a substantial obstacle (or ban) on abortion to serve a compelling interest. So it actually presupposed Roe’s strict-scrutiny framework. It’s just that Casey—like Roe itself—also pre-determined the results of applying strict scrutiny, by telling us exactly when there would (and wouldn’t) be a compelling justification for bans or effective bans: always after viability, never before. That was why undue burdens and bans would always be invalid until viability. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 846 (“Before viability, the State’s interests are not strong enough to support a prohibition of abortion or the imposition of a substantial obstacle to the woman’s effective right to elect the procedure.”).

I think one can say more about what makes a burden “undue” or “substantial,” and show that the principle subjecting such burdens to heightened scrutiny applies as well under other civil liberties.

The common thread is this: A (non-targeted) burden on a liberty is “substantial” or “undue”—and so triggers heightened scrutiny—if the burden leaves no adequate alternative means of exercising that liberty. (This is not to be confused with the “least restrictive means” test sometimes invoked by courts at stage two of a civil-liberties analysis, the application of heightened scrutiny.)

This principle does not simply re-describe “substantial burden”: It adds substantive content. So our law’s reliance on the principle constitutes a rejection of many other ways courts might have measured burdens on civil liberties. Of course, the adequate alternatives principle doesn’t exhaust the doctrine on any civil liberty but only gives a sufficient condition for heightened scrutiny. So stated, the principle abstracts from minor variations from right to right. And like any doctrine, it isn’t applied perfectly. But it is there, in substance or even in so many words.

1. Free Speech

For all its crosscutting rules and standards, free speech law sits on “two tracks.” “Track One” imposes strict scrutiny on any regulation that’s based on the content of a message being conveyed—in my terms, any targeted burden. At least officially, then, content-based restrictions will

102 See generally Dorf, supra note 31.
103 Under the adequate alternatives principle, the question is whether the claimant has other forms of conduct by which to pursue her interests—whereas the “least restrictive means” test asks if the government has other policies by which to pursue its interests. The first determines if the burden on an individual is substantial. The second dictates whether an admittedly substantial burden on the individual is justified, because it’s overridden by some other interest.
104 Note, for example, that the adequate alternatives principle doesn’t measure the weight of a legal burden in isolation, but always by means of a comparison. And the comparison is not between the legal burden at issue and the burdens imposed by other laws, or between the law’s burden on the individual and benefits to the public. It’s between two ways of exercising the burdened liberty: the option closed off by the law, and the next-best option (if any). To see the concrete difference this doctrinal choice makes, contrast the adequate alternative principle’s implications for measuring free exercise burdens (in Section III.D) with the implications of four other proposed measures (in Section I.A). Or contrast the principle’s implications for abortion with those of a sliding-scale balancing test. See nn. 116–125 and accompanying text.
106 For an argument that the two “tracks” have begun to run together, see R. George Wright, Content-Neutral and Content-Based Regulations of Speech: A Distinction That is No Longer Worth the Fuss, 67 FLA. L. REV. 2081 (2016).
generally face heightened scrutiny whether or not their impact on speech is deemed “substantial” in any sense.\textsuperscript{107} But the topic here is non-targeted burdens on civil liberties, which in the case of free speech would fall on “Track Two.” These include content-neutral laws of two kinds: (1) restrictions on the time, place, and manner of speech in a public forum (e.g., noise ordinances); and (2) regulations of expressive conduct—not of written or spoken words but of behavior (e.g., flag-burning\textsuperscript{108}) that is intended and understood\textsuperscript{109} to convey a message. And as it happens, Track Two regulations must, among other things, “leave open ample alternative channels for communicating the information.”\textsuperscript{110} For example, no heightened scrutiny applied to an ordinance that prevented bands who performed in Central Park from using their own sound equipment. That’s because the ordinance left them an adequate alternative: using a sound system provided by the city.\textsuperscript{111} (The Court has clarified that the same “alternatives” standard applies to burdens on expressive conduct,\textsuperscript{112} even though the test for the latter was first cast in slightly different terms.)\textsuperscript{113} Quite explicitly, then, non-targeted burdens on free speech must satisfy a kind of adequate alternatives principle.

\textbf{2. Abortion}

Under \textit{Casey}’s revision of \textit{Roe}, as noted, the Fourteenth Amendment requires a compelling justification for “undue burdens” on abortion access\textsuperscript{114} (which ultimately makes all such burdens unlawful before fetal viability, the point at which the state’s interest in fetal life becomes compelling under \textit{Casey} and \textit{Roe}\textsuperscript{115}). This doctrine precludes not only regulations whose goal is to prevent abortions, but also those that have the “effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion.”\textsuperscript{116} On its face, and as implemented, this standard requires non-targeted burdens on

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{107} See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 717 (2012) (Content-based regulations trigger “exacting scrutiny,” are “presumed invalid,” and are “permitted, as a general matter, only when confined to the few ‘historic and traditional categories’” of exceptions, including obscenity, defamation, and the like.) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).


\textsuperscript{111} \textit{Ward}, 491 U.S. at 803.


\textsuperscript{114} See supra note 25.

\textsuperscript{115} See supra note 100.

\textsuperscript{116} \textit{Casey}, 505 U.S. at 877.
abortion to leave women adequate access to abortion—i.e., to satisfy the adequate alternatives principle. Thus, the Casey plurality upheld Pennsylvania’s recordkeeping and reporting requirements because they would “increase the cost of some abortions” only by a “slight amount.” That is, the requirements left open an adequate (almost equally affordable) path to an abortion. But the spousal-notification requirement was held invalid, despite serving what the plurality deemed a permissible purpose, because it would sometimes give a husband “an effective veto over his wife’s decision”—leaving her no adequate means of procuring an abortion.

In Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, the Court seemed to replace this adequate-alternatives test (focused exclusively on legal burdens) with one that weighs benefits and burdens together, which might have made a significant difference in the outcomes of other cases. But four years later, in June Medical Services v. Russo, a majority of the Court “reject[ed] the Whole Woman’s Health cost-benefit standard.” And Chief Justice Roberts’ apparently controlling opinion restored a standard focused just on the extent of the obstacle faced by a woman seeking an abortion.

3. Travel

The Constitution requires “that all citizens be free to travel throughout the length and breadth of our land uninhibited by statutes, rules, or regulations which unreasonably burden or restrict this movement.” And here the pattern recurs. Not only does this civil liberty rule out regulations

117 Id. at 901.
118 Id. at 895.
119 Ibid.
120 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016).
121 See id. at 2309 (requiring courts to “consider the burdens a law imposes on abortion access together with the benefits those laws confer” and referring to this as a “balancing” test).
122 Since Casey determines if a law imposes an “undue” burden without any reference to the law’s benefits, it makes “undue” a fixed standard. By contrast, Hellerstedt would have made “undue” a moving target: the greater the law’s benefits, the greater its burden would have to be to count as undue, and the smaller the law’s benefits, the smaller the burdens that would count as undue. So Casey’s test is more forgiving (than Hellerstedt’s) when a law’s benefits are large, but more demanding when the law’s benefits are small.
124 See, e.g., Hopkins v. Jegley, No. 17-2879, 2020 WL 4557687, at *2 (8th Cir. Aug. 7, 2020) (Chief Justice Roberts’ “separate opinion is controlling”) (citation omitted); see also Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (when no opinion garners a majority, the opinion that “concur[s] in the judgment on the narrowest grounds” is controlling).
125 June Medical, 140 S. Ct. at 2135–38 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
that take direct aim at it. Even non-targeted regulations infringe this liberty if they are unduly burdensome. Then-Justice Rehnquist said so in a dissent whose principles the Court later adopted:

"[The Court] have derived the line to be taken from the case law which makes the lawfulness of "financial" obstacles to interstate travel turn on how extensive a "barrier" they impose. In particular, the question is whether regulations are so sweeping that they "foreclose[]" claimants "from obtaining some part of what [they] sought"—in a word, whether the regulations leave adequate travel alternatives.

