

Gideon Yaffe

Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld Professor of Jurisprudence
Professor of Philosophy & Psychology
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Publications

Books

As Author:

The Age of Culpability: Children and the Nature of Criminal Responsibility, Oxford University Press, 2018.

Attempts: In the Philosophy of Action and the Criminal Law, Oxford University Press, 2010.

Manifest Activity: Thomas Reid's Theory of Action, Oxford University Press, 2004.

Liberty Worth the Name: Locke on Free Agency, Princeton University Press, 2000.

As Co-Editor:

Rational and Social Agency: The Philosophy of Michael Bratman (with Manuel Vargas), Oxford University Press, 2014.

Contemporary Perspectives on Early Modern Philosophy: Essays in Honor of Vere Chappell (with David Owen and Paul Hoffman), Broadview Press, 2008.

Articles

"How Could you?": The Moral Significance of Obliviousness" forthcoming in Agency, Negligence and Responsibility, edited by George Pavlakos and Veronica Rodriguez-Blanco, Cambridge University Press.

"Neuroscientific Evidence in the Courtroom: A Review" (middle author-- Aono, D.E., Yaffe, G., Kober, H.) forthcoming in Cognitive Research: Principles and Implications, 2019.

"Compromised Addicts" in Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility, 2019.

- “Alternative Lesser Evils” in Moral Puzzles and Legal Perplexities: Essays on the Influence of Larry Alexander, edited by Heidi Hurd, Cambridge University Press, 2019.
- “The Point of *Mens Rea*: The Case of Willful Ignorance” in Criminal Law and Philosophy, 2018.
- “Hypothetical Consent” in The Routledge Handbook of the Ethics of Consent, edited by Peter Schaber, 2018.
- “Consequences for Peers Differentially Bias Computations about Risk from Adolescence to Adulthood” (middle author—Powers, K.E., Yaffe, G., Hartley, C.A., Davidow, J.Y., Kober, H. & Somerville, L.H.) in Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 2018.
- “Mens Rea by the Numbers” in Criminal Law and Philosophy, 2017.
- “The Duty Requirement” in The Ethics and Law of Omissions, edited by Dana Nelkin and Sam Rickless, Oxford University Press, 2017.
- “Collective Intentionality in the Law” in The Routledge Handbook of Collective Intentionality, edited by Kirk Ludwig and Marija Jankovic, 2017.
- “Predicting the Knowledge–Recklessness Distinction in the Human Brain” (middle author—Iris Vilares, Michael J. Wesley, Woo-Young Ahn, Richard J. Bonnie, Morris Hoffman, Owen D. Jones, Stephen J. Morse, Gideon Yaffe, Terry Lohrenz, and P. Read Montague) in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 2017.
- “Desert for Wrongdoing” in The Journal of Ethics, 2016.
- “What Does Recent Neuroscience Tell Us About Criminal Responsibility?” (with Uri Maoz) in Journal of Law and the Biosciences, 2015.
- “Non-Political Images Evoke Neural Predictors of Political Ideology” (middle author--Ahn, W.-Y., Kishida, K. T., Gu, X., Lohrenz, T., Harvey, A. H., Alford, J. R., Smith, K. B., Yaffe, G., Hibbing, J. R., Dayan, P., & Montague, P. R.) in Current Biology, v.24, n. 22, 2014.
- “In Defense of Criminal Possession” in Criminal Law & Philosophy, 2014.
- “Criminal Attempts” in The Yale Law Journal, v. 124, n. 1. 2014.
- “Law and Neuroscience: Recommendations Submitted to the President's Bioethics Commission” in Journal of Law and the Biosciences, v. 1, n. 2, 2014. (Fifteen author consensus document co-written with Owen Jones and the other members of the MacArthur Law and Neuroscience Project.)

