CIVIL LIBERTIES ENFORCEMENT
AND THE NEW DEAL STATE

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In May 1937, just one month after the Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of the National Labor Relations Act, the American Civil
Liberties Union issued a report on the merits of judicial review. Its subject
was only incidentally the Court’s persistent invalidation of New Deal
economic legislation, which prompted President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s ill-
fated Judicial Procedures Reform Bill. Instead, the ACLU’s report—
prepared by Osmond Fraenkel, a member of the Board of Directors and the
ACLU’s Supreme Court litigator—addressed the question “how far the
Court has been a defender of civil liberties.” To that end, it evaluated the
Court’s record in civil liberties cases since the nineteenth century. It
concluded that the Court had “more often failed to protect the Bill of Rights
than preserve it,” and that those decisions favorable to civil liberties
involved “less important issues.” Still, the Court had begun to protect
“personal rights” (a term encompassing privacy, bodily integrity, and
expressive freedom) more vigilantly as a result of its “widening conception
of the due process clause.” As Fraenkel reflected in comments to the ACLU
Board, “so long as we believe in safeguarding the rights of minorities, the
power of review is essential to protect these rights.”

The report was poorly timed to influence debate. By May, the
prospects for the president’s court-packing plan were dim, and the ACLU’s
eleventh-hour contribution to the discussion garnered relatively little notice.


2 It tallied the Court’s decisions in such far-ranging areas as military trials, slavery or
peonage, searches and seizures, freedom of religion, education, aliens and citizenship,
freedom of speech, and labor relations.

Fraenkel, the Supreme Court had “spoken strongly against federal laws restricting civil
liberties” only once, in \textit{Ex parte Milligan}, 71 U.S. 2 (1866). Felix Cohen went further. By
his interpretation of the case law, “No person deprived of any civil liberty by an oppressive
act of Congress has ever received any help from the Supreme Court. On the other hand,
when Congress has extended aid to those deprived of civil liberties, the Supreme Court, in
five cases out of seven, has nullified the aid that Congress tendered.” Felix Cohen to

4 Preliminary Report of the American Civil Liberties Union Temporary Committee
Concerning the Supreme Court, ACLU Papers, reel 143, vol. 978.
In contrast to the ACLU’s ambivalence, mainstream conservatives and the American Bar Association publicly celebrated the Supreme Court’s recent decisions upholding (if tepidly) civil liberties—decisions, that is, in cases argued by Fraenkel and the ACLU, which most members of the bar had staunchly opposed when they were handed down. Newly converted, the ABA proclaimed to radio audiences that the Supreme Court had proven its worth by defending personal and property rights alike. To Fraenkel, that was precisely the problem. “Since property can defend itself more effectively,” he cautioned, “administrative officials and lower courts follow the Supreme Court more consistently in protecting property than personal rights.” The result was that “the fight for personal rights has constantly to be fought over.”

The ACLU’s report is a striking document. It represents the organization’s effort to grapple with one of the most divisive questions facing civil liberties advocates during the 1930s: whether efforts to defend civil liberties should proceed through the legislature, government agencies, or the courts. That question was intimately bound up with an equally fundamental debate over how civil liberties should be defined and what goals and values they served. Notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s newfound deference toward economic regulation, the ACLU remained skeptical of the judiciary. Within a few years, however, the dilemma raised by Fraenkel had been decisively settled. By the 1940s, the organization’s “battleground [was] chiefly in the courts.” Its volunteer attorneys had carried “scores of civil liberties issues” to the United States Supreme Court, “where decisions in case after case [had] firmly established the interpretations of the Bill of Rights which the Union supports.”

6 See Laura Weinrib, “The Liberal Compromise: Civil Liberties, Labor, and the Limits of State Power, 1917–1940” (PhD diss., Princeton University, 2011); Emily Zackin, “Popular Constitutionalism’s Hard When You’re Not Very Popular: Why the ACLU Turned to the Courts,” Law and Society Review 42 (2008), 367–96. In the wake of the First World War, the nascent civil liberties movement had sought unsuccessfully to secure its agenda through propaganda and popular persuasion. Its constituents subsequently experimented with a range of top-down methods for cabining state repression—including, but not limited to, a court-based approach—despite conflicting conceptions of government’s appropriate reach. Even in the domain of legal argument, its early victories were rarely decided on constitutional grounds; rather, civil liberties advocates counseled prosecutorial restraint and, in court, argued that criminal statutes and the common law contained safe harbors for dissenting views. By the end of the 1920s, however, civil liberties advocates increasingly pressed, and occasionally won, constitutional claims.
7 American Civil Liberties Union, Presenting the American Civil Liberties Union, Inc., November 1941 (New York: American Civil Liberties Union, 1941).
8 American Civil Liberties Union, Presenting the American Civil Liberties Union,
By the Second World War, civil liberties were effectively subsumed within the constitutional protections for criminal defendants, religious freedom, and, most famously, freedom of speech. Those rights, in turn, were enforced by the judiciary against an interventionist state. The vision of civil liberties that ultimately prevailed established the judiciary as a check on majoritarian democracy and administrative discretion. State action was its target, not its engine. Civil liberties enforcement was a species of judicial review that closely resembled substantive due process—that is, it curtailed government’s power to interfere with “private” behavior, without disturbing the legal framework through which market power was allocated and preserved—a feature that industry understood and quickly endorsed.

But this narrow commitment to a counter-majoritarian Bill of Rights was the terminus of the interwar civil liberties movement rather than its origin. Recovering the historical alternatives to court-based constitutionalism entails taking a more expansive and prospective view.

Put briefly, state neutrality was not the only plausible posture for civil liberties during the New Deal, and the courts were not the only plausible candidate for civil liberties enforcement. The ACLU, whose deep state-skepticism initially stemmed from the tenets of radical trade unionism, framed popular and judicial understandings of civil liberties in the interwar period and after. The account of civil liberties that the organization espoused and the Court eventually accepted reflected a strategic partnership with such unlikely entities as the American Bar Association and the American Liberty League. Meanwhile, many of the ACLU’s liberal and labor allies broke with the organization over its reliance on judicial review. The labor movement, after all, had railed for more than a century at its ill treatment by the courts.9 For their part, the New Deal reformers who called for active intervention in the economy also demanded active intervention on behalf of disfavored ideas. They advocated adjustments in the marketplace of ideas to correct distortions stemming from inequality of access or relative power. And many sought to implement that vision in spite of, rather than through, the courts.

The first goal of this Article, then, is to redress a lacuna in historical accounts of civil liberties advocacy and enforcement during the New Deal.

Its second objective is to relate that historical intervention to theoretical accounts of liberal legalism, institutional competence, and constitutional change. The New Deal transformation in constitutional law is conventionally understood to contain two distinct but interconnected parts: first, a relaxation of structural constraints on Congress’s control over the economy, entailing the complete revision of commerce clause and federalism doctrine, in addition to the abrogation of freedom of contract and property rights; and second, an invigoration of constitutional protections for “discrete and insular minorities” along with free speech. The latter is said to ensure the democratic legitimacy of the former: judicial deference to the outcomes of democratic processes requires robust debate, with ample protection for minority interests, as state policy is formulated and enforced. However sensible the new arrangement appears in hindsight, however, few contemporaries understood judicial review as susceptible to decoupling in this way. On the contrary, most critics (and, later, conservative opponents of the Court—packing plan) assumed that judicial review came as a package, and that in the absence of constitutional amendment, expansion of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to protect personal rights would buttress the Court’s economic due process doctrine as well.

As events unfolded, the judiciary’s anti-regulatory constitutionalism evolved along less predictable and more insidious lines. The Supreme Court definitively abandoned its aggressive defense of property and economic liberty. And yet, industry rapidly assimilated free speech as a second-best alternative to Lochner-era economic rights. By 1940, the First Amendment would stand in for substantive due process as a shield against government regulation of industry—a process I explore in other work. In 1937, however, the disaggregation of personal and property rights still seemed radical. Indeed, with respect to labor’s most cherished weapons—the rights to organize, boycott, and strike—the Court’s embrace of “preferred freedoms” and its validation of the Wagner Act initially served the same end.

During the 1930s, then, the judiciary emerged for the first time as a potential guardian and even emblem of personal freedom. But it would be years before it was the only plausible forum for enforcing civil liberties, let

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10 United States v. Carolene Products Company, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n. 4 (1938). Footnote 4, which provided the basis for the most familiar civil-rights victories of the twentieth century, was initially invoked far more frequently in First Amendment cases than in race cases. On the “bifurcated review process,” see G. Edward White, The Constitution and the New Deal (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000).

alone the most desirable one. On the contrary, New Deal civil liberties advocates pursued their agenda simultaneously across the full range of state actors. What stands out most about their efforts is the similarities in outcome among the various forums. At the level of policy, ideology, and even personnel, institutional differences mattered less than New Deal lawyers and activists expected. In short, constitutionalism outside the courts resembled nothing so much as constitutionalism within them.