4. Guns

The D.C. Circuit has adopted a similar approach to Second Amendment rights (and a since-vacated panel decision of the Ninth Circuit expressly agreed). The court held that historical sources and the Supreme Court's analysis in District of Columbia v. Heller yield an adequate alternatives principle for the rights both to keep and to carry:

There is . . . an easy way to explain the many cases tolerating limits on bearing, despite the parity of keeping and bearing in the Amendment's text . . . The rights to keep and to bear, to possess and to carry, are equally important inasmuch as regulations on each must leave alternative channels for both . . . It's simply that traditional carrying restrictions have generally left ample opportunities for bearing arms. As Judge Posner writes: "[W]hen a state bans guns merely in particular places, such as public schools, a person can preserve an undiminished right of self-defense by not entering those places." . . . By contrast, a ban on owning or storing guns at home leaves no alternative channels for keeping arms.

The idea that the government must leave ample channels for keeping and for carrying arms explains much of the analysis in Heller I. It explains why Heller I saw no need to bother with "any of the [familiar] standards of scrutiny" in reviewing a ban on ownership that left no means of defense by handguns.

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129 Sosna, 419 U.S. at 406.
130 Young v. Hawaii, 896 F.3d 1044, 1070 (9th Cir. 2018), reh'g en banc granted, 915 F.3d 681 (9th Cir. 2019).
at home. It explains why the Court favorably treated cases allowing bans on concealed carry only so long as open carry was allowed. The Court itself highlighted this feature of those cases, explicitly describing one of them as limiting only the “manner” of exercising gun rights. The “ample alternative channels” principle also explains the Court’s approval of bans on some types of guns so long as those most useful for self-defense remained accessible. Indeed, this same principle makes an appearance in [circuit precedent] where we cite Professor Eugene Volokh’s suggestion that courts applying the Second Amendment borrow from the law of “content neutral speech,” which looks askance at “restrictions that impose severe burdens (because they don’t leave open ample alternative channels)” for speech.  

To gloss the Amendment this way is not to prove that the right is desirable as a policy matter, any more than the Casey Court’s articulation of the right to abortion is self-justifying. The point here is just that current Second Amendment—and privacy—doctrines embody an adequate alternatives principle, as do other civil liberties.  

5. Some Pre-Smith Free Exercise Cases

Before reversing course in Smith, the Court asked under the Free Exercise Clause “whether government ha[rd] placed a substantial burden” on religion “and, if so, whether a compelling governmental interest justifie[d] the burden.” Its application of this standard was deeply conflicted. But in a few major cases—including ones to which Congress later


133 The fact that the pre-Smith law involved exemptions is no anomaly. Such exemptions are analogous to the relief granted in as-applied challenges available for speech and abortion. See, e.g., Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood, 546 U.S. 320, 323 (2006) (holding that if an abortion regulation “would be unconstitutional in medical emergencies, . . . invalidating the statute entirely is not always necessary or justified, for lower courts may be able to render narrower declaratory and injunctive relief”). See also Gillian E. Metzger, Facial and As-Applied Challenges Under the Roberts Court, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 773, 773 (2009) (discussing the Roberts Court’s preference for as-applied challenges to abortion); Stephanie Barclay & Mark Rienzi, Constitutional Anomalies or As-Applied Challenges? A Defense of Religious Exemptions, 59 BOSTON COLLEGE L. REV. 1595, 1596 (2018) (“Far from being ‘anomalous’ or ‘out of step’ with our constitutional traditions, religious exemptions are just a form of ‘as-applied’ challenges offered as a default remedy elsewhere in constitutional adjudication”).

directed courts when it created statutory substantial-burden tests— the Court looked for the presence of adequate alternatives for exercising religion.

In Wisconsin v. Yoder, for example the Court emphasized that a law requiring the Amish to send their children to school beyond eighth grade, contrary to their religious convictions, would “interpose a serious barrier to” their ability to form their children in their faith; that the law’s “impact” on the “practice of the Amish religion is not only severe, but inescapable”; and that the law thus left them no choice but to “abandon belief and be assimilated into society at large, or be forced to migrate into some other and more tolerant religion.” So the law left the Amish no adequate alternatives for living out their religion.

Likewise, in Sherbert v. Verner, a state agency’s denial of unemployment insurance to a Seventh Day Adventist who refused to work on the Sabbath “forced her to choose between following the precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of her religion in order to accept work, on the other.” In other words, the agency’s action left Ms. Sherbert only one alternative for exercising her religion, and that alternative was not adequate.

By contrast, when a claimant faced no pressure to violate its religion—when the “only burden” was a marginal decrease in “the amount of money [the claimant] has to spend on its religious activities”—there was no substantial burden, no heightened scrutiny. Nor was there a substantial burden from minimum-wage laws requiring employees of a nonprofit to receive “wages,” against their felt duty to volunteer, since there was “nothing in the Act to prevent [them] from returning the [wages].” The Act left an adequate alternative way for them to honor their beliefs.

Again, the Court applied this doctrine unevenly and left key questions open. I’ll show that and propose a more coherent, justified, and specified version of the test in Part II.

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B. What Makes an Alternative “Adequate”?

The doctrine raises the question: What does it mean to say that a law burdening a civil liberty leaves adequate alternatives for exercising it? Three points:

First, “adequacy” must be about the quality of the alternatives, not just the number. (A noise ordinance that banned all speech louder than a whisper would you leave you many alternative means in some sense—speaking at 20 decibels, at 19 decibels, etc.—but none of those alternatives is adequate.) And what counts as a qualitatively good alternative for exercising your liberty won’t be completely arbitrary. It will be based on some purpose or function the liberty is designed to serve. So one can think about what makes an alternative “adequate” for each civil liberty by thinking of the liberty as having a certain purpose or function.140 (This is in the first instance a view about what a right covers, not about the best method for judges to figure out what it covers; i.e., this does not by itself require purposivism.141)

As to freedom of speech, for example, the Court has taught that whatever its ultimate purposes are, they’re adequately served by the proximate goal of enabling speakers to express their preferred message to their preferred audience,142 but not necessarily in their preferred spot143 or by their preferred means.144 (And that is plausible.145) So speech regulations leave adequate alternatives “so long as the overall ability to communicate is not impaired.”146

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141 Even if what makes an alternative “adequate” is its ability to serve a certain purpose, it may be that the best way for judges to tell if it’s “adequate” (or, equivalently, to determine the law’s purpose, in the relevant sense) is to look to, say, the history of which regulations were long understood to be consistent with the right. That’s the precise position taken by arch-anti-purposivist Justice Scalia on Second Amendment rights to keep and bear arms. He conceptualized the content of those rights partly in terms of a purpose (self-defense) but suggested that the outer bounds of those rights are best ascertained by appeal to historical sources as well as longstanding practice. See, e.g., Heller, 554 U.S. at 624 (relying on “longstanding prohibitions” as guides to the rights’ boundaries).


143 See id. at 654–655. But there are limits to this tolerance of place restrictions. See Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939).


145 See Geoffrey R. Stone, Constitutionally Compelled Exemptions and the Free Exercise Clause, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 985, 991 (1986) (“This conception of the free speech guarantee is at least arguably consistent with both the self-governance and self-fulfillment rationales for free expression”).

146 Ibid.
More broadly, here’s the first lesson about what makes an alternative way of exercising a given liberty “adequate”: The alternative must allow you to pursue the liberty’s justifying function\textsuperscript{147} or purpose to about the same degree as you could have through the means that’s now closed off.