- “Moore in Jeopardy, Again” in Legal, Moral and Metaphysical Truths: The Philosophy of Michael Moore, edited by Kim Ferzan and Stephen Morse, Oxford University Press, 2016.
- “Hart’s Choices” in Hart on Responsibility, edited by Christopher Pulman, Palgrave-MacMillan, 2014.
- “Mind-Reading by Brain-Reading and Criminal Responsibility” in Law and Neuroscience: State of the Art, edited by Michael Pardo and Dennis Patterson, Oxford University Press, 2016.
- “On Reporting the Onset of the Intention to Move” (last author—Maoz, U., Mudrik, L., Rivlin, R., Ross, I., Mamelak, A., Yaffe, G.) in Surrounding Free Will edited by Alfred R. Mele, Oxford University Press, 2015.
- “Cognitive Neuroscience and Criminal Responsibility” (with Uri Maoz) in The Cognitive Neurosciences, edited by Michael Gazzaniga, MIT Press, 2015.
- “Attempts” in Philosophy of Law, edited by Joel Feinberg, Jules Coleman and Christopher Kutz, Thomson-Wadsworth Publishing, 2014.
- “Neurological Disorder and Criminal Responsibility” in Handbook of Clinical Neurology, 2013.
- “Are Addicts Akratic?: Interpreting the Neuroscience of Reward”, in Addiction and Self-Control, edited by Neil Levy, Oxford University Press, 2013.
- “Reid on Favors, Injuries and the Natural Virtue of Justice” (with Lewis Powell), in Thomas Reid on Mind, Knowledge, and Value, edited by Rebecca Copenhaver and Todd Buras, Oxford University Press, 2015.
- “Trying to Defend *Attempts*: Reply to Bratman, Brink, Alexander and Moore” in Legal Theory, v. 19. 2013
- “The Legal Importance of Trying: Reply to Enoch, Dahan-Katz and Berman” in Jerusalem Review of Legal Studies, v. 6, n.1, 2012.
- “Intending to Aid” in Law and Philosophy, 2012. Reprinted in Rodopi Philosophical Studies, v. 10—*Social, Political, & Legal Philosophy: Law and the Philosophy of Action*, v. 3, 2014.
- “More Attempts: A Reply to Duff, Husak, Mele and Walen” in Criminal Law and

Philosophy, v. 6, n. 3, 2012.

“Reply to Broersen, Nadelhoffer and Sverdlik” in Jurisprudence, v.3, n.2, 2012.

“Intoxication, Recklessness and Negligence” in Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law, v. 9, 2012.

“Attempt, Risk-Creation and Change of Mind: Reflections on *Herzog*” in Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law, v. 9, 2012.

“Moore on Causing, Acting and Complicity”, in Legal Theory, v. 18, 2012.

“The Voluntary Act Requirement” in The Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Law, edited by Andrei Marmor, 2012.

“Defending, not Excusing, ‘Excusing Mistakes of Law’” in Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association, v. 11, n. 1, 2011. A revised version appears in Jurisprudence, v. 6, n. 1, 2015 under the title “Excusing Mistakes of Law: A View Sketched” and “Replies to Guerrero and Greenberg”.

“Prevention and Imminence, Pre-punishment and Actuality”, in San Diego Law Review, v. 48, 2011.

“Trying to Kill the Dead: De Re and De Dicto Intention in Attempted Crimes” in Philosophical Foundations of Law & Language, edited by Andrei Marmor and Scott Soames, Oxford University Press, 2011.

“Lowering the Bar for Addicts” in Addiction and Responsibility, edited by George Graham and Jeffrey Poland, MIT Press, 2011.

“Locke on Consciousness, Personal Identity and the Idea of Duration” in Noûs, 2011.

“A Procedural Rationale for the Necessity Defense” in Responsibility in Morality and Law, edited by Susan Dimock, a special issue of The Journal of Value Inquiry, v. 43, 2009.

“Excusing Mistakes of Law” in Philosopher’s Imprint, 2009.
2010 winner of the American Philosophical Association’s Berger Prize for the best article or chapter in legal philosophy over the last two years.

“Libet and the Criminal Law’s Voluntary Act Requirement” in Conscious Will and Responsibility, edited by Lynn Nadel and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Oxford University Press, 2011.

“Beyond the Brave Officer: Reid on the Unity of the Mind and Locke’s Theory of Personal Identity” in Thomas Reid on Ethics, edited by Sabine Roeser,

Palgrave-Macmillan Press, 2009.