Drawing on archival materials, including unpublished organizational records, government documents, and personal correspondence, this Article introduces an unfamiliar and surprising account of civil liberties enforcement during the 1930s. The first Part identifies four discrete visions of civil liberties in circulation among advocates and government actors during the New Deal: a radical, state-skeptical vision rooted in the “direct action” of militant trade unionism; a progressive vision premised on deliberative openness in the formulation of public policy; a conservative vision that linked economic liberty to the Bill of Rights; and a substantive vision that encompassed material social and economic goals. By the late New Deal, these competing understandings yielded to a synthetic, liberal vision that privileged judicial enforcement. Part II then takes up, in turn, the practice of civil liberties enforcement within four New Deal institutions that vied for interpretive power: the Supreme Court, the Senate Civil Liberties Committee, the National Labor Relations Board, and the Civil Liberties Unit within the Department of Justice. All of the administrative actors discussed in this Article associated civil liberties primarily with workers’ rights to organize, boycott, and strike. The labor-centric vision of civil liberties contended with other alternatives, however, which foregrounded individual autonomy in place of group rights.

In Part III, I draw several tentative conclusions from these historical materials with respect to the relationship between institutional constraints and accounts of constitutional rights. Sometimes, the institutional actors featured in this Article operated at cross purposes. Often, their efforts overlapped. Although it is possible to identify some salient differences between them—most notably, with respect to their willingness to constitutionalize positive rights—all proved to be responsive to popular pressures and yet willing to resist public opinion to protect disfavored rights claimants against both state and private repression.

As a matter of historical circumstance, the theory of civil liberties that prevailed during the New Deal foregrounded the courts as a check on state abuses. Whether that was the only plausible outcome should matter to constitutional theorists as much as historians. Reconstructing the alternatives visions of civil liberties and their optimal enforcement in the
formative years of the modern civil liberties movement reveals the anticipated advantages of the judicial strategy as well as its costs.

I. Visions of Civil Liberties During the New Deal

Historians and constitutional scholars have approached civil liberties enforcement during the New Deal through an unduly narrow lens—a focus shaped by the state-skeptical and court-centered vision of civil liberties that ultimately prevailed. They have looked for struggles over the appropriate scope of state power to curb advocacy and expression. They have found them in the seminal First Amendment cases that populate the pages of Constitutional Law casebooks.

To be sure, these familiar battles over subversive propaganda, expressive freedom, and the security of the state were understood by New Dealers as important civil liberties concerns. To cabin civil liberties in this way, however, is inconsistent with contemporary understanding. During the 1930s, the meaning of civil liberties was in flux. More to the point, it was vehemently contested. Whatever their underlying objectives, advocates across the political spectrum defended them in civil liberties terms. To some, civil liberties were constraints on state power; to others, they served as a basis for state intervention against private abuses or economic inequality. Civil liberties might undercut administrative discretion or justify government intrusions. By the end of the decade, even constituencies that had long decried free speech as a cover for subversive activity claimed the mantle of civil liberties as their own.

This convergence on civil liberties was more than mere rhetoric. The common terminology betokened a common engagement with (if not a shared solution to) a basic New Deal problem, namely, the appropriate balance between state power and individual rights in a period of rapid government growth. Under the rubric of civil liberties, self-described civil liberties advocates debated such far-ranging issues as anti-lynching legislation, tribal autonomy for American Indians, expansion of political asylum, transfer of colonial possessions from naval to civilian rule, and the rights of the unemployed. At an ACLU-sponsored conference on Civil Liberties Under the New Deal in 1934, representatives from such groups as the International Labor Defense, the National Urban League, and the NAACP debated legislative proposals to expand asylum for political refugees, provide jury trials in postal censorship cases, and criminalize lynching under federal law. Although they “showed surprising unanimity

12 Memorandum of Bills Proposed for Discussion, Conference on Civil Liberties under
of opinion on fundamentals,” delegates clashed over such issues as the desirability of federal regulation of radio content—including a requirement to allocate equal radio airtime to all sides of controversial questions—and the tradeoffs between private and public control. Over the course of the decade, self-described civil liberties advocates would split over anti-fascist security measures, the extension of free speech to Nazi marches, and the propriety of racial discrimination in public accommodations.

If there was a single issue, however, that most poignantly foregrounded the costs and benefits of an interventionist state vis-à-vis personal rights, it was the labor question. In fact, the defining feature of the interwar civil liberties movement in the United States was its obsession with labor relations. Between the First World War and the New Deal, the modern civil liberties movement evolved from a radical fringe group espousing labor’s right of revolution to a mainstream exponent of widely held (if seldom enforced) principles of constitutional democracy. The primary architect of that feat was the American Civil Liberties Union. After an unsuccessful stint as a “frankly partisan[]” labor adjunct, the organization had extended its operations into such areas as academic freedom, artistic expression, and sex education, in which broad-based consensus was feasible. When it solicited assistance in labor cases during the 1920s, it was careful to emphasize the neutrality of its principles. And yet, for the radical core of the ACLU leadership, civil liberties were synonymous with the “right of agitation”—roughly, a right of private actors

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16 Walter Nelles, Suggestions for Reorganization of the National Civil Liberties Bureau (undated), ACLU Papers, reel 16, vol. 120.
to marshal persuasion, propaganda, and economic power in the arena of political and economic struggle, without intervention by the state.

Needless to say, theirs was not the only view. While conservatives were marginal in the 1920s civil liberties coalition, some were sympathetic to expanding the scope of private action.\(^\text{18}\) Progressives, meanwhile, played a central role. For many of them, civil liberties served to buttress rather than undermine state power. When they endorsed the rights of workers to organize or disseminate their views, they emphasized the marketplace of ideas and disavowed radical ends. Their defense of labor radicals echoed Justice Holmes’s dissenting pronouncement in *Gitlow v. New York*: “If in the long run the beliefs expressed in proletarian dictatorship are destined to be accepted by the dominant forces of the community, the only meaning of free speech is that they should be given their chance and have their way.”\(^\text{19}\)

As long as civil liberties were more aspiration than reality, disagreements within the civil liberties campaign were relatively inconsequential. In the 1930s, by contrast, seemingly small differences took on immense proportions. And the most important fracture in the civil liberties alliance occurred over New Deal labor policy.

The core of the conflict involved competing attitudes toward state power and the federal courts. The various efforts to regulate labor relations during the New Deal prescribed a strong role for the state in brokering disputes between workers and their employers. This development marked a substantial departure from labor’s longstanding skepticism toward state involvement, most familiarly expressed in the American Federation of Labor’s commitment to labor voluntarism. Although they had often endorsed political candidates and welcomed government support in return, AFL unions had vehemently opposed compulsory arbitration and favored collective bargaining over statist protections for workers’ rights. And while radical trade unionists anticipated the eventuality of a proletarian state, in the short term many promoted non-state “direct action.” Consistent with American labor leaders’ deep distrust of the state, previous measures to protect labor’s rights—most famously, the 1933 Norris-LaGuardia Act, which the ACLU had helped to draft\(^\text{20}\)—had sought to shield the struggle


\(^{19}\) 268 U.S. 652 (1925).

\(^{20}\) In 1931, its National Committee on Labor Injunctions managed to produce a draft anti-injunction measure agreeable to the AFL, labor lawyers, law professors, and interested organizations. Monthly Bulletin for Action, January 1931, ACLU Papers, reel 79, vol. 444. The bill eliminated ex parte hearings, ensured that all violations of injunctions would be tried by juries, limited punishment of contempt, abolished yellow dog contracts, and
between workers and industry from government intervention, not to invite the state in. Indeed, in the early interwar period, insulating the instruments of direct action had been the civil liberties movement’s most pressing goal.

Against this trajectory, the New Deal’s state-centered labor policy reflected an ironic reversal of the civil liberty movement’s founding assumptions. New Deal legislation explicitly recognized the “right of employees to organize” and preserved the “right to strike.” Indeed, in the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), Congress eventually declared its intention to protect “the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing.” 21 Importantly, it accomplished these objectives not merely by preventing state incursions on workers’ organizing efforts, but employer interference as well. That is, it marshaled the power of the state to facilitate labor activity. In the process, it sharply limited employers’ common law prerogatives, including some—such as freedom of contract—that had long been accorded constitutional status.

From the perspective of state involvement, the NLRA reflected a compromise. The statute employed state power to shield workers from employer retaliation for concerted activity and to force employers to the bargaining table. But it was equally central to the statutory framework that the parties would negotiate and police their own substantive contractual terms. The NLRA sought to equalize bargaining power by curtailling employers’ common law prerogatives and by removing legal and economic obstacles to worker power. The role of the NLRB was to ensure that employers played by the rules.