A second crucial point: civil or criminal bans are not the only ways to close off adequate alternatives. That is, a law might deny you adequate alternatives even if the law doesn’t prohibit anything (via civil or criminal penalties). For example, a regulation that has the effect of requiring women to drive much farther to get an abortion imposes an undue burden on them even if the regulation doesn’t ban the procurement of an abortion.\textsuperscript{148} Likewise, the right-to-travel cases cited above involved regulations—durational residency requirements—that didn’t impose criminal or civil penalties for travel, but only significant (but indirect) financial burdens. And the regulation struck down on free exercise grounds in \textit{Sherbert} didn’t impose criminal or civil penalties on Ms. Sherbert for taking her Sabbath rest on Saturdays. The regulation only raised the cost of her doing so, by denying her unemployment benefits for refusing Saturday work. Thus, leaving open some option for achieving a right’s purpose isn’t enough. An alternative won’t be “adequate” if it’s much costlier than the option eliminated by the regulation.

These two points provide more detail on what makes an alternative adequate. An adequate alternative means of exercising some liberty will allow you to achieve the liberty’s function (i) to the same degree, and (ii) at not much greater cost, than you could have through options now blocked by the law.

But what, finally, is a civil liberty’s “justifying function” or purpose? Constitutional norms serve many ideals—wellbeing, autonomy, dignitary interests in equality, systemic interests “in avoiding abuse of government power.”\textsuperscript{149} But legal theorists broadly agree that at least when it comes to

\textsuperscript{147} In speaking of “justifying function,” I’m running together two ideas that the philosophical literature on rights tends to consider distinct: function (a conceptual issue) and justification (a normative issue). Fallon’s treatment of constitutional rights and liberties does not separate these aspects, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., \textit{Individual Rights and the Powers of Government}, 27 GA. L. REV. 343 (1993), nor do many theorists’ accounts of moral rights, see Leif Wenar, \textit{The Nature of Rights}, 33 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 223, 224 (2005), but that’s no surprise or problem, in my view. When it comes to rights, I think the conceptual and normative questions are inseparable: the most satisfying account of the nature and function of rights will include reference to their justifying purposes. See [redacted].


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constitutional liberties like those at issue here, the object is to promote people’s fundamental needs or interests.\(^{150}\)

Hence the following line of best fit across constitutional-liberties case law:

**The adequate alternatives principle:** A (non-targeted) law that prevents, prohibits, or raises the cost of exercising your civil liberty imposes a “substantial” or “undue” burden (triggering heightened scrutiny) if the law leaves you no adequate alternatives. And to be adequate, an alternative means of exercising the liberty must let you pursue the interest served by that liberty

(i) to about the same degree, and

(ii) at not much greater cost,

than you could have through the options the law has closed off.

Spelled out this way, the adequate alternatives principle requires a prising apart of two things: (1) the conduct that some liberty covers, and (2) the interest said to be served by that conduct (or by its protection). With free speech, for example, the “conduct” is expression—writing, speaking, making art, burning flags and draft cards to make a point. But the interests said to be served by that conduct or its protection are many: the development of knowledge and functioning of democracy, to name two.

With abortion, the covered conduct is simply the procurement of an abortion. And the interests said to be served include a woman’s life or health, professional and economic opportunities, equality with men, and so on.

In general, the interest is the end, and the protected conduct is a means. Civil liberties serve the end by protecting our access to the means—our ability to engage in certain conduct free of interference from the state.

**III. Applications to Religion: “Substantial Burdens”**

Applying the adequate alternative principle to religion yields a balanced “substantial burden” test—a workable trigger for heightened scrutiny and,
potentially, exemptions—that avoids several problems with existing proposals.

A. An Adequate Alternatives Principle for Religion

To tailor the adequate alternatives principle to religion, one must determine when one form of religious exercise is an “adequate” alternative to another. And this turns on whether the two forms of exercise achieve the interests served by religious conduct to the same degree. But how to judge that? What are the interests served by religious conduct? And whatever they are, how can a judge tell when those interests are realized just as well by this form of religious exercise as by that one?

Similar questions arise for free speech. There is disagreement over the interests served by it—democracy, autonomy, the pursuit of knowledge—and such general interests would hardly offer judicially manageable criteria for “adequacy.” But I outlined above the Court’s solution. It has focused on a more concrete standard that would, if enforced, arguably secure the ultimate purposes of free speech well enough, whatever those might be. The concrete question is: Does the challenged law leave the claimant free to convey her preferred message as effectively?\textsuperscript{151} If so, the law passes muster.

Something similar is possible here, I submit: A wide range of views about the interests served by religious exercise will converge on the same test for “adequacy.” And that test will be more tractable for courts than a direct focus on the interests themselves would be. That is likely to hold whether religious exercise serves the interests of forging one’s personal identity,\textsuperscript{152} or pursuing meaning or “ultimate concerns”\textsuperscript{153} “in one’s own way,”\textsuperscript{154} or seeking harmony with the transcendent as one understands it.\textsuperscript{155} Whichever

\textsuperscript{151} See supra notes 110–113.
\textsuperscript{153} The phrase is Paul Tillich’s.
\textsuperscript{154} See, e.g., MARThA NussbaUm, Women and human development: The Capabilities approach 179, 180 (2001).
\textsuperscript{155} See, e.g., Sabina Alkire, Valuing freedoms: sen’s capability approach and pOvertY reduCtion 51–2, 76–7 (2005). A more specific version of this view (albeit one inadequate to explain many intuitively compelling religious protections) might equate religion with obedience to the one true God. But the view can be more capacious; for Finnis, for example, the objective interest at stake consists of “harmony between oneself and the wider reaches of reality including the reality constituted by the world’s dependence on a more-than-human source of meaning and value,” John Finnis, Natural Law and Legal Reasoning, 38 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1, 2 (1990); or “harmony with whatever can be known or
interest is at stake, a claimant realizes that interest just insofar as her own values and standards (her religious creed or code) say that she does. On any of these views, that is, an alternative form of religious exercise will be “adequate” if the alternative is just as good religiously, in the claimant’s view. So courts applying this internal-criteria rule for adequacy can be agnostic on what the precise interests served by religious exercise may be. Whatever the interests are, they are secured if people live as their creed recommends or demands. And it’s easier for courts to test for this than to consider directly how much an option realizes the interests served by religion.

With this, one can tailor the adequate alternatives principle above to religion:

*Substantial Burden Test:* State action that prevents, prohibits, or raises the cost of religious exercise imposes a “substantial burden” unless it leaves you another way that you could

realize your religion to *about the same degree* as you could by the now-burdened means of exercise,

and

at *not much greater cost* than you could by that means.

So an alternative might flunk if it’s not as good from your religion’s perspective, or if it’s significantly more costly in nonreligious terms (requiring you to give up unemployment insurance, go to jail, etc.). Another way to put this, roughly, is that substantial burdens increase the cost to you of living your faith to about the same degree as you could before.


I think whether a cost is significant should vary by regulatory context. Maybe $2,000 is significant when a state agency denies you weeks of unemployment insurance, but not when a zoning law requires you to build a church on another plot: Since the prices of alternative plots can vary easily by the thousands anyway, someone setting out to build will have to be ready for price variations of that size. **Cf. Guru Nanak Sikh Soc’y** v. **County of Sutter**, 326 F. Supp. 2d 1140, 1152 (E.D. Cal. 2003) (mere inconvenience insufficient to establish a substantial burden from a zoning decision); **Midrash Sephardi, Inc.** v. **Town of Surfside**, 366 F.3d 1214, 1227 (11th Cir. 2004) (high price of land). But perhaps a difference of millions is burdensome even in the zoning context. **See Rector of St. Bartholomew’s Church v. City of New York**, 914 F.2d 348 (2d Cir. 1990), *cert. denied*, 499 U.S. 905 (1991).

For the two formulations to match up exactly, two things would have to be true: (1) both preventing and prohibiting religious conduct count as (limiting cases of) “increasing the cost”; and (2) “to the same degree as before” means “to the same degree as you could by the means now burdened by the regulation.” The second clarification ensures that, for example, a prison rule won’t count as a substantial burden just because the rule, by taking up an hour of your time, leaves you less time overall to advance in your religion. Rather
This test is a linguistically plausible gloss on what “substantially burdens” a religion, and thus “prohibit[s] the free exercise thereof,” as the First Amendment proscribes. After all, no one takes the Amendment to rule out only those laws that prohibit the exercise of someone’s religion entirely (like a law simply banning Quakerism or Islam). So the Amendment must be referring to laws that prohibit the exercise of one’s religion to the same extent as was possible in the absence of those laws. And on this reading, the text fits the adequate alternatives principle perfectly.