- "Thomas Reid on Consciousness and Attention" in Canadian Journal of Philosophy, v. 39, 2009.
- "Trying, Acting and Attempted Crimes" in Law and Philosophy, 2008.
- "Reasonableness in the Law and Second-Personal Address" in Loyola Law Review, v. 40, 2007.
- "Promises, Social Acts and Reid's First Argument for Moral Liberty" in Journal of the History of Philosophy, v. 45, 2007.
- "Trying, Intending and Attempted Crimes" in Philosophical Topics, v. 32, 2006.
- "More on 'Ought Implies Can' and Alternate Possibilities" in Midwest Studies in Philosophy: Free Will and Responsibility, v. 29, 2005.
- "The Government Beguiled Me': The Entrapment Defense and the Problem of Private Entrapment" in The Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, v.1, 2005.
- "Berkeley and the 'Mighty Difficulty': The Idealist Lesson of the Inverted Retinal Image" in Philosophical Topics, v. 31, 2005.
- "Conditional Intent and *Mens Rea*" in Legal Theory, v. 10, 2004.
- "Locke on Ideas of Substance and the Veil of Perception" in Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, v. 85, 2004.
- "Peach Trees, Gravity and God: Mechanism in Locke" (with Marleen Rozemond) in The British Journal for the History of Philosophy, v. 12, n. 3, 2004.
- "Time in the Movies" in Midwest Studies in Philosophy: Meaning in the Arts, v. 27, 2003.
- "Indoctrination, Coercion, and Freedom of Will" in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, v. 67, n. 2, September 2003.
- "Reid on the Perception of Visible Figure" in Journal of Scottish Philosophy, v. 1, n. 2, 2003.
- "The Office of an Introspectible Sensation: A Reply to Falkenstein and Grandi" in Journal of Scottish Philosophy, v. 1, n. 2, 2003.
- "Reconsidering Thomas Reid's Geometry of Visibles" in Philosophical Quarterly, v. 52, n. 209, October 2002. Reprinted in The Philosophy of Thomas Reid, edited by John Haldane and Stephen Read, Blackwell Publishing, 2003.
- "Recent Work on Addiction and Responsible Agency" in Philosophy and Public Affairs,

v. 30, n. 2, Spr. 2001.

“Locke on Suspending, Refraining and the Freedom to Will” in History of Philosophy Quarterly, v. 18, n. 4, October 2001.

“Free Will and Agency at Its Best” in Philosophical Perspectives, v. 14, edited by James Tomberlin, Oxford University Press, 2000.

“‘Ought’ Implies ‘Can’ and the Principle of Alternate Possibilities” in Analysis, v. 59, n. 3, July 1999.

“Velleman on Intentions as Reasons for Action” in Analysis, v. 55, n. 2, April 1995

“Freedom, Natural Necessity and the Categorical Imperative” in Kant-Studien, v. 86, 1995.

Reviews, Columns, Commentaries and Encyclopedia Entries

“Congress Should Give Felons the Right to Vote in Federal Elections” in The Hill, April 1, 2019.

“Children Deserve Leniency in the Law, and the Reason is Political” in Aeon, July 2018.

“Is Akrasia Necessary for Culpability? On Doug Husak’s *Ignorance of Law*” in Criminal Law and Philosophy, 2018.

“Would lower voting age justify being tougher on under 18s?” (interview with Joe Humphreys) in The Irish Times, May 8, 2018.

“Jon Venables and Robert Thompson should not have been punished as harshly as adults for killing James Bulger”, argues legal professor” in The Mirror, April 24, 2018.

“No, the Federal Charges against Garcia Zarate, Acquitted in Kate Steinle’s Killing, are not Double Jeopardy” in The Los Angeles Times, January 26, 2018.

“The Child’s Special Status and Disenfranchisement: A Comment on Keating” forthcoming in Criminal Law Reform Now, edited by John Child and Anthony Duff.

“Van Cleve on Reid on Exertion and Incompatibilism” forthcoming in Analytic Philosophy.

“Trump’s Administration Says the Travel Ban Isn’t Like Japanese Internment. It is.” (with Duncan Williams) in The Washington Post, May 16, 2017.