The new approach satisfied most, but not all, proponents of labor’s civil liberties. Within the mainstream labor movement, the dissenters were committed voluntarists representing established craft unions. Their relatively strong bargaining power rendered government assistance unnecessary; in their view, the risks of administrative meddling outweighed the benefits. 22 By contrast, the industrial unionists who sought to organize unskilled workers overwhelmingly favored affirmative protections in part

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21 NLRA Section 13; Section 1.
because they had more to gain.\footnote{23}{William E. Forbath, \textit{Law and the Shaping of the American Labor Movement} (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991).}

But there were critics on the left, as well—and the Communists and other radicals who opposed the Wagner Act framed their objections in civil liberties terms. Influenced by their concerns, the ACLU informed Senators Wagner and Walsh in a letter that the organization would not support the Wagner Act because no federal agency could be trusted “to fairly determine the issues of labor’s rights.” It expressed several concrete objections to the exclusion of agricultural workers and the failure of the act to prohibit “discrimination on account of sex, race, color or political convictions.”\footnote{24}{Wagner declined to address the objections in light of Baldwin’s “frank statement that [he was] philosophically against any legislation that might set up a government agency as one of the areas within which the industrial struggle might be waged.” Robert Wagner to Roger Baldwin, 5 April 1935, ACLU Papers, reel 116, vol. 780. In general, those advocates of the Wagner Act who were concerned with racial discrimination thought that “racial discrimination, etc. will only be eliminated after economic injustices are corrected.” John W. Edelman to Roger Baldwin, ACLU Papers, reel 116, vol. 780; John P. Davis to Roger Baldwin, 25 January 1935, in Gardner Jackson Papers, 1912–1965, Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library, Hyde Park, N.Y. (hereafter Jackson Papers), General Correspondence, box 3, folder ACLU: Labor (advising against a prohibition on racial discrimination in trade unions because “such promises, even if enacted into law would be unenforceable in any real sense” and would in any case “be used by the industry as another weapon to defeat the solidarity of the trade-union movement,” and urging the ACLU instead to enlist the support of the union rank and file in defeating segregation).}

In later years, these would become major civil liberties concerns.\footnote{25}{See Sophia Lee, \textit{The Workplace Constitution from the New Deal to the New Right} (Cambridge University Press, forthcoming 2014).} For the time being, however, the ACLU emphasized other defects, including the ability of the board to act on its own initiative. To Roger ACLU co-founder Roger Baldwin, who authored the letter, any governmental intervention in the labor struggle was an independent and fundamental incursion on civil liberties.\footnote{26}{Roger Baldwin to Robert Wagner, 1 April 1935, ACLU Papers, reel 116, vol. 780; Roger Baldwin to David I. Walsh, 30 March 1935, Jackson Papers, General Correspondence, box 3, folder ACLU: Labor.}

Baldwin considered the conflict between labor and capital to be the “central struggle involving civil liberties,” and he believed that administrative intervention would inevitably undermine labor’s cause. He acknowledged that his continuing state skepticism was increasingly out of line with mainstream opinion. Opposition to administrative power emanated from two principal sources, he explained: “employers still wedded to laissez-faire economics,” and their unlikely allies, those “radicals who oppose state capitalism as a form of economic fascism, denying to the
working class a chance to develop its power.”

Still, according to Baldwin, government could not be trusted to safeguard labor’s interests. The workers who accomplished most were the ones who struck hardest. “The real fight is on the job,” he said, “not in Washington.”

Where Baldwin saw violence and compulsion, others saw the potential for buttressing labor’s strength. Wagner was disappointed at Baldwin’s position and considered it short-sighted. In his view, which many progressives shared, government regulation was the only feasible means of countering powerful private interests. Appropriate state policies would facilitate organizing, not quash it. As it turned out, the ACLU’s national membership sided with Wagner, and the organization eventually rescinded its opposition to the bill.

Historians who have noticed the ACLU’s engagement with New Deal labor policy have regarded it as an aberration—a diversion from the organization’s true and abiding concerns. In so doing, they have missed or fundamentally misconstrued the core conflict over civil liberties during the New Deal. Civil liberties, in 1935, was not reducible to the Bill of Rights.

What, then, are we to make of the fact that debates over New Deal labor legislation were framed in civil liberties terms? The NLRA created positive, affirmative rights of a kind typically absent in accounts of American constitutionalism, much less civil liberties. These rights sometimes sounded in constitutional language, and they were intimately

27 Speech of Roger Baldwin, Annual Meeting of the ACLU, 19 February 1934, ACLU Papers, reel 105, vol. 678.
28 Ibid. According to Baldwin, this principle was responsible for the particularly disfavored plight of “Negro workers” in the current administrative scheme. “Exploited by the employers in the hardest and lowest-paid jobs, they are also excluded from most unions. They cannot organize and fight in independent unions, Negro Workers’ rights—N.R.A. or no N.R.A.—are pretty near zero.” Ibid.
30 E.g., John W. Edelman, David S. Schick, and Isadore Katz to Roger Baldwin, 3 May 1935, ACLU Papers, reel 116, vol. 780; John W. Edelman to Roger Baldwin, ACLU Papers, reel 116, vol. 780 (“Trade unionists who know ‘what it’s all about’ realize well enough that the Labor Disputes Bill has many weaknesses and will not bring about social justice, but they also know that the passage of some such legislation is essential to enable the organization drive in the unorganized industries to continue. . . . The Civil Liberties [Union] functions usually for the alleged radical unions who are so weak that they are licked before getting started with or without a Labor Disputes Bill. In fact the Communist led unions don’t really want to settle strikes and you know that is the case. But some of us are connected with really militant-acting unions who do things and who want to settle strikes. We have used the government mechanisms and the arbitration technique very effectively to that end.”).
bound up with freedom of speech. Did the Wagner Act’s proponents stake out an alternative constitutional vision, or did they reject constitutionalism altogether? Relatedly, what was the connection between their substantive commitments and the architecture they established for civil liberties enforcement?

In discussions over the Wagner Act, advocates for workers’ “civil liberties” were up against fundamentals. For the first time, the progressive project for the affirmative protection of labor’s rights was a realistic possibility. The modern civil liberties movement had been founded on resistance to state power. When the state appeared ready to come genuinely to its aid, the labor movement set aside its reservations (which, in any case, had always been qualified) and embraced government action.

But for some civil libertarians, resistance to state authority had become a core unifying ideology, even outside the labor context. In such cases as Pierce v. Society of Sisters, the Scopes trial, and United States v. Dennett, they had denounced the governmental oversight of ideas as dangerous and misguided.\(^{31}\) Over the course of the 1920s, they had expanded from a skeptical stance toward state intervention in labor disputes to a general aversion to state interference with minority viewpoints, personal morality, and private life.

The founding leaders of the interwar civil liberties movement were victims of their own success. To keep the state out of the labor struggle, they had hitched the right of agitation to the First Amendment. They emphasized a neutral commitment to freedom of speech and association consistent with government oversight of the economy, rather than a revolutionary right to restructure government and the economy through collective power. Strikes were legitimate not because the proletariat retained the right to reconstitute the state, but because picketing communicated workers’ views.

The result was a fundamental reshuffling of the civil liberties lineup. The loose coalition of the 1920s was destined to dissolve. In its place, at least four competing visions of civil liberties emerged. The first was the radical vision, which Baldwin and some labor radicals continued to espouse. On this account, which foregrounded the right of agitation, state regulation of labor slid inevitably into fascism. To be sure, state suppression of artistic expression and sexual freedom was also ill-advised. But the true civil liberties threat was the institutionalization and consequent vitiation of labor’s collective, revolutionary power. These radicals did not regard civil liberties

\(^{31}\) Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Scopes v. Tennessee, 152 Tenn. 424 (Tenn. 1925); United States v. Dennett, 39 F.2d 564 (2nd Cir. 1930).
liberties as bounded by the Bill of Rights. On the contrary, as they often emphasized, civil liberty preexisted the Constitution. The right of agitation mapped almost fully onto the labor struggle, and it was broad enough to encompass all of workers’ tools.

The second view was a progressive vision of civil liberties that is still familiar to us today. For many New Dealers, the rights to organize, picket, and strike were derivative of a constitutional commitment to expressive freedom. Theirs was the understanding associated—in distinct but basically compatible forms—with Justices Holmes and Brandeis as well as influential First Amendment theorists such as Zechariah Chafee and Alexander Meiklejohn. Thus, in his capacity as a member of the ACLU’s National Committee, Meiklejohn wrote to register his support for the NLRA, lamenting “the tendency of the Board to engage in industrial disputes instead of fighting for the maintaining of civil liberties in connection with them.”