The principle above also has moral appeal (by limiting protection to cases where it’s really needed). And it has doctrinal and historical pedigree, given its basis in a principle that pervades our law now and (officially) the Court’s free exercise doctrine before Smith.

For all these reasons, the principle could guide courts if Smith were reinstated. It could also legitimately inform the Supreme Court’s attempt to reshape any post-Smith test if the First Amendment’s text and history are silent and practice (“liquidation”158) or policy considerations can be used to fill the gaps159—as even some originalists think.160 (Indeed, at least one originalist thinks that originalism as applied to the Free Exercise Clause requires courts to advert to certain moral principles.161) Meanwhile,

than compare your total amount of access to religion before and after the law, my test would compare particular forms of exercise: (i) the one burdened and (ii) the one still open to you.

158 See William Baude, Constitutional Liquidation, 71 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2019) (arguing that when the constitutional text is vague, constitutional meaning can be “liquidated” and settled by practice” that enjoys popular support). The Court’s pre-Smith doctrine, applied (unevenly) for thirty years, enjoyed so much support that Congress reproduced the doctrine in RFRA by a voice vote in the House and a 98–0 vote in the Senate, with the support of a wide coalition from across the political and religious spectrums. See Douglas Laycock, Interpreting the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 73 TEX. L. REV. 209, 210–211 & n.9 (1994).


160 Originalists will think—I do—that text and history should constrain courts applying the First Amendment, but they’ll disagree about what to do when text and history are indeterminate. That “is beyond the scope of a theory of originalism per se and turns on a broader set of normative issues.” Keith Whittington, Originalism: A Critical Introduction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 875, 406 (2013). See also Greenawalt, supra note 53, at 13 (“When originalists rely on abstract principles that lie behind provisions, the gap narrows between them and nonoriginalists, who typically believe that wise modern understandings of constitutional texts correspond with fundamental values they have always embodied.”) In fact, originalism per se might have nothing to say about a post-Smith order if Professor Hamburger is right that as originally understood, the Free Exercise Clause doesn’t entitle one to judicial exemptions at all. See Philip A. Hamburger, A Constitutional Right of Religious Exemption: An Historical Perspective, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 915 (1992).

161 See Gerard V. Bradley, Moral Truth and Constitutional Conservatism, 81 LA. L. REV. 1317, 1927–28 (2021) (arguing that originalism, properly applied, requires judges to
textualists and non-textualists alike would have good reason to rely on this gloss on “substantial burden” under RFRA and RLUIPA. That’s because statutory text (and legislative history) suggests that these laws use the phrase as a term of art recalling the very pre-Smith doctrine I’ve tried to render clearer and more coherent.

A full specification of this test might address other nuances. But the test has three virtues discussed below: (1) It yields more-compelling outcomes than the proposals offered to date. (2) It strikes the right balance between blind deference to claimants and violations of the religious questions doctrine. And (3) it resolves several questions that remain open in the case law on substantial burdens—including questions that will loom large for free exercise law if Smith is reversed.

B. What is covered: achieving the right scope

To see when this test does and doesn’t trigger scrutiny, consider the kinds of religious conduct the test protects, and the kinds of legal burden it protects that conduct from.

1. Religious conduct protected

This test protects less than the “religious motivation” criterion, but more than the “religious duty” criterion. The latter asks if you were religiously obligated to engage in some burdened conduct C. The motivation test essentially asks whether you had any religious reason to do C rather

“resort, as the Constitution directs, to critically justified metaphysical and moral truths such that judges “can be faithful to the Founders only by relying upon moral and metaphysical truths that lie beyond the Constitution”).


RFRA’s stated goal is to “restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner and Wisconsin v. Toder and to guarantee its application in all cases where free exercise of religion is substantially burdened.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1) (Supp. V 1993). RFRA also says that “the compelling interest test as set forth in prior Federal court rulings is a workable test for striking sensible balances between religious liberty and competing prior governmental interests.” Id. § 2000bb(a)(5).

For instance: (1) how to set baselines when measuring costs, (2) whether to recognize group claimants and, if so, whether the test should vary for them, and indeed whether there should be some kinds of substantial burdens that only groups can challenge (e.g., zoning regulations, or governmental land use as in Lyng); (3) what this right’s “coverage” in Schauer’s sense should be, see Frederick Schauer, The Politics and Incentives of First Amendment Coverage, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1613 (2015); and (4) whether to take a claimant’s financial situation into account when judging a cost substantial or not.
than nothing. My test asks if you had a religious reason to do C rather than any alternative left open by the law.

So first, this test covers conflicts between religious and legal duties. If the only alternative left open by a law—or the only equally affordable one—involves violating a religious duty, that alternative is by definition religiously inferior. This will cover, for instance, criminal laws requiring a religiously forbidden clerical disclosure of a penitent’s confessions.\textsuperscript{165}

But second, such cases are only a subset of those that trigger protection. For violation of a perceived religious duty (like the confidentiality of the confessional) is only a special case of what counts on my view: not being able to pursue one’s religion to the same extent. The latter category can also involve burdens on non-obligatory conduct that still intuitively seem substantial. Take, for example, bans on the religious solemnization of same-sex marriages\textsuperscript{166}; public development of grounds held sacred by Native American tribes\textsuperscript{167}; bans on the central worship service of the Native American religion; or denials of access to Friday services for Muslim inmates,\textsuperscript{168} parochial schooling, ministry-training.\textsuperscript{169}

But finally, not just any religiously-motivated-but-optional activities will count. For not all are activities the claimant thinks more religiously valuable than available alternatives. Recall the example of laws imposing curfew on a public park. These shouldn’t trigger scrutiny just because they deprive someone of one quiet place to pray if other, still-available options—like strolling through her neighborhood—would be just as good from her religion’s perspective. To trigger protection, the conduct blocked by the law must be religiously non-fungible with options left open.

This non-fungibility test may be what the once-favored “centrality” test meant to track, but it has advantages over the latter, as seen below.\textsuperscript{170}

2. Legal burdens protected against

Just as my test covers more than religious requirements, though without protecting all religious conduct, so it protects against more than legal

\textsuperscript{165} See, e.g., Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980). See also Greenawalt, supra note 53 at 246 (“All jurisdictions in the United States have some form of priest-penitent privilege that protects clergy from having to testify about what they have learned in their professional roles”).

\textsuperscript{166} Gen. Synod of the United Church of Christ v. Reisinger, 12 F.Supp.3d 790 (W.D.N.C. 2014).

\textsuperscript{167} Lyng, 485 U.S. 439.

\textsuperscript{168} O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987).


\textsuperscript{170} See infra Part III.C.1.
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requirements (i.e., laws imposing criminal or civil penalties), but not against all legal burdens.

First, as already noted, the test triggers heightened scrutiny of criminal or civil bans on protected religious conduct—e.g., laws requiring priests to disclose sins from the confessional, or forbidding religious education or solemnizations of same-sex weddings.

But second, there’s also a substantial burden when the law, though not banning protected religious conduct, forces you to choose between that conduct and some otherwise generally available material benefit—e.g., between your Sabbath obligation and your unemployment benefits, or between wearing religious attire and serving in the army or playing high school sports or joining ROTC. This directly answers another question posed by several Justices in Fulton: whether, in a regime providing free exercise exemptions from neutral laws that burden religion, courts should treat “indirect and direct” burdens differently. They should not. The same question applies to both: whether the burdens leave no adequate alternatives. (Of course, the answer may be “yes” more often for direct burdens.)