- “Give Felons and Prisoners the Right to Vote” in The Washington Post, July 26, 2016.
- “Activists say Airbnb drives up rents. But is that actually true? L.A. needs to find out” in The Los Angeles Times, May 16, 2016.
- “To Convict, Prove a Guilty Mind” in The New York Times, February 12, 2016.
- “Ruben on the Physical Action Theory of Trying” in Method, v. 4, n. 6, 2015.
- “Dopamine Dysfunction and Addict Responsibility: A Comment on Read Montague’s ‘The Freedom to Choose and Drug Addiction’” in Moral Psychology, Volume IV: Free Will and Moral Responsibility, edited by Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, MIT Press, 2014.
- “Michael Bratman” in the Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, edited by Robert Audi, Cambridge University Press, 2015.
- “Harry Frankfurt” in the Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, edited by Robert Audi, Cambridge University Press, 2015.
- “Review of Scott Shapiro’s Legality” in Philosophical Review, 2012.
- “Intention in the Law” in Companion to the Philosophy of Action, Wiley-Blackwell, 2010.
- “Harmfulness, Wrongfulness, Lesser Evils and Risk-Creation: A Comment on Douglas Husak’s Overcriminalization” in The Jerusalem Review of Legal Studies, v. 1, 2010.
- Critical Response to Stephen Darwall’s The Second-Person Standpoint: Morality, Respect and Accountability in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2010.
- Critical Response to John Fischer’s My Way in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2009.
- “The Real Link Between Imminence and Necessity” in Criminal Law Conversations, Oxford University Press, 2009.
- “Free Will and Volition” in Continuum Companion to Locke, Thoemmes Continuum Press, 2010.
- Review of James Harris’s Of Liberty and Necessity: The Free Will Debate in Eighteenth Century British Philosophy in Mind, v. 117, April 2008.
- Review of Randolph Clarke’s Libertarian Accounts of Free Will in The Journal of Ethics, 2007.

“Locke on Identity and the Identity of Persons” in The Cambridge Companion to Locke’s ‘Essay’, edited by Lex Newman, Cambridge University Press, 2007.

“Waldron’s Locke and Locke’s Waldron: Review of Jeremy Waldron’s God, Locke and Equality” (with Nomi Stolzenberg) in Inquiry, v. 49, n. 2, April 2006.

“Shaftesbury” in The Blackwell Companion to Early Modern Philosophy, edited by Steven Nadler, Blackwell Publishing, 2002.

“Thomas Reid” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (plato.stanford.edu)

“Review of Nicholas Jolley, Locke: His Philosophical Thought” in The British Journal for the History of Philosophy, June 2000.

“Review of J. Fischer and M. Ravizza, Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility” in Erkenntnis, December 2000.

Employment

2019-Present	Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld Professor of Jurisprudence and Professor of Philosophy & Psychology Yale Law School
2012-2019	Professor of Law and Professor of Philosophy & Psychology Yale Law School
2010-2012	Professor of Philosophy and Law University of Southern California Department of Philosophy & School of Law
2004-2010	Associate Professor of Philosophy and Law University of Southern California Department of Philosophy & School of Law
1999-2004	Assistant Professor University of Southern California Department of Philosophy
1998-1999	Lecturer University of California at San Diego Department of Philosophy

Education

June 1998	Ph.D. (Philosophy), Stanford University
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June 1992

A.B. (Philosophy), Harvard University

Professional Presentations

Papers

“Why Are Child Criminals Owed a Break?”

Presented at the University of Iowa (November 2018)

“Mens Rea by the Numbers”

Presented at a conference on strict liability and the responsible corporate officer doctrine at Georgetown Law Center (April 2017)

“Immaturity and Reduced Culpability”

Presented at a criminal law seminar at Harvard Law School (March 2017)

“Compromised Addicts”

Presented at a conference in honor of Gary Watson at Tulane University (November 2016)

“Giving Kids a Break”

Presented at the law school at University College London (June 2016)

“Targeted Investigation and Criminal Culpability”

Presented at an event hosted by USC Law School (November 2015)

“Omission and the Proper Objects of Criminal Liability”

Presented at a conference on Omission at the University of California San Diego (April 2015).