The progressives had never entirely accepted the notion of a right of agitation as an independent revolutionary force, productive of (rather than protected by) the marketplace of ideas. More to the point, they never were opposed to state power as such, merely to the intrusion of the state into the realms of democratic decision-making and private conduct. As a result, they were willing to bracket the regulation of labor relations as an appropriate forum for the exercise of state power—even if the result was ameliorative and counter-revolutionary—as long as rights derived from the First Amendment were preserved. In other words, for progressives, fundamental transformation of the economic system might be accomplished through the exercise of civil liberties, but it was not a civil liberty in and of itself.

It bears emphasis that the progressive understanding was, as yet, neither negative nor necessarily tied to the courts. It was, however, a constitutional vision. An earlier generation of progressives had understood civil liberties (though they did not yet use that term) as a thumb on the scale, not a constitutional right. Often, civil liberties served simply as a background condition for the exercise of state authority, hardly distinguishable from good policy. Wherever possible, they argued, it was advisable to tolerate dissent rather than suppress it. Police commissioners,

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33 For some, however, definition remained capacious. Letter from Arthur Garfield Hays, 7 May 1935, ACLU Papers, reel 116, vol. 780 (“From the point of view of civil liberties the subject of unionism should be confined to the rights of free press, free speech, free assemblage, the right to organize, strike, picket and demonstrate, the right to be free from unfair injunctive processes and cognate matters.”).
prosecutors, and administrative agencies exercised their discretion to accommodate minority interests and unpopular views—on occasion, disregarding explicit legislative directives in the process. They did so because they believed that open discussion enhanced democratic legitimacy, defused violent conflict by avoiding the production of martyrs, and facilitated social and scientific progress. During the interwar period, they constitutionalized those commitments, and the progressive vision of civil liberties was born.

A third defense of civil liberties would emerge during the 1930s. Rooted in a commitment to individual autonomy, the conservative vision regarded the Bill of Rights as a bulwark against an intrusive state. Although antecedents of this idea appear in nineteenth century treatises and in classical liberal thought, conservatives had typically opposed civil liberties claims, distinguishing between “liberty and license” and relegating disfavored speech to the latter, unprotected category. During the 1920s, the organized bar had opposed ACLU efforts to defend radical speech. In the 1930s, however, shifting political winds prompted a reevaluation of conservatives ideals. The New Deal posed an unprecedented threat to the speech and association of conservative groups. Equally important, a vigorous defense of personal rights was poised to counter claims of judicial hypocrisy and buttress the case for judicial review.

Progressives were quick to note the resonances between the radical and conservative views. The notion that labor relations should be isolated from state intervention smacked of the *Lochner*-era tradition of economic liberty, which they had unequivocally repudiated. The radicals registered the objection. In opposing state labor policy, Roger Baldwin was hesitant “to use so misunderstood a word as ‘liberty,’ invoked today so loudly by those rugged defenders of property rights” who understood liberty as a “right to exploit the American people without governmental interference.” He took great pains to distinguish the position of the ACLU leadership, emphasizing that “the historic conception of liberty” was “the freedom to agitate for social change without restraint”—although both groups

35 Francis Biddle, chair of the NLRB created under Public Resolution No. 44, accused Baldwin of sounding like the Liberty League; Francis Biddle to Roger Baldwin, 17 April 1935, ACLU Papers, reel 116, vol. 780.
37 Ibid. He added: “Practically today that means freedom for the working-class to organize and of minorities to conduct their propaganda.” The following month, Baldwin again rejected the liberty espoused by groups like the American Liberty League and
opposed the NLRA, their reluctance was justified on “diametrically opposite grounds.” The radical concern was “human rights,” which were expressed collectively rather than as individual rights. Like the radicals, conservatives linked civil liberties to labor relations, but in place of the radicals’ abolition of wage labor or the progressives’ social welfare, they privileged individual autonomy of the *Lochner*-era ilk, including the freedom to sell one’s labor under conditions that progressives and radicals deemed coercive. Although this Article focuses on the left-liberal variants of the civil liberties coalition, the conservative foil played a powerful background role during this period, and it is important to bear it in mind.

Finally, debates over the Wagner Act hinted at a fourth conception of civil liberties that would take root within the NLRB and its congressional counterpart over the coming years. Like the radical understanding, the *substantive vision* evinced unabashed support for labor’s cause. Unlike the radicals, however, proponents of the substantive view—like their progressive counterparts—imagined a strong role for the state in enforcing civil liberties. Their aspirations for the administrative enforcement of civil liberties were intimately bound up with their antagonistic relationship to the judicial construction of constitutional rights. Importantly, the civil liberties they defended encompassed not only the rights to picket, boycott, and strike, but also the end goals of labor activity, including higher wages, better working conditions, and a stronger position at the bargaining table. Indeed, To NLRB chair J. Warren Madden, it was the state’s role to enforce as “fundamental” the liberty of the workers “to emerge from a condition of economic helplessness, and dependence upon the will of another, to a status of having one’s chosen representative received as an equal at the bargaining conference table.” This liberty was prior to all other rights—including the rights of speech, press, and assembly—which might benefit the workers

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38 Roger Baldwin to Robert Wagner, 1 April 1935, ACLU Papers, reel 116, vol. 780. See also Joseph Schlossberg to Roger Baldwin, 14 May 1935, ACLU Papers, reel 116, vol. 780 (“Rightly or wrongly the American Federation of Labor is committed to the Wagner Bill. By your opposition to the bill you unwillingly lined up with the employers and all reactionaries who opposed the bill . . . This is one case in which the Civil Liberties Union can well afford to take no official position.”).


40 Radio address by Warren Madden, 29 January 1939, quoted in Respondents’ Sixth Circuit Brief, Ford v. NLRB, 54.
only after their right of collective bargaining was realized.41

These categories are, of course, ideal types. They are meant to capture, in broad strokes, diverse understandings of the conditions for human thriving and their underlying values. Those values, in turn, are linked to divergent accounts of the proper scope of state power and private rights. Many of the figures discussed in this Article flitted between these commitments, drawing on strains of each in service of legal and political goals. Few would have drawn the lines between them so starkly.

Indeed, the permeability of the boundaries rendered the categories unstable and susceptible to revision. In the late 1930s, these competing accounts of civil liberties would attain a rough equilibrium. A fifth, liberal vision of civil liberties embraced a broad spectrum of the earlier views but, in finding common ground, fundamentally transformed them.

III. Civil Liberties in the New Deal State

In other work, I explore the process through which an “overlapping consensus”42 on civil liberties emerged during the interwar period and culminated in the New Deal settlement commonly associated with Carolene Products’ Footnote Four.43 The goal for this project is a different one. In the remainder of this Article, I examine how the various understandings of civil liberties manifested and differed within the institutions designated for their enforcement. What follows are suggestive snapshots of the four principal New Deal institutions in which ideological contestation over civil liberties took place. They are not comprehensive histories of these institutions or of the mundane administration of civil liberties within their respective domains. Rather, they focus on discrete examples of ideological convergence and conflict. In order to make this project feasible within a single Article and, more importantly, because of its central significance to the actors who articulated the contours of civil liberties during the New Deal, the discussion focuses on the labor question. The hope is that observing the tangible legal and political consequences of contestation will yield insight into the relationship between government institutions and the rights they are designated to protect.

41 Ibid.
The Judicial Enforcement of Civil Liberties

Of the many institutions committed to the enforcement of civil liberties during the New Deal, the Supreme Court is by far the most familiar. Constitutional law scholars have painstakingly traced the Court’s evolving understanding of civil liberties between the World Wars—its flagrant dismissal of the Holmes and Brandeis dissents; its tepid incorporation of the First Amendment into the Fourteenth beginning with Gitlow v. New York; its rejection of prior restraint in Near v. Minnesota; its bold extension of First Amendment protection to freedom of assembly and religious proselytizing in DeJonge v. Oregon and Lovell v. City of Griffin.

Sometimes, accounts of the Supreme Court’s early First Amendment jurisprudence observe that the interwar cases disproportionately involved labor speech. They assume, however, that the Court’s inquiry pertained only to the freedom of radicals and revolutionaries to disseminate their subversive views. In short, the constitutional law canon has fallen victim to winners’ history—that is, it has been distorted by the near total dominance in the postwar era of a liberal vision of civil liberties premised on judicially enforceable constitutional rights.

Given the wide circulation and high salience of alternative understandings of civil liberties during the New Deal, it is unsurprising that the liberal conception was not the only one to reach the Supreme Court. An account of civil liberties that is true to historical circumstances has to evaluate civil liberties claims as they were framed, not as they have been remembered. Such an approach also necessitates a reassessment of the line between the two halves of the New Deal settlement. In later years, labor’s rights to organize and strike would largely be written out of the First Amendment, even while the rights of corporations to circularize their employees and to influence political elections were written in. But in the late 1930s, the Court’s vigorous enforcement of “preferred freedoms” and its newfound deference toward labor and economic legislation were of a single civil liberties piece.