And finally, not all legal burdens are substantial. A law penalizing or indirectly burdening protected conduct will trigger no scrutiny if the law leaves an equally affordable alternative means to achieving the same religious goal. This includes speeding laws that leave Catholics with an affordable alternative for making it to Mass on time: leaving home on time.

To say all this is already to pick sides in some disputes among courts. It’s to recognize, for example, that zoning laws making a mosque “relatively inaccessible within the city limits,” though not preventing or punishing Muslim worship, imposes a serious burden “on the exercise of religion by the poor”—contrary to some courts’ view that expense is never enough to make a burden substantial. It is also wrong to require, as some courts have, that burdens involve “coercion in religious practices.” I explore more applications below.

171 Sherbert, 374 U.S. 398.
173 Menora v. Ill. High School Ass’n, 683 F.2d 1030 (7th Cir. 1982).
175 Fulton, 141 S. Ct. at 1883 (Barrett, J., concurring).
176 Islamic Center of Miss., Inc. v. City of Starkville, 840 F.2d 293, 299 (5th Cir. 1988).
177 Christian Gospel Church, Inc. v. City and County of San Francisco, 896 F.2d 1221, 1224 (9th Cir. 1990). See also Guru Nanak Sikh Soc’y v. County of Sutter, 326 F. Supp. 2d at 1152 (mere inconvenience insufficient);
178 Rector, 914 F.2d at 355.
179 See infra Section III.D.
C. Who decides: setting limits while avoiding religious questions

Some might worry that the test above is constitutionally problematic because it requires courts to see if the law leaves open conduct that’s as good from the claimant’s religious perspective. This inquiry might seem as problematic as the “centrality” test was said to be. Isn’t it “jurisdictionally off-limits” for courts to determine “the religious impact” of a legal burden, as Lupu and Tuttle contend? Isn’t this a “contra-constitutional excursion into appraising theological questions,” as they might fear? No and no.

As to Lupu and Tuttle’s first question, the substantial burden test requires courts to compare “the religious impacts” of legal burdens, precisely by deeming some “substantial” and others not. And good policy requires this, too, if our system isn’t to protect just any religiously motivated conduct (which would be too broad, as seen above).

Lupu and Tuttle are right to worry about courts “appraising theological questions.” But putting this worry more precisely will make it easier to see how to address the worry while still testing for substantiability. A good substantial burden test will allow a court to (1) determine for itself the religious significance of a legal burden is substantial, but (2) without replacing the claimant’s own answer to any religious question, with answers provided by the court itself or anyone else. My test can square tasks (1) with (2), while the centrality test systematically risks failure on task (2).

1. No theology by judges

To begin with task (2): For courts to respect the religious questions doctrine while also giving a substantial-burden test real teeth, two things must happen. First, courts must get to determine which questions to ask about the claimant’s faith, in testing for substantiability. (And the questions can’t amount to legal questions like “should you win?”) But second, courts must then accept the claimant’s own answers to (beliefs about) those religious questions, if sincere. Just so, my test provides the non-circular question that determines substantiability: whether any options left open by a law are as religiously valuable as the ones blocked by the law. But then the test takes, as its key input, the claimant’s views about relative religious value.

At this point, one might worry that my test makes no progress on the centrality test. For that test could be thought to turn on the claimant’s view of a question that’s only slightly different from mine: whether a practice is “central” to her faith. So if (as is widely believed) the centrality test was

181 Id. at 1917.
182 See supra Section II.A.
problematic, one might suppose, my test is, too. But when you scratch the surface of scholarly and judicial objections to centrality tests, it becomes clear that the most common and compelling one is not that courts would have to decide if a claimant thinks some practice religiously central. It’s that in doing so, courts might end up relying on someone else’s answer to that question—whether the “someone else” be the judge, the jury, the claimant’s co-religionists, or a rival church. Indeed, one or another of these risks was the explicit concern of all four precedents cited in Smith against “centrality” tests, as well as of the Lyng Court and several scholars who reject such tests.

Why fear that courts applying a centrality test would test a plaintiff’s religious views against others? Perhaps “centrality” is so vague that courts can’t easily test the sincerity of a plaintiff’s answer (to the question of what conduct she deems “central”) without judging her answer by external standards. And that would indeed be a problem, since the interests that justify religious liberty (as seen above) rise and fall with the plaintiff’s fidelity to her own creed, not others’ views of what her creed should be.

But this risk does not arise for courts applying my test, which asks the more determinate question of whether the plaintiff thinks one option is religiously as good as another. Indeed, my question must be more tractable. For there’s no deep difference between asking my question, and asking if a plaintiff is religiously motivated to engage in some conduct C. And courts ask the latter all the time, under all kinds of religious liberty regimes. There’s no deep difference because (i) the “motivation” question asks if someone sees a religious reason to do C rather than nothing, and (ii) my test asks if she sees a religious reason to do C rather than some activity left open by the law.

183 What all four precedents rejected was the idea of judges second-guessing the truth of a claimant’s answer—whether by rejecting a claimant’s account of his own faith for one given by his coreligionists, see Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Emp. Sec. Division, 450 U.S. 707, 716 (1981); by privileging one church’s theology over another’s in church-property disputes, see Presbyterian Church in U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 450 (1969); Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602–606 (1979); or by submitting to a jury “the truth or verity of [claimants’] religious doctrines or beliefs,” United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 85–87 (1944).

184 Lyng, 485 U.S. at 457–58 (averse to “holding that some sincerely held religious beliefs and practices are not ‘central’ to certain religions, despite protestations to the contrary from the religious objectors who brought the lawsuit,” and fearing that this would “require [courts] to rule that some religious adherences misunderstand their own religious beliefs.”) (emphasis added).


186 See supra Section III.A.
Both ask what the claimant believes. Both are sharp enough that courts can—and should—test for sincerity based on fit with the claimant’s statements or conduct,\(^\text{187}\) rather than fit with anyone else’s religious views.

2. **Meaningful narrowing of successful claims**

One might now have the opposite fear—that leaving it to the claimant to say if two options are religiously interchangeable is too deferential.

If the fear is about claimants gaming the system with crafty pleading, then first, that will be possible no matter how stingy a test courts adopt. More important, in some cases it will just be too implausible to plead around this test. The person speeding to religious services can’t seriously claim that the alternative way of making it to the service on time—leaving home on time—is inferior from his religion’s perspective. Or take the real-life cases below, where people engaged in disruptive religious speech in locations on public grounds where such speech happened to be forbidden. They could not and did not claim that their religion required them to speak in the forbidden spots rather than a few yards over. The adequate alternatives principle blocks these and other claims.

If the concern is instead that my test invites judicial abdication, it’s misplaced. As a preliminary matter, under my proposal, courts would be (1) defining, not deferring on, the essentially legal question of what “substantial” means. They would do so by spelling out the two criteria above, about religious significance and material cost. And then courts would be (2) applying the cost criterion without consulting the plaintiff’s views at all. True, the religious-significance criterion would turn on a claimant’s creed, not judges’ opinions about religious matters. But enforcing this criterion, too, would set real limits on plaintiffs, for two reasons.

First, requiring plaintiffs to make more than a conclusory claim\(^\text{188}\)—to “show that the [challenged] decision poses a substantial and realistic threat”

\(^{\text{187}}\) *See* Nathan S. Chapman, *Adjudicating Religious Sincerity*, 92 Wash. L. Rev. 1185 (2017). As Chapman argues, a court can test for sincerity without itself taking positions on religious questions, as long as the court never infers that a belief is insincere, from its judgment that the belief is implausible. I would add that courts should avoid relying on others’ judgments of religious plausibility, too. They should instead focus on whether context suggests that the claimant has special incentives to assert the belief at issue insincerely, *see id.* at 1231–34, and on whether there is “narrative fit” between the claimant’s asserted belief and her other statements and conduct, *see id.* at 1234–37.