“The Point of Mens Rea: The Case of Willful Ignorance”

Presented at the Criminal Justice Roundtable at Yale (May 2015), as a colloquium at Georgia State University (October 2014), at the University of Connecticut Law School (September 2014), at Fordham Law School (November 2014), at the University of California at Irvine Law School (December 2014), and as the Law and Ethics Lecture at the University of Michigan (November 2014).

“Neuroscience and Skepticism About Free Will”

Presented at a conference on skepticism about freedom of will at the University of Chicago (April 2014).

“In Defense of Criminal Possession”

Presented as a colloquium at the University of California at San Diego (May 2013), the Law and Agency conference at the University of Antwerp (June 2013), and in events at Columbia Law School (October 2013), NYU Law School (October 2013), Northwestern Law School (October 2013), Yale Law School (March 2014), and to the philosophy department at the University of Vermont (April 2014).

“Libet and the Criminal Law’s Voluntary Act Requirement”

Presented at a seminar on responsibility at the University of Chicago Law School

“Criminal Responsibility—Voluntariness and Mental State: Two Neuroscientific Studies in Progress”

Presented to the Cognitive Forum at the UCLA Psychology Department (Feb 2013).

“Temptation, Disinhibition and Criminal Responsibility”

Presented to a criminal law seminar at Harvard Law School (Feb 2013) and in a colloquium session at the Pacific Meeting of the American Philosophical Association (March 2013).

“Attempts”

Presented in workshops at Yale Law School (February 2012) and University of Pennsylvania Law School (February 2012)

“Intending to Aid”

Presented at a conference on philosophy of action and the law at Instituto De Investigaciones Juridicas, Universidad Nacional Autonoma De Mexico. (September 2011) Presented at a philosophy department colloquium at Harvard (February 2012). And presented at the Analytic Law and Philosophy Conference at Yale (April 2012).

“Intoxication, Reckless and Negligence”

Presented at a conference on causing the conditions of one’s own defense at University of Pennsylvania Law School (December 2011).

“Criminal Responsibility and Neuroscience: The Absurd, the Overstated and the Potentially Useful (Someday, maybe)”

Presented as the Dean's Lecture at Yale Law School (November 2011)

"Prevention and Pre-Punishment, Imminence and Actuality"

Presented at a conference on preventive detention at the University of San Diego Law School (April 2011).

"Inherently Impossible Criminal Attempts"

Presented as a philosophy department colloquium at the University of Manitoba (March 2010).

"Addiction and the Reasonable Person"

Presented as a public lecture at the University of Manitoba (March 2010).

"Can We Try to Kill the Dead?: De Dicto and De Re Intention in Attempted Crimes"

Presented to the UCLA Legal Theory Workshop (November 2009).

"Harmfulness, Wrongfulness, Lesser Evils and Risk-Creation: A Comment on Douglas Husak's Overcriminalization"

Presented at Hebrew University as part of a symposium on Husak's book (March 2009).

"Trying by Asking: Solicitation as Attempt"

Presented as a philosophy department colloquium at Florida State University (October 2008) and in the General Aspects of Law seminar series at the University of California at Berkeley Law School (November 2008).

"Libet and the Criminal Law's Voluntary Act Requirement"

Presented at the Consciousness conference in Tucson, AZ (May 2008).

"Beyond the Brave Officer: Reid on the Unity of the Mind and Locke's Theory of Personal Identity"

Presented at the University of Toronto's conference on the history of thought about consciousness (May 2007) and as a philosophy department colloquium at the University of Pennsylvania (February 2008).

"Excusing Mistakes of Law"

Presented as a philosophy department colloquium at the University of California at Santa Barbara (November 2006) and the University of British Columbia (February 2007) and to the law school at the University of Illinois Champaign-Urbana (April 2007).

“Trying, Acting and Attempted Crimes”

Presented at the Analytic Law and Philosophy Conference (April 2006), and to the Social Ethics and Normative Theory group at Stanford University (April 2006).