We start, consequently, not with the well-worn First Amendment cases, but rather their Commerce Clause and freedom of contract counterparts. As soon as the Wagner Act took effect, dozens of challenges to the statute began making their way up through the federal courts. In May 1936, the Supreme Court had declared in Carter v. Carter Coal Company that labor provisions in the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act were an
unconstitutional extension of Congress’s commerce power.\textsuperscript{44} Relying on \textit{Carter Coal}, corporate attorneys easily convinced lower court judges that the Wagner Act was inconsistent with a century of settled judicial precedent. Unlike earlier measures (for example, the Clayton Act), the new legislation was unmistakably pro-union in its statutory language. Rather than cabin its potential through statutory interpretation, courts proved willing to invalidate it on constitutional grounds. Their decisions severely undercut the NLRB’s authority to issue orders in all but the most clearly interstate industries, such as transportation and communications. Industry and labor alike considered it a matter of time until the Supreme Court took up the Wagner Act and expressly declared a broader application unconstitutional.

President Roosevelt was determined to forestall that outcome. With the help of Labor’s Nonpartisan League, founded by John L. Lewis to mobilize labor voters, the 1936 presidential election resulted in a landslide victory for Roosevelt. The president considered the results a mandate for the New Deal. Popular support for his new labor policies seemed unequivocal, and he pledged to do whatever was necessary to preserve them. With the NLRB mired in constitutional litigation, its legitimacy squarely rejected by industry and its lawyers, preserving those labor policies meant doing something about the courts.

There was substantial support for measures to curb the power of judicial review in economic cases through such means as constitutional amendment or statutory limitations on federal jurisdiction.\textsuperscript{45} The approach on which Roosevelt ultimately settled, however, was less direct and distinctly unpopular, even among critics of the Court.\textsuperscript{46} In February 1937, Roosevelt recommended a bill that would have authorized the appointment of an additional justice to the Supreme Court for every sitting justice who had not retired within six months after reaching the age of seventy, up to a

\textsuperscript{44} Carter v. Carter Coal Company, 298 U.S. 238 (1936).


\textsuperscript{46} See generally Brinkley, \textit{End of Reform}; Osmond Fraenkel, An Open Letter to the President, 8 February 1937, ACLU Papers, reel 143, vol. 978 (“May I take the liberty of expressing the opinion that you have been less ably advised than usual, to recommend the appointment of additional justices to the United States Supreme Court? . . . The precedent you are creating seems to me to be not only unsettling, but to carry in it the seeds of its own destruction.”).
maximum of six. Had the bill passed, Roosevelt would have been able to appoint six new justices. Although it was clearly designed to ensure a pro-New Deal majority, Roosevelt publicly justified the measure on the grounds that the current justices were unable to meet the demands on their resources.

In the spring of 1937, then, much appeared to ride on the institutional mechanisms of civil liberties enforcement. Debate over potential court-curbing measures, including but not limited to President Roosevelt’s judiciary reorganization proposal, invited broader discussion of the merits of judicial review and its alternatives in civil liberties cases. Critics of the Court accused their opponents of whitewashing its record, while defenders of judicial review thought the detractors were “mak[ing] the Court’s record worse than it is.” Much turned, of course, on how civil liberties were defined.

To assess the field, the ACLU administered a survey to prominent legal authorities, soliciting their views on the implications for civil liberties of various proposals to cabin judicial review. Walter Gellhorn, an administrative law scholar who was then serving as regional attorney for the Social Security system, thought the importance of the courts in safeguarding liberties was exaggerated. The principal threat to civil liberties, in his view, was administrative abuse. Lloyd Garrison, dean of the University of Wisconsin Law School and the first chair of the original NLRB, cautioned against “giving majorities too much say over minorities.” Edwin Borchard, a law professor at Yale, commented that he did not think it necessary to weaken the Court or its influence. “On the contrary,” he wrote, “it ought to be apparent that the current danger is an expansion of the executive power into dictatorship”—and he considered the Court to be “the greatest safeguard we have against executive arbitrariness.” Finally, Norman Thomas emphasized that a simple count of Supreme Court decisions would underestimate the effectiveness of the federal judiciary in fostering civil liberties. He noted the “psychological effect of the review power of the Court,” which he thought—based on “some fairly close contacts with American life”—was more significant than the Court’s critics

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47 Among civil liberties advocates, debate over the “court-packing plan” centered less on its immediate threat to civil liberties decisions than on the general desirability of judicial review. After all, the addition of pro-New Deal justices was unlikely to disrupt the trend toward greater protection of civil liberties, particularly in cases involving radical speech.


49 Ibid.

50 Edwin Borchard to Osmond Fraenkel, 4 February 1937, ACLU Papers, reel 143, vol. 978.
appreciated.\footnote{51}

Unsurprisingly, those committed to a substantive view of civil liberties were less sanguine about judicial review. Wisconsin Senator Robert M. La Follette, Jr. (sponsor of the Senate Civil Liberties Committee discussed in the next session) favored a constitutional amendment to curtail judicial review. He acknowledged the importance of preserving civil liberties but argued that “no kind of legal guaranty has ever been able to protect minorities from the hatreds and intolerances let loose when an economic system breaks down.”\footnote{52} In a view diverging increasingly from the progressive civil liberties vision, a pamphlet issued by the leftist International Juridical Association and the National Lawyers Guild concluded that “there can be no true enforcement of the Bill of Rights in the interests of persons instead of wealth, except by the elected representatives of the people.”\footnote{53}

On the other hand, those nascent liberals who valued judicial independence as a check on majoritarian repression or administrative discretion had ample company. In the face of mounting criticism of the federal courts, conservative lawyers, most of whom had resisted the Supreme Court’s speech-friendly turn, evinced a sudden concern for the preservation of civil liberties. The American Bar Association staunchly opposed any restriction on the power of the federal courts, and it mobilized a massive publicity campaign that substantially weakened the prospects for passage of the President’s bill.\footnote{54} In convincing New Deal supporters that

\footnote{51}Norman Thomas to Roger Baldwin, 25 February 1937, ACLU Papers, reel 142, vol. 969. He also thought the “due process of law clause . . . should be confined to matters of procedure.” Thomas, like many others within the ACLU, favored a constitutional amendment granting Congress the power to legislate “in economic and social matters” and a corresponding restriction on judicial review in those cases only.

\footnote{52}He continued: “Liberals, be realists; do not let a lot of professional legalists, paid to do the job, bind you to the woods while they are showing you the trees.” Radio Address by Hon. Robert M. La Follette, 13 February 1937, ACLU Papers, reel 143, vol. 978.

\footnote{53}Ibid.

\footnote{54}A referendum taken in March 1937 revealed that ABA members overwhelmingly opposed the plan (6 to 1). William L. Ransom, “Members of the American Bar Association Decide Its Policies as to the Federal Courts.” \textit{American Bar Association Journal} 23 (April 1937): 271–74, 277. Those figures were presented to the Senate. “Association’s Views on the Supreme Court Issue Presented to Senate Committee,” \textit{American Bar Association Journal} 23 (May 1937): 315–18. In the member referendum, 18,695 ballots were returned and with reference to the Supreme Court 16,132 (86 percent) were against the proposal and 2563 (13 percent) were in favor. 142,320 ballots were sent to non-members. Of those, 40,021 (77.3 percent) were opposed and 11,770 (22 percent) were in favor. The ABA concluded that “the lawyers of America in every section and State of the Union are more aroused over the Supreme Court proposal, and the threat to an independent judiciary, than they have been on any previous occasion since the Civil War.” Ibid., 316. On the strategic
the independence of the Supreme Court should be preserved, the Court’s recent civil liberties decisions proved invaluable. An ABA committee brainstormed methods for arousing popular hostility toward reorganization of the judiciary, and its “best idea” was to develop a series of radio broadcasts featuring “famous case[s] in which personal rights have been upheld by the Supreme Court” in the face of contemporary criticism.\textsuperscript{55} In the two issues of the \textit{ABA Journal} devoted to the court-packing plan, its threat to the Bill of Rights was a dominant theme.

In spring 1937, then, institutional preferences for civil liberties enforcement apparently mapped onto underlying ideological views. Congress and administrative agencies were the domain of substantive civil liberties. As the controversy over employer speech would soon make clear, the NLRB’s commitment to labor rights trumped a more general commitment to the marketplace of ideas. For those radicals who were wary of the state writ large, judicial review was a potent but precarious mechanism for reining it in.