\(^{\text{188}}\) *See* Krieger v. Brown, 496 F. App’x 322, 325 (4th Cir. 2012) (finding insufficient for RLUIPA “substantial burden” purposes an inmate’s “blanket assertion” that certain “sacred items were ‘necessary’ to perform ‘well-established rituals,’” when plaintiff “did not identify those rituals, or explain why the absence of the sacred items had an impact on the rituals and violated his beliefs.”).
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to their religious exercise—is hardly trivial. One court rejected a Jewish inmate’s substantial burden claim against the state’s practice of “inspecting [his] kosher meals” on the ground that he failed to show that “the manner in which meals were uncovered and inspected rendered them, or was likely to render them, non-kosher.” The court never second-guessed the inmate’s understanding of kosher laws. The court pointed out his failure to show that kosher laws seen as he sees them were really at risk of being violated.

Second and more important, enforcing the religious-significance criterion would weed out cases involving mere religious motivation. Again, to take one example, plaintiffs would be denied exemptions from neutral speech laws when preaching at a different time or place would have served their religious purposes just as well. More broadly, Sections III.D.1-2 reviews other real-life cases where this test would have made a difference, weeding out unmeritorious claims.

3. No superfluous element

Finally, one might object that the religious-significance prong of my test is superfluous. After all, one might think, if a law didn’t confine you to religiously inferior options, you’d have no motivation to run to court in the first place. So in cases that do get to court, the alternatives left open by the challenged law will always flout the religious-significance prong, making that prong dispensable (one might object). But the objection’s premise is false. Even if a law leaves you religiously adequate alternatives, you might be motivated to challenge it—if you happen to prefer the option precluded by the law, but for non-religious reasons. (You might be speeding to church not because your faith required you to leave the house late, but because you preferred to hit the snooze button, or watch a few more minutes of “Meet the Press.”) The religious-significance prong stops believers from exploiting religious liberty in such cases to get an exemption for their mere wants when others can’t. And again, these cases do arise in real life, as revealed by several examples described throughout section III.D.

So the test proposed here requires neither too much nor too little deference to claimants, and no part of it is superfluous.

189 Lyng, 485 U.S. at 475 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
D. What results

To see the fruits of this test, I’ll apply it to three questions exemplifying a broader set of questions facing courts.

1. Regulating internal affairs: religious minorities and government contractors

My test draws a plausible, principled line between two major pre-Smith cases on whether the government’s disposition of its own affairs (e.g., its property) can be a substantial burden. The line drawn here embraces the better of these decisions and rejects the other, but on more principled grounds than others have given. The test would vindicate prisoner rights systematically under-enforced today. And it would provide sensible guidance in more recent cases, like Fulton, involving government contractors seeking exemptions from antidiscrimination laws.

The first pre-Smith case at issue is Bowen v. Roy. The claimant there believed that governmental use of a social security number to identify his daughter for the purpose of administering welfare benefits would “rob her spirit.” The Court found no burden on religious exercise, holding that “the Free Exercise Clause simply cannot be understood to require the Government to conduct its own internal affairs in ways that comport with the religious beliefs of particular citizens.” Relying on that proposition two years later, in Lyng, the Court rejected a free exercise challenge to the government’s plan to develop part of a forest long used for religious purposes by three Native American tribes, even if this development would “virtually destroy” the tribes’ “ability to practice their religion.”

The Lyng majority insisted that “[t]he building of a road or the harvesting of timber on publicly owned land cannot meaningfully be distinguished from the use of a Social Security number.” But the two cases have struck many as quite different—with the first drawing wide support and the second, heavy criticism. After all, if discouraging religious exercise can impose a burden, so must a “decision that promises to destroy an entire religion,” to quote Justice Brennan’s vigorous dissent in Lyng. Yet Brennan’s own basis for distinguishing Lyng from Bowen was dubious. He said the government in Bowen had acted “in a purely internal manner.”

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192 Id. at 699.
193 485 U.S. at 448.
194 Id. at 451–52. Based on this language, I’ll assume that the development would do more than inconvenience the tribes—that there was some discrete, religiously significant conduct prevented by the development.
195 Id. at 449.
196 Id. at 476 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
whereas the land-use decision in *Lyng* had “external effects.” But the *Bowen* claimant thought the policy there, too, had external effects—spiritually devastating ones. How could courts deny that claim in *Bowen*, but credit the tribes’ assertions of harm in *Lyng*, without effectively taking positions on the underlying theological beliefs?

On my framework, the distinction is not between actions that do and don’t involve the government’s internal affairs (as *Lyng* held), or between actions that do and don’t have some external effect (as Brennan urged). It’s between actions that do and don’t inhibit the claimant’s religious conduct. The reason that prevention of conduct (as in *Lyng*) is at least as bad as discouragement (as in *Sherbert*) is that both have a negative impact on religious conduct, and the adequate alternatives principle is all about a policy’s impact, not form.

On the other hand, it isn’t arbitrarily narrow to focus on conduct when the *Bowen* claimant asks the Court to weigh broader spiritual impact. Limiting the analysis to conduct doesn’t dismiss his claim on a technicality, or implicitly reject his theological assertions. No, limiting relief to burdens on conduct, too, is fully justified by the political-moral justifications for religious liberty canvased above. For our civil liberties in general advance interests only by protecting from state interference the private conduct that advances those interests.

These critiques of *Lyng*, as corrections of pre-*Smith* precedent, would be relevant if the Court reversed *Smith*. But the corrections also help us now to fill gaps and resolve tensions and ambiguities, in the handling of prisoners’ claims. In RLUIPA cases, many courts have relied on *Lyng*’s “distinction between governmental actions that compel affirmative conduct inconsistent with religious belief, and those governmental actions that prevent conduct consistent with religious belief.” Such courts have found substantial burdens only in the former. That’s had a “devastating” effect on prisoners, for obvious reasons: prison is one place where private conduct is intimately tied up with (at the mercy of) the state’s arrangement of “internal” affairs.

In *Adkins v. Kaspar*, a pro se prisoner argued that prison officials violated his RLUIPA rights by effectively preventing him from “congregating with [fellow] members of the [Yahweh Evangelical Assembly (YEA)] on many occasions.”

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197 Id. at 470.
198 For a similar account, see Michalyn Steele & Stephanie Hall Barclay, 134 HARV. L. REV. 1294 (2021).
199 Here I’m using “conduct” loosely to include expression and even belief as well as behavior.
Sabbath and YEA holy days.” The Fifth Circuit denied there was even a substantial burden, holding that the real obstacle to assembly was beyond the prison’s control: “a dearth of qualified outside volunteers available” to supervise the YEA members’ meetings. But then why didn’t the prison regulation requiring outside volunteers also contribute to the burden? Here the Fifth Circuit fell back on its Lyng-inspired view that a cognizable burden must “truly pressure[] the adherent.” The court held that it’s lawful to entirely prevent the adherent’s religious exercise, if this is a side effect of arranging governmental affairs. But again, the better distinction is not between internal and external operations. It’s between actions that do and don’t impede religious conduct. Adkins is wrong on substantial burdens.

The Lyng principle was also raised in Fulton, the recent Supreme Court case in which the Court flirted with applying free exercise exemptions from neutral laws. In that case, Philadelphia had contracted with private agencies, paying them to provide social services for foster children or “congregate care” (group facilities) for children with special needs. The City had also tasked the agencies with taking applications from prospective foster parents, conducting home studies, and “certifying” whether the would-be parents satisfied the City’s official eligibility criteria for taking in foster children. One agency, Catholic Social Services (CSS), sought relief from the City’s requirement that CSS certify same-sex couples if it was going to accept funds to certify opposite-sex couples.

In response, the City invoked Lyng-related cases for the notion that “contractors generally do not suffer a cognizable burden on their religious exercise when the government conducts the quintessentially ‘internal affair’ of telling its own agents how to do their jobs.” But by my test, the question is not whether the City’s rule is “internal,” but whether the rule hinders the agency’s religion: Does the antidiscrimination rule put the agency to a choice between violating (or not as fully realizing) its faith, and giving up otherwise-available funding for its work?