“Trying, Intending and Attempted Crimes”

Presented as a philosophy department colloquium at Stanford University (April 2006).

“Reid on Consciousness and Attention”

Presented to the New York University Consciousness Seminar (February 2006).

“‘The Government Beguiled Me’: Legal Responsibility and the Entrapment Defense”

Presented as a colloquium at Cardozo Law School (February 2005), and to the UCLA Legal Theory Workshop (September 2004). Presented as a philosophy department colloquium at the University of California at Riverside (January 2004) and the California Institute of Technology (November 2003)

“Locke on Consciousness, Personal Identity and the Idea of Duration”

Presented at the 1st NYU Conference on Issues in Modern Philosophy (December 2004) and as a colloquium at the University of California at Irvine (April 2005).

“Promises, Social Acts and Reid’s First Argument for Moral Liberty”

Presented in a plenary session at the 3rd International Reid Symposium for Scottish Philosophy at the University of Aberdeen (July 2004).

“Reid’s Theory of Action and the Problem of Motivation”

Presented at the conference of the International Society for Eighteenth Century Studies (August 2003)

“Conditional Intent and *Mens Rea*”

Presented as a philosophy department colloquium at the University of Michigan (March 2003), at California State University at Northridge (March 2003), and at the University of San Francisco (April 2003).

“Precis of Liberty Worth the Name: Locke on Free Agency”

Presented at an author-meets-critics session on my book at the Southern California Philosophy Conference (October 2002)

“Motivated Action and Caused Behavior: Thomas Reid on the Influence of Motives”

Presented as a philosophy department colloquium at the University of California at Riverside (October 2002)

"Thomas Reid and the Geometry of Perspectival Shape"

Presented as a philosophy department colloquium at the University of Arizona (April 2002).

"Locke on Ideas of Substance and the Veil of Perception"

Presented in a symposium session at the 2001 Pacific meeting of the American Philosophical Association (March 2001).

"Character Traits and Reid's Third Argument for Moral Liberty"

Presented at the Reid Symposium at King's College, Aberdeen (July 2000), at the Southern California Philosophy Conference (October 2000), and at Colorado College (May 2001).

"Locke on Free Agency"

Presented as a philosophy department colloquium at Harvard University (January 1999), the University of California at Davis (January 1999), the University of Virginia (January 1999), the University of Southern California (January 1999) and the University of California at San Diego (October 1998).

"Free Will and Agency at its Best"

Presented as a philosophy department colloquium at Arizona State University (January 1999), and the University of California at Irvine (November 1998).

"Peach Trees, Spirits and God: Superaddition in Locke" (with Marleen Rozemond)

Presented at the California Conference in Early Modern Philosophy (September 1998).

"The Role of Personal Identity in Locke's Account of Free Agency"

Presented in a symposium session at the 1998 Pacific meeting of the American Philosophical Association (March 1998).

"An Evaluative Conception of Free Will"

Presented as a philosophy department colloquium at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (January 1997), the University of California at Riverside (January 1997), and the University of Massachusetts at Amherst (February 1997).

Comments

Replies to Alex Guerrero, Erin Kelly and Gabriel Mendlow at an author-meets-critics session about my book *The Age of Culpability* at the American Philosophical Association Eastern Division Meeting (January 2019).

Comment on Adil Haque's "Theorizing International Criminal Law Reform" at a conference on law reform at Rutgers Law School (April 2017).

Comment on Amy Sepinwall's "Faultless Wrongdoing" at New Voices in Criminal Law Theory, a conference held in Death Valley (March 2014).

Comment on Kim Ferzan's "Beyond Crime and Commitment" at the Pacific Meeting of the American Philosophical Association (March 2013).

Comment on David Dagan and Steven Teles, "The Social Construction of Negative Feedback: Incarceration, Conservatism and Policy Change" at the Criminal Justice Roundtable at University of Chicago Law School (April 2013).

Replies to Mitch Berman, David Enoch and Leora Katz at a conference on my book *Attempts* held at Hebrew University (June 2012).