As for the progressive vision, many New Dealers were conflicted. Their basic belief in an interventionist state attracted them to the administrative enforcement of civil liberties where feasible. They acknowledged that the administrative state posed a threat to civil liberties; postal censorship under the wartime Espionage Act and a wide array of invasive state practices thereafter had made that reality unavoidable. Many accepted that the courts might occasionally need to curtail administrative discretion when regulation trampled on free speech. In their view, insulating civil liberties against state interference served to legitimate rather than undermine state power; as an ACLU-commissioned treatise had prematurely opined a decade earlier, the courts had abandoned their reliance on “natural rights” in favor of the “modern idea that grants liberty to men . . . for the sake of the state.”\textsuperscript{56}

It did not follow, however, that progressives had abandoned their faith in administrators as alternative or even preferential practitioners of civil liberties enforcement. Rather, they continued to believe in the state’s capacity to protect important rights. Their reasoning is succinctly captured

\textsuperscript{55}Arthur Vanderbilt to Frank Grinnell, 18 March 1937, Vanderbilt Papers, box 113, folder Correspondence 1937.

by philosopher (and longtime ACLU member) John Dewey: “social control, especially of economic forces, is necessary in order to render secure the liberties of the individual, including civil liberties.” Accordingly, the First Amendment test they endorsed was deferential to state efforts to improve the marketplace of ideas. The courts, as it were, had set a bar beneath which administrators could not drop, but there was plenty of space for them to climb. Notably, that was a battle they lost in the courts, notwithstanding the strong purchase of their views in legal scholarship.

For three long months during the spring of 1937, as the public debated the President’s proposal, the Supreme Court deliberated over five cases testing the constitutionality of the Wagner Act. Whether the court-packing plan influenced the Court’s resolution of those cases is, of course, an intractable question. The outcome, however, is well-known. In April, Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes wrote for a five-member majority in upholding the broadest construction of the statute. All of the companies in question, he insisted, operated within interstate commerce, and the NLRB’s procedures were consistent with due process. Employers and unions could not be made to agree on a contract, he concluded, but they could lawfully be compelled to try. The administration declared victory. Henceforth, the Supreme Court would allow Congress significant latitude in its regulation of labor and industry, but it would become ever more vigilant in upholding the Bill of Rights.

Two features of the “Constitutional Revolution” are often elided in discussion of the best known cases. First, insofar as the Wagner Act advanced labor’s substantive rights, Jones and Laughlin Steel was not a counterpart to the Supreme Court’s civil liberties decisions; it was itself a civil liberties decision. To be sure, the Supreme Court upheld the NLRA as a valid exercise of the Commerce Clause, not a constitutional mandate. In other words, it did not justify the statute as a legitimate means of enforcing the underlying constitutional rights of employees to organize, whether under the Thirteenth Amendment (an argument advanced by Andrew Furuseth and other conservative trade unionists) or the First. It does not follow, however, that the justices were blind to the substantive vision of

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58 NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation, 301 U.S. 1 (1937); NLRB v. Fruehauf Trailer Company, 301 U.S. 49 (1937); NLRB v. Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing Company, 301 U.S. 58 (1937). Six weeks later, in Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union, 301 U.S. 468 (1937), the Supreme Court held that a state could constitutionally prevent a court from issuing an injunction against peaceful picketing.
civil liberties that motivated the NLRB. Given how dominant that understanding was in public rhetoric and political debate, it would have been hard to miss.  

Historical work suggests that the NLRB was reluctant to frame its legal claims in terms of constitutional rights for fear that the Court would cabin them.  

Rightly or wrongly, the courts were understood to hold an interpretive monopoly in the domain of constitutional rights, and labor advocates were all too aware of their past biases. New Deal lawmakers believed the Wagner Act vindicated substantive rights—even constitutional rights—and they loudly proclaimed as much outside the courtroom. Their legal arguments, however, emphasized neutral principles and congressional prerogatives, in a poignant parallel to the debates over free speech. In light of this strategic approach, it is all the more striking that the substantive vision of civil liberty found its way into the majority opinion in *Jones and Laughlin Steel*, even if the Court did not rely on it. Notwithstanding the NLRB’s cautious approach, Hughes described “the right of employees to self-organization” as a “fundamental right.”  

Of course, the NLRA was not directed at state suppression of the right to picket or strike, and justifying it on First Amendment grounds would have required a radical new conception of state action and the scope of the Bill of Rights. Such an approach was not unthinkable, but New Deal officials and NLRB brief-writers had good reason to doubt it would succeed. Nonetheless, the federal courts had ample opportunity to evaluate labor activity in constitutional terms. In cases involving interference with strikes and pickets by state or local officials, sometimes as a direct result of

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60 William Forbath has extensively documented Wagner and Roosevelt’s promotion of “social citizenship.” Forbath, “Constitution in Exile”; Forbath, *Shaping of the American Labor Movement*.  

61 Forbath, “Constitution in Exile,” 182 (“In public political discourse, New Dealers cast the changes they sought as fundamental rights reinvigorating the Constitution’s promise of equal citizenship by reinterpreting it. Yet, as a matter of statutory drafting and litigation strategy, they consistently relied on congressional power clauses, not on rights-affirming clauses of the Constitution. The New Deal Constitution took this odd and, from today’s perspective, lamentable form not for lack of constitutional commitment, but because of a specific conception of the rights at issue and the appropriate allocation of interpretive and enforcement authority regarding them, combined with a strategic concern about judicial interpretation and enforcement.”)  

62 Ibid., 176.  

63 Pope, “Thirteenth Amendment,” argues that the Court adopted a narrow, Commerce Clause approach because it wanted to empower administrators rather than the working class.  

64 *Jones & Laughlin Steel* at 33.  

65 For this reason, the Thirteenth Amendment appeared to some contemporaries to be a stronger alternative. Pope, “Thirteenth Amendment.”
state legislation or city ordinances, they faced the question whether labor activity was constitutionally protected head on.

Thus, the second important corrective to the conventional account of the Constitutional Revolution stems from the observation that labor cases and First Amendment cases often overlapped. For example, Justice Brandeis’s 1937 decision in *Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union* is well known by labor scholars for upholding a state statute authorizing labor picketing and withholding injunctive relief. The ACLU filed an amicus brief in the case, but it nowhere mentioned the First Amendment, instead invoking the “right to organize” to buttress the legitimacy of the labor bill it had helped to secure. Notwithstanding that the organization defended the legislation in substantive civil liberties terms, Justice Brandeis’s opinion presumed that “members of a union might … make known the facts of a labor dispute, for freedom of speech is guaranteed by the Federal Constitution.”

Indeed, the foundational labor and speech cases often involved the same parties, the same lawyers, and the same underlying activity. Take *Associated Press v. NLRB*, decided the same day as *Jones and Laughlin Steel*. In a world divided between newly deferential economic review and preferred personal freedoms, the case falls squarely on the labor side of the line. After all, it was among the five foundational cases upholding the constitutionality of the Wagner Act. The Supreme Court concluded that the Associated Press was involved in interstate commerce and therefore validly within the reach of the statute. In a surprising twist, the AP had also asserted a First Amendment claim premised on the conservative civil liberties vision (“Freedom of expression,” it concluded, “is as precious as either due process or the equal protection of law”). Citing recent First Amendment victories for radical defendants, among other cases, it argued that the compulsory employment of unionized workers would undermine its control of editorial content. “Freedom of the press and freedom of speech,

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66 Senn v. Tile Layers Protection Union, Brief on Behalf of the ACLU and International Juridical Association, at 17-18. The brief explained: “The complaint which has been heard so continuously in legislative halls, and to which so-called anti-injunction legislation was a response, stems from the basic contention by working men that recognition of labor’s abstract right to organize necessarily implies recognition and sanction of labor’s concrete right to use, among other economic measures, the appeal for public support in its controversies with employers.”

67 301 U.S. 468, 478.


as guaranteed by the First Amendment, means more than freedom from censorship by government,” the AP’s brief argued, albeit unsuccessfully.\footnote{In a dissenting opinion, the conservative justices embraced the First Amendment argument. Justice Sutherland wrote: “No one can read the long history which records the stern and often bloody struggles by which these cardinal rights were secured, without realizing how necessary it is to preserve them against any infringement, however slight.” He continued, more dramatically: “Do the people of this land—in the providence of God, favored, as they sometimes boast, above all others in the plenitude of their liberties—desire to preserve those so carefully protected by the First Amendment?...If so, let them withstand all beginnings of encroachment. For the saddest epitaph which can be carved in memory of a vanished liberty is that it was lost because its possessors failed to stretch forth a saving hand while yet there was time.” Associated Press at 135, 141 (Justice Sutherland, dissenting).} “[I]t means that freedom of expression must be jealously protected from any form of governmental control or influence.”