As to the conditions for fully realizing its faith: The agency plausibly pleaded that it has historically felt a special religious calling to care for foster children. But the agency could not have (and did not) plausibly allege that its Catholic faith historically saw special value in the specific task that Philadelphia now hindered the agency from performing: namely, applying the City’s criteria and “wielding [the City’s] authority to determine whether

201 393 F.3d 559, 571 (2004).
202 Ibid.
203 Id. at 570.
204 Brief for Respondents at 19, Fulton, 141 S. Ct. 1868 (No. 19-123).
other private parties may legally care for” such children.205 After all, this particular way of helping foster children, entirely a creature of municipal law, wasn’t even possible until the City began regulating in this field. Meanwhile, though CSS could no longer certify couples on the City’s behalf (without violating its faith), CSS did “continue to provide congregate care and case management services for children in the City’s custody, for which the City [was still paying] CSS approximately $17 million annually.”206

Assume that if pressed, CSS would have said that it saw distinctive religious value in helping foster children, but not in helping with the certification process as such. Then the agency’s exclusion from the latter would not have substantially burdened its religion under my test. Unless, that is, this exclusion would have also denied CSS the ability or funding to perform other elements of foster care that do have irreplaceable religious significance for CSS—e.g., recruiting new foster parents, or giving them spiritual guidance and support. Whether that was so turns on factual details not clearly addressed in the briefing. (The details weren’t addressed precisely because the City focused on a Lyng argument, while CSS had framed the burden on itself too broadly: CSS said the City had “exclude[d it] from its historical ministry of caring for foster children,”207 period.) The Court’s opinion in Fulton, for its part, glossed over the whole “substantial burden” question in a short paragraph.208 If the adequate alternatives framework is the one to apply, Fulton skipped over the crucial questions.

2. Preferences, desires, and substantiality: prisons and zoning

Last section’s reading of “substantial burden” might sharpen a concern raised by RFRA and RLUIPA’s expansion to cover burdens on religious exercise, whether or not mandatory or central: What’s left to distinguish substantial from non-substantial burdens? Are preferences decisive? If that’s too lax, what is the alternative? Courts have struggled—sometimes drawing convincing lines on unconvincing grounds, and sometimes flouting RLUIPA’s command to protect non-central conduct.

That struggle was on display in a case brought by an inmate who practiced Asatru, an ancient polytheistic religion. Prison officials afforded him several items used in Asatru worship rituals but denied his request to hold outdoor worship circles. He sued under RLUIPA, arguing that the prison’s policy required him to practice religion “differently than he

206 Ibid.
207 Brief for Petitioners at 52, Fulton, 141 S. Ct. 1868 (No. 19-123).
208 Fulton, 141 S. Ct. at 1877; see supra notes 85–86 and accompanying text.
otherwise would have.” 209 This bare expression of a preference for an alternative means seemed hardly sufficient, and the district court found no substantial burden. But the court did so on RLUIPA-forbidden grounds: that practicing outdoors was not “essential” to the Asatru. 210 Then the Fourth Circuit, agreeing with this result but not that rationale, instead reasoned that the prison’s denial of access to an outdoor ceremony did not have the effect of “modifying the inmate’s behavior.” 211 But that’s obviously false. If there’s a sound basis for rejecting the claimant’s bare preference, neither court found it. What does my test say?

It says that an alternative is inadequate if it’s significantly costlier in material terms or worse in religious terms. The frustration of a mere preference is not by itself a significant material cost, so the question is whether the alternatives are as good in religious terms. 212 If the inmate thinks outdoor worship more religiously valuable, the burden is substantial, even if outdoor worship isn’t “central” to his faith. But if the inmate’s preference reflects nothing more than personal taste, the policy creates no substantial burden, even if it does require him to “modify” his behavior.” Enforcing this distinction between religiously grounded “preferences” and mere taste or convenience prevents claimants from getting an unfair advantage over nonbelievers: The distinction keeps claimants from stretching religious liberty to get an exemption for their mere taste or convenience. A few cases will show how the distinction plays out in practice:

- Someone religiously duty-bound to run a soup kitchen seeks an exemption from zoning laws, to run the kitchen out of her garage. 213 Unless her religion cares where the kitchen is run, 214 this zoning law imposes no substantial burden on her religion.
- A Muslim inmate challenged a ban on standing for long periods in prison dayrooms, saying the ban interfered with the postures required for his prayer five times a day. The court found no substantial burden because he was free to stand in the yard and his cell, to which he had access every hour. 215 Rightly so: Islam (as understood by the inmate) had nothing to say about whether prayers

209 Krieger, 496 F. App’x at 325.
210 Id. at 326.
211 Ibid.
212 Cf. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 216 (emphasizing the Amish way of life being protected “is not merely a matter of personal preference, but one of deep religious conviction”).
214 Or that there are no affordable alternative spaces to use.
215 DeMoss v. Crain, 636 F.3d 145 (5th Cir. 2011).
are better said in prison dayrooms or yards. His preference was a matter of taste.

By contrast:

- Certain prison restrictions prevented two Muslim inmates from attending Jumu’ah, a weekly religious service of “central importance,” and one that their faith required to take place on Fridays.\textsuperscript{216} Though granting all of this, the Supreme Court upheld the restrictions, partly on the ground that the inmates were free to engage in other Muslim practices. But whatever the propriety of this reasoning under the relaxed standard applied to burdens on prisoners’ First Amendment rights generally,\textsuperscript{217} the prison had surely imposed a substantial burden. As the prisoners pleaded and the Court never denied, their “preference” for Friday services was rooted in their religion, not taste.

- A Buddhist inmate challenged execution protocols forbidding his chaplain to accompany him in the execution chamber; the state suggested they meet shortly beforehand. “Persons of many faiths may desire the support of a cleric in the moments before death,” Justice Alito observed, but is denial of that desire a substantial burden?\textsuperscript{218} Though acknowledging that RLUIPA doesn’t require religious conduct to be central or mandatory, Alito noted that the Court has never said “what results when the State offers a prisoner an alternative practice that, in terms of religious significance, is indistinguishable from the prohibited practice.”\textsuperscript{219} My test’s verdict: if the alternative is no worse religiously,\textsuperscript{220} it’s adequate, and the burden is not substantial. By that standard, the burden here was substantial because the claimant, a Pure Land Buddhist, believed he could be reborn in the Pure Land “only if he [was] able to focus on the Buddha at the time of his death and that the presence of his spiritual advisor . . . would permit him to maintain the required focus by reciting an appropriate chant.”\textsuperscript{221}

There will be (as always) close cases, where the basis of the “preference” (religion or taste) is fuzzy. But this framework gives courts guidance on how to identify substantial burdens, beyond RFRA and RLUIPA’s negative rule about what not to require.

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{216} O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 352 (1987).
\item \textsuperscript{217} Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
\item \textsuperscript{218} Murphy v. Collier, 139 S. Ct. 1475, 1484 (2019) (mem.) (Alito, J., dissenting).
\item \textsuperscript{219} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{220} There was no question of a substantial material burden here: the prison wasn’t offering to allow the Buddhist chaplain into the chamber for a fee, for example.
\item \textsuperscript{221} Pet. for Prohibition in In re Murphy, No. 18–8615, at 12–13 (U.S. March 28, 2019).
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3. No religious privilege in speech: evangelists and abortion protestors

The Supreme Court has long taught that religious speech warrants no more protection than nonreligious speech. Perhaps for that reason, the Court has reviewed burdens on religious speech under the Free Speech Clause. (Some of the most famous free speech cases involved religiously motivated expression.\textsuperscript{222}) But as Professor Volokh has observed, RFRA might be read to give religious speech more protection. After all, RFRA imposes strict scrutiny of neutral burdens on religion, whereas the Free Speech Clause requires only intermediate scrutiny of content-neutral burdens on speech. But tighter protection of religious versus nonreligious speech might pose constitutional problems of its own, interfering with the free flow of ideas.\textsuperscript{223}

So it’s worth asking: Does RFRA give religious speech as such extra protection\textsuperscript{224} and, if it did, would that result be justified by religious liberty principles? The answers are “no” and “no” if the framework above is sound.