Replies to Anthony Duff, Doug Husak and Alfred Mele at a conference on my book *Attempts* held at USC (October 2011)

Replies to Michael Bratman, David Brink and Michael Moore at an author-meets-critics session on my book *Attempts* at the meeting of the Pacific Division of the American Philosophical Association (April 2011).

Replies to Mark Greenberg and Alex Guerrero at the Berger Prize session on my paper "Excusing Mistakes of Law" at the meeting of the Pacific Division of the American Philosophical Association (April 2011).

On Douglas Husak's *Overcriminalization* at a conference on the book at Hebrew University (April 2009)

On Michael Moore's "Intention, Responsibility and the Challenges of Recent Neuroscience" at a conference on neuroscience and the law at Stanford Law School (March 2009)

On John Fischer's *My Way* at the Pacific Meeting of the American Philosophical Association (March 2008)

On James Harris's *Of Liberty and Necessity* at the Pacific Meeting of the American Philosophical Association (March 2007)

On Chrisoula Andreou's "On Harmful Addictions and Habits" at the Pacific Meeting of the American Philosophical Association (March 2005)

On Giovanni Grandi's "Thomas Reid's Notion of Visible Figure" at the Pacific Meeting of the American Philosophical Association (March 2004)

On James Harris's "Thomas Reid and the Limits of Philosophy" at the Pacific Meeting of the American Philosophical Association (March 2002)

On Galen Strawson's "Free Agents" at the Causation and Free Will Conference at Florida State University (January 2002)

On James Harris's "Hume's Reconciling Project and 'the common distinction between *moral* and *physical* necessity'" at the Hume Society Conference (July 2001)

On David Owen's "Locke and Hume on Belief and Assent" at the California Conference in Early Modern Philosophy (October 2000)

On Kenneth Winkler's "Intelligibility and the Theory of Ideas" at the California Conference in Early Modern Philosophy (June 1999)

On Jack Davidson's "Leibnizian Lessons in Philosophical Theology, or, Why Theists Shouldn't be Libertarians" at the Central meeting of the American Philosophical Association (April 1999)

Fellowships, Awards, Grants and Service

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| 2019-20 | Fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences at Stanford. |
| 2015 | Guggenheim Fellowship |
| 2014-2017 | (with Hedy Kober) Grant from the Oscar M. Ruebhausen Fund at Yale Law School to fund "Psychological and Neural Mechanisms of Adolescent Peer Influence" |
| 2011-14 | Member of the MacArthur Foundation Research Network on Law and Neuroscience. |
| 2011-13 | (with Christof Koch and Uri Maoz) Grant from the Templeton Foundation's Big Questions in Free Will Project to fund "An Intracranial Study of Free Will and Moral Responsibility". |

- 2010 The Berger Prize, given for the best article or chapter in legal philosophy over the last two years, from the American Philosophical Association for “Excusing Mistakes of Law”.
- 2009-10 New Directions Fellowship from the Mellon Foundation to study neuroeconomics at Caltech.
- 2008-09 Burkhardt Fellowships for Recently Tenured Scholars from the American Council of Learned Societies (awarded 2007, used 2008-09)
- 2007-2010 Member, Network on Criminal Responsibility and Prediction of the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation Project on Law and Neuroscience
- 2007 Fellowship from USC Provost’s Initiative for the Advancement of Scholarship in the Social Sciences and Humanities
- 2004 USC College General Education Teaching Award
- 2002-2003 Research Fellowship from the American Council of Learned Societies
- Summer 2000 Participant in a National Endowment for the Humanities Summer Seminar on Thomas Reid
- 1993-1998 Department Fellowship, Stanford University
- 1997 Fellow in the Institute for the Study of the History of Modern Philosophy, University of Massachusetts at Amherst

Referee: Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Criminal Law and Philosophy, Dialogue, Ethics, Inquiry, Journal of the History of Philosophy, Law and Philosophy, Legal Theory, Mind, Noûs, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, Philosopher’s Imprint, Philosophical Quarterly, Philosophical Studies, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Utilitas, the National Endowment for the Humanities, Acumen Publishing, Cambridge University Press, and Oxford University Press.

Editorial Boards: Philosophy Compass, Southern Journal of Philosophy, Legal Theory, and Law and Philosophy.