In another context, those words might have been warmly endorsed by the ACLU—but in \textit{Associated Press v. NLRB}, they encountered fierce resistance. Indeed, the attorney for the American Newspaper Guild was none other than ACLU co-counsel Morris Ernst. In an amicus brief for the Guild, he squarely rejected the AP’s reasoning. The First Amendment, he argued, did not license the press to discriminate against unionized employees. On the contrary, non-enforcement of editors’ organizing rights posed the graver threat to the First Amendment. “Non-action of a governmental agency may be far more destructive of a fundamental guarantee than positive legislation,” Ernst explained. That Congress could not abridge the freedom of the press did not preclude it from combating “an evil which threatens of itself to nullify that freedom.” Labor unrest was an impediment to the free flow of information and liberty of thought; the key to a free press was a strong union.\footnote{Ernst Brief, 26-27. As in Jones and Laughlin Steel, the NLRB characterized the right to organize as a “recognized and essential liberty.” Brief for NLRB, 93. Justice Sutherland, by contrast, squarely embraced the conservative civil liberties view. He wrote: “We may as well deny at once the right of the press freely to adopt a policy and pursue it, as to concede that right and deny the liberty to exercise an uncensored judgment in respect of the employment and discharge of the agents through whom the policy is to be effectuated.” 657-58.}

Notably, Ernst also served as counsel in a seminal First Amendment case, \textit{Hague v. CIO}. The case stemmed from the suppression of CIO organizing activities in Jersey City, across the Hudson River from New York. By the time it was decided, the Supreme Court’s hands-off approach to economic legislation was firmly entrenched, and the NLRA was secure against judicial invalidation. The trouble in Jersey City was not recalcitrant employers, though they played a role. Rather, the principal obstacle to
organizing in Jersey City was the town’s powerful mayor, Frank Hague.

Boss Hague, as he was known to his political foes, was determined to keep the CIO out of Jersey City. Facing a fiscal crisis owing as much to mismanagement as the Great Depression, he had launched a campaign to attract New York businesses to Jersey City by keeping unions at bay. Hague’s police force harassed, beat, and arrested agitators and shut down all picketing, meetings, and leafleting by organized labor—and by the ACLU observers who endeavored to defend them. When organizers began provoking arrests in order to challenge local ordinances and police practices in the courts, Hague simply had them deported across city lines.

_Hague_, then, involved civil liberties violations in recognizable guise. As Jersey City officials, Hague and his henchmen were unmistakable state actors, and the Supreme Court had clearly indicated that they were within First Amendment reach. In a 1939 decision, the Court upheld the CIO’s right to picket and hold meeting in Jersey City’s public spaces, subject to reasonable limitations to maintain order in the public interest. In this, they implicitly validated the lower courts’ positive variant of the progressive civil liberties vision. The Court of Appeals had insisted that the city was obligated to open space for public discussion, and if private violence threatened, it was the function of the police to “preserve order while they speak.” Mere non-interference would not suffice.

The various opinions in _Hague_ (none commanded a majority) turned on a highly technical jurisdictional issue and contained no paean to free speech. It is notable, however, that Justice Roberts’s opinion, which uncharacteristically rested on the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, deemed the CIO’s activity in Jersey City protected because the rights of national citizenship encompassed discussion of the NLRA.

In the face of international totalitarianism, the ACLU secured broad-based support for its legal and publicity campaigns in _Hague_. It even managed to solicit an amicus brief from the American Bar Association’s newly formed Committee on the Bill of Rights—a development that marked the ascent of the conservative vision of civil liberties in the wake of the Court-packing plan. The wide consensus gratified the ACLU, but the CIO leadership was more ambivalent. On the one hand, the _Hague_ decision was an unmistakable “go signal” (as California’s state bar journal put it) for labor organizing in Jersey City and elsewhere. On the other, public

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72 Hague, 101 F.2d at 784.
enthusiasm for free speech was supplanting support for labor activity per se. The *Yale Law Journal* reflected that “when practically every shade of public opinion became outraged at what appeared to be a blatant denial of fundamental rights, emphasis shifted from specific attempts by one group at raising abnormally low Jersey City working conditions to the more basic issue of whether constitutional guaranties of free speech, free press, and free assembly apply to union sympathizers as well as to other citizens.”

For a time, the Supreme Court would entertain the full gamut of civil liberties claims. In *Thornhill v. Alabama*, discussed in Part I, it all but collapsed the radical, substantive, and progressive visions into a unitary celebration of labor’s rights. Just as quickly, however, the Court pulled back from the transformative potential of such decisions. By the 1940s, it read civil liberties through a liberal lens that privileged the Bill of Rights.

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**The Congressional Enforcement of Civil Liberties**

In the years between passage of the Wagner Act and its validation by the Supreme Court in *Jones and Laughlin Steel*, employers flagrantly resisted compliance with the new legislation. Indeed, they continued to engage in blatant anti-labor practices, including industrial espionage, strikebreaking, and the use of munitions and private police forces.\(^{74}\) Although these methods were clear violations of workers’ new statutory rights, employers’ lawyers advised that the Wagner Act was unconstitutional and would shortly be declared so by the Supreme Court. True to form, employers mobilized around a legal campaign, supported most visibly by the American Liberty League’s National Lawyers Committee, a collection of corporate lawyers who believed that the Wagner Act was incompatible with *Lochner*-era values. The threat of an adverse decision was so menacing that the NLRB devoted much of its energy during 1935 and 1936 to formulating its own legal strategy.

Congress did not leave the beleaguered NLRB without recourse. In the spring of 1936—prompted by the suppression of the Southern Tenant Farmers Union, an organization of tenant farmers and sharecroppers in northeastern Arkansas, and by the ineffectuality of the NLRB—Senator La Follette submitted a Senate resolution authorizing the investigation of “violations of the rights of free speech and assembly and undue interference with the right of labor to organize and bargain collectively.”\(^{75}\) La Follette

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initially doubted that the Senate would act on his proposal, but after highly effective preliminary hearings, the resolution was approved in June with significant public support.\footnote{Gardner Jackson to Roger Baldwin, 9 April 1936, Jackson Papers, box 42, folder La Follette Civil Liberties. See also Robert Wohlfarth to Senator Elbert D. Thomas, 6 October 1936, in Violations of Free Speech and Rights of Labor, General Data and Information, Sen 78A-F9, Record Group 46 (Records of the United States Senate), National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, D.C. (hereafter La Follette Committee Papers), 10.25, box 4, folder October 1936 (enclosing nine editorials from New York and Washington papers and commenting that “nearly all of the editorials, with few exceptions, are favorable”).}

Known as the La Follette Civil Liberties Committee, the new body was an early and powerful voice for the substantive vision of civil liberties. As its title suggests, the committee regarded civil liberties as synonymous with the rights of labor, whether statutory or constitutional. It set out to investigate the activities of detective agencies, employer associations, corporations, and individual employers “in so far as these activities result in interference with the rights of labor such as the formation of outside unions, collective bargaining, rights of assemblage and other liberties guaranteed by the Constitution.”\footnote{Felix Frazer (Investigator) to James A. Kinkead, 9 October 1936, La Follette Committee Papers, 10.25, box 4, folder October 1936.} The younger Senator La Follette, whose famous father had begun his career as a law partner of the Free Speech League’s Gilbert Roe, chaired the subcommittee, which was organized within the Senate’s Committee on Education and Labor.\footnote{The committee also included Elbert Thomas, a Utah Democrat, and Louis Murphy, who died soon after his appointment.}

Prominent members of the ACLU were instrumental in engineering the new measure, which they had first proposed at the Conference on Civil Liberties under the New Deal. Roger Baldwin, newly reconciled to state involvement in labor relations, was convinced that “the worst evil which should be investigated is the mounting rise of force and violence by employers against the organization of labor,” which threatened “rights presumably guaranteed by federal legislation.”\footnote{Roger Baldwin to Robert La Follette, 16 April 1936, ACLU Papers, reel 131, vol. 887.} He thought a successful inquiry would justify a full slate of federal legislation protecting the rights of labor against public and private curtailment.\footnote{Ibid. In particular, he recommended legislation involving an amendment to the Civil Rights statute; the federal licensing of detective agencies engaged in interstate business; the relation of federal aid to state troops used in strikes; the importation of strike-breakers; and the relation of the federal government to local interference with the rights of the unemployed.} At first, the ACLU urged the committee to investigate civil liberties abuses in other contexts as
well. It soon became evident, however, that the La Follette Committee would confine its inquiry to labor relations. At the preliminary hearings, NLRB chair J. Warren Madden was the first witness. He tellingly declared, “The right of workmen to organize themselves into unions has become an important civil liberty.” The connection between the two bodies was not merely ideological; much of the La Follette Committee’s staff was borrowed from the NLRB.

The La Follette Committee aimed to eliminate all interference with workers’ right to organize, whether perpetrated by local law enforcement or by employers themselves. Its engineers, however, were seasoned and savvy politicians. They sought to generate support by invoking the specter of totalitarianism—“We are unquestionably the most powerful agency against Fascism in this country,” one staff member wrote—and the corresponding collapse of American democracy. In his testimony at the hearings, NLRB member Edwin Smith recited the civil liberties movement’s well-worn argument that the unchecked abuse of civil liberties would lead to violent revolt. He denounced “entrenched interests” and “alleged patriotic organizations” for arguing that repression was the only means of saving America from the radicals. “You cannot suppress freedom of expression,” he cautioned, “without rapidly undermining democracy itself.”