Content-neutral speech regulations generally face intermediate scrutiny, though only if the regulations leave adequate alternative channels for communication. But most regulations that do that will leave adequate alternatives for exercising religion (through speech), too, and thus shouldn’t trigger strict scrutiny under RFRA. That’s because the purpose of religious speech is usually the same as the already-protected purpose of nonreligious speech: spreading a message.

In other words, the religious goal of religious speech is usually no more particular than the goal of nonreligious speech: both aim to communicate. And that goal is safe under any content-neutral law that leaves adequate alternative channels for communication, and hence under any that passes muster under the Free Speech Clause. That’s why religious expression usually needs no more protection than nonreligious expression receives.

Conversely, if a speech regulation left you no adequate alternatives—because you felt obligated to do something more specific than spreading a message—the regulation would be burdening more than speech. It would be burdening obligatory conduct not reducible to the “conduct” of sharing a (religious) view with others. And then giving you more protection would

\textsuperscript{222} E.g., \textit{Barnette}, 319 U.S. 624; Cantwell \textit{v.} Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).


\textsuperscript{224} For what it’s worth, the Senate Judiciary Committee at the time would have answered in the negative. See S. REP. No. 111, at 9 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892, 1898.
not constitute an official preference for religious speech as such, so it wouldn’t raise free speech concerns.\textsuperscript{225}

Consider \textit{Heffron}, the leading Supreme Court case on this. A Minnesota regulation limited the distribution of written materials and solicitation of funds at the state fair to a few fixed locations. Members of the Krishna religion brought a First Amendment challenge, saying the regulation forbade them to carry out a religious duty to hand out literature in public places. The Court upheld the regulation as a content-neutral restriction leaving ample alternative channels for speech. And in an oft-quoted line, the Court denied that religious organizations “for present purposes . . . enjoy rights to communicate, distribute, and solicit on the fairgrounds superior to those of other organizations having social, political, or other ideological messages to proselytize.”\textsuperscript{226}

But why didn’t the Free Exercise Clause (pre-\textit{Smith}) give religious groups superior rights to communicate? The Court fudged this hard issue with its “for present purposes” hedge and its failure to address the group’s free exercise claim head on.\textsuperscript{227} In fact, some think the Court deliberately avoided reviewing religious expression claims under the Free Exercise Clause precisely to avoid the “embarrassment” of having to treat religious speech better, as pre-\textit{Smith} doctrine might seem to have required.\textsuperscript{228}

My test would not have embarrassed the Court. The Krishna claimants, like adherents of many other faiths, felt a duty to give witness, to preach the word—but not to preach from \textit{this versus that location on the Minnesota fairgrounds}. So the regulation that closed off only some spots left the preachers alternatives that were perfectly adequate. That’s why it imposed no substantial burden, and deserved nothing more than the intermediate scrutiny applied to other content-neutral laws. \textit{Heffron} came out right.

Something quite like the adequate alternatives principle seemed to drive the D.C. Circuit’s rejection of RFRA claims in two cases involving religious expression. But in both, the court ended up overstating the principle at stake in ways that may unfairly limit religious claims in other cases.

In one of the two cases involving expression, a Christian group sought to sell on the National Mall some t-shirts bearing Christian messages—against a regulation barring sales on the Mall. The court found no

\textsuperscript{225} Protecting religious conduct that happens to be tied up with religious speech may have a disparate impact in favor of some religious speech, on some occasions, but then so do less controversial measures like, for example, the ministerial exception, which gives religious groups more of a handle on their memberships and thus on their messaging.

\textsuperscript{226} \textit{Heffron}, 452 U.S. at 652–53.

\textsuperscript{227} \textit{Id.} at 659 n.3.

\textsuperscript{228} See Stone, supra note 145, at 994–96 (describing “the special embarrassment that exists when free speech and free exercise claims coalesce”).
substantial burden because the group’s “declarations do not suggest that their religious beliefs demand that they sell t-shirts in every place human beings occupy or congregate,” and because the regulation “is at most a restriction on one of a multitude of means” of “spread[ing] the gospel.”

But the court failed to spell out the principle at work in this distinction. While the court rightly rejected a test that asks only if the restriction makes claimants refrain from “religiously motivated conduct,” it lurched to the other extreme of protecting only religiously mandatory conduct. This rule would protect too little. What the court was after—but failed to articulate—is something like the adequate alternatives principle of protection.

Similarly, in the second expression case, the D.C. Circuit rightly rejected a claimant’s request for a RFRA exemption from a defacement ban preventing him from using chalk to write pro-life messages on the sidewalk in front of the White House when this was but “one of a multitude of means” of “spread[ing] his message”—it does not even “prevent [him] from chalking elsewhere.”

In the same vein, the Eleventh Circuit was right to reject a RFRA challenge to a law forbidding religious protestors from obstructing access to an abortion clinic since the law left them “ample avenues” for “express[ing] their deeply-held belief” about the injustice of abortion, and expressing that message was all they felt a religious duty to do.

CONCLUSION

Our constitutional liberties have an underappreciated coherence to them. Each liberty guards against some but not all incidental burdens. And each sifts the serious from insubstantial burdens in the same way: by appeal to an adequate alternatives principle. This principle ensures that in the face of regulations touching on a given liberty, people remain free to realize the interests served by that liberty to the same degree and at no greater cost.

Courts have long borrowed from the doctrine of one liberty to develop doctrines for another. So I’ve used this principle to spell out a test for “substantial burdens” on religion under RFRA, RLUIPA, and—if Smith is reversed—the First Amendment. The resulting test has linguistic, doctrinal, and moral appeal, giving religion protection only where religion

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230 Id. at 17 (citation omitted).
231 Id. at 16 (noting that “plaintiffs cannot claim that the regulation forces them to engage in conduct that their religion forbids or that it prevents them from engaging in conduct their religion requires.”) (citation omitted).
232 Mahoney v. Doe, 642 F.3d 1112, 1121 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
233 Cheffler v. Reno, 53 F.3d 1517, 1522 (11th Cir. 1995).
(forthcoming 108 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW (2022))

has more need of protection. And the test produces unified answers to a range of doctrinal puzzles about when courts should find that a legal burden on religion triggers heightened scrutiny. This test offers a balanced approach to politically charged cases and ensures fairness to less familiar minority faiths. And it avoids giving believers carte blanche, on the one hand, and having judges second-guess their religious judgments, on the other.

It may also speak to deeper questions of constitutional design—questions about which interests to protect with a civil liberty in the first place. For decades, scholars have debated, for example, whether it could be fair to give religion special protection over secular commitments from education to conscience to sports. Both sides have generally assumed that the answer turns on value judgments alone: Special protection for religion is fair if religion matters more, and unfair if not. Something similar is true of a related debate about whether it makes sense to single out speech for more protection than other activities. But “what rights are recognized” turns also on “which interests need judicial protection.” So for special protections of a given activity to be fair, the activity needn’t be more important than others. It might be, not more worthy, but more needful of this particular protection. But to tell if it is, one needs a clear view of the protection at issue.

This Article has proposed an answer: our civil liberties guard against incidental burdens that leave no adequate alternatives for pursuing important interests. So an interest will have greater need for this protection if neutral burdens on the interest are likelier to leave no adequate alternatives, compared to neutral burdens on other interests—if the interest is, in that sense, more fragile. Thus, this Article’s analysis of our existing liberties can shed light not only on how to fix their scope, but on whether to recognize them at all—and on which new civil liberties to create.

235 See, e.g., Leslie Kendrick, Free Speech as a Special Right, 45 PHIL. PUB. AFF. 87, 89 nn.6-7 (2017) (collecting articles on the topic).