La Follette and his staff were policymakers, not scholars or theorists. There was much slippage in their characterization of civil liberties. Still, some salient features emerge from their public defenses of the committee and from their private communications. First, the true goal of the committee was something more than expressive freedom or individual

81 Morris Ernst to Roger Baldwin, 9 April 1936, ACLU Papers, reel 131, vol. 887. At the preliminary hearings, Arthur Garfield Hays and Morris Ernst were prepared to testify regarding postal and radio censorship, sedition and criminal syndicalism laws, and alien laws, as well as the operation of the federal civil rights statute, the use of state troops against strikers in relation to the federal government’s aid to the national guard, and other issues. Memorandum Re: La Follette Investigation, 20 April 1936, ACLU Papers, reel 131, vol. 887. La Follette declined their offer. Robert La Follette to Roger Baldwin, 22 April 1936, ACLU Papers, reel 131, vol. 887.

82 Quoted in Auerbach, Labor and Liberty, 65.

83 Felix Frazer to Byron Scott, 3 February 1937, La Follette Committee Papers, 10.25, box 5, folder February 1937.

84 Statement by Edwin S. Smith before Hearings of Subcommittee on Senate Resolution 266, 23 April 1936, ACLU Papers, reel 131, vol. 887. The committee was careful to maintain an air of impartiality to maintain its credibility. See, e.g., Robert Wohlforth to Harold Cranefield, 9 March 1937, La Follette Committee Papers, 10.25, box 5, folder March 1937 (“Under no condition should you or any members of this Committee try to address any union meetings. However well intentioned this may be, it is providing ammunition for those opposed to the Committee to give us a terrific smear.”).
rights. As Edwin Smith put it in an address to the ACLU: “Civil liberties are not abstractions which hover above the passions of contending groups and can be successfully brought to earth to promote the general welfare.”85 Robert La Follette was adamant that “the right of workers to speak freely and assemble peacefully is immediate and practical, a right which translates itself into the concrete terms of job security, fair wages and decent living conditions.”86 Progressives and conservatives increasingly were casting civil liberties in neutral terms—as a commitment to deliberative openness rather than particular values. The La Follette Committee, by contrast, was most focused on economic security.

Second, and relatedly, civil liberties were not negative rights. The Committee was determined to introduce new, affirmative protections for labor’s organizing efforts, many of which were directed against private action. These rights would be established by statute and enforceable through administrative actors—namely, the NLRB—as well as the state and federal courts.

The La Follette Committee did not clarify whether its operations were grounded in the Constitution. In common usage, civil liberties were increasingly associated with the Bill of Rights, and defenses of the committee’s work often capitalized on the cachet of the American constitutional tradition. Certainly the La Follette Committee considered its recommendations to be consistent with the Constitution, even important extensions of its underlying goals. To justify incursions on employers’ property rights and managerial discretion as constitutional mandates, however, would have required a revision of constitutional thought more radical than the so-called Constitutional Revolution.

The Administrative Enforcement of Civil Liberties

Consistent with the La Follette Committee’s substantive vision of civil liberties, the early NLRB considered the rights of labor to be independent rights deserving of state protection. NLRB member Edwin Smith put the point bluntly. In his view, organized labor was the only force capable of preserving democracy. To survive, he insisted, it must “receive from the government firm protection against those who have the power and will to destroy it.”87

87 Address by Edwin S. Smith before the Carolina Political Union, 30 March 1938,
In its enforcement of the Wagner Act, the NLRB sought to implement this ideal. The early operations of the NLRB have been documented in tremendous depth and detail. On the whole, its members were unexpectedly aggressive in advancing labor’s interests. Whether state support radicalized organized labor or instead institutionalized it is a much debated question. So too is the effect of the NLRB’s preference for CIO-style industrial unionism over the established craft model of the AFL. These questions have important implications with respect to the effects of institutional differences on civil liberties enforcement, and I will briefly address them in Part III. For now, I want to stress that the NLRB often spoke in terms of civil liberties when it defended social rights.

For much of the 1930s, civil liberties advocates within and outside the NLRB assumed they were defending the same ideals. NLRB administrators upheld their commitment to labor’s substantive rights, and their New Deal allies simply bracketed the agency’s operations as economic regulation beyond the domain of civil liberties concerns. The conflict between then came to a head in early 1939, however, when a congressional coalition of Republicans and Southern Democrats introduced a host of amendments designed to curb the authority of the NLRB. Concurrently, Massachusetts Democrat David I. Walsh proposed a more moderate bill, which was backed by the AFL and commanded considerable support.

Two provisions in the Walsh bill raised civil liberties concerns, as the category was understood at the time. The first provided for more robust judicial review of NLRB decisions. Although progressive civil libertarians opposed the measure because it singled out the NLRB for special treatment, they were beginning to regard administrative agencies as incipient civil liberties threats. In other words, the progressive civil liberties vision was in transition. One of its longstanding pillars—confidence in administrative regulation of economic relations, if not free speech—had begun to crumble. In response to the bill, ACLU attorney Arthur Garfield Hays called for enhanced procedural protections in “trial by commission” and convened a committee to study quasi-judicial boards. Hays thought the commissions were censoring business, “which [was] just as bad as a censorship over literature.”

Another of Senator Walsh’s suggestions was even more pressing: a

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quoted in “Memorandum in Support of Proposal to Confine the National Labor Relations Board of the Functions of Accusing and Prosecuting and to Transfer its Judicial Functions to a Separate Administrative Body Similar to the Board of Tax Appeals,” 15, Ford Legal Papers, box 3, vol. 3.

provision guaranteeing an employer’s right to free speech in the context of union organizing efforts. During the late 1930s, the NLRB had aggressively policed the employer distribution of anti-union materials on the theory that it coerced employees in the exercise of their right to organize under the NLRA. In response, the ACLU reluctantly defended the right of such notorious anti-labor employers as Henry Ford to circulate anti-union propaganda—a position that polarized the ACLU and coincided with the expulsion or resignation of its board’s Communists and fellow travelers. 89 Testimony by Warren Madden before the Senate Committee on Education and Labor captures the NLRB’s understanding. Madden told the committee that an employer’s accurate statement that the leaders of a union were Communists might dissuade an employee from joining and would therefore constitute coercion. “The fact that it is true,” he insisted, “does not keep it from being coercive.” Citing labor injunctions, he argued that “there is no privilege against being enjoined from telling the truth if you state it at such times or under such circumstances that you destroy somebody else’s rights.” 90

From the progressive perspective, “Brother Madden[‘s]” reasoning threatened to undercut a decade of civil liberties gains. 91 Indeed, labor activity had often been regulated for precisely the reasons Madden was endorsing; the Supreme Court had long denied First Amendment protection to labor picketing in light of its coercive effect. Despite “violent[] oppos[ition]” to the free speech amendment from longtime labor allies, 92 many progressives thought some sort of legislative reformulation was

89 See Weinrib, Liberal Compromise, Chapter 6.
90 The question, he suggested, was one of parity. “If there were any constitutional doctrine that people could go about the world speaking the truth or speaking their opinions under any and all circumstances, and regardless of its destructive consequences, we of course would follow it. The courts do not follow any such doctrine when they are protecting property or when they are protecting employers against picketing and that kind of thing.” Any other decision, he concluded, would amount to class discrimination. Ibid.
92 Lee Pressman to Arthur Garfield Hays, 10 February 1939, reel 169, vol. 2080. CIO General Counsel Lee Pressman told Arthur Garfield Hays that the CIO was “violently opposed” to the amendment. The CIO had explained its position in an earlier pamphlet (in which it implicitly compared the proposed curtailment of the Board’s powers to Roosevelt’s judiciary reorganization plan). The Committee For Industrial Organization, “Why the Wagner Act Should NOT Be Amended,” October 1938, ACLU Papers, reel 156, vol. 1078 (“[It is] useless to pretend that constitutional rights of free speech are being invaded. There are many kinds of speech which are unlawful. . . . Society is entitled to impose such reasonable limitations upon freedom of speech and press as may be necessary to its own protection. It has always done so and always will.”).
desirable. The ACLU ultimately opposed the free speech amendment, along with the other amendments, as “either unnecessary or dangerous to the fundamental purpose of the act.” The organization did not, however, endorse the NLRB’s view of employer speech. Instead, it argued that existing limitations on the Board’s authority were sufficient—that is, that the abridgement of employer speech was inconsistent with the NLRA as well as unconstitutional.

In this, the progressive and conservative visions of civil liberties aligned. The demise of economic due process had made civil liberties all the more appealing: the dispute over employer speech demonstrated that the First Amendment might succeed where freedom of contract had failed. The ACLU’s position on employer speech was warmly celebrated by the United States Chamber of Commerce and the ABA.

The Executive Enforcement of Civil Liberties

Enforcement of civil liberties through the courts is often reduced to the practice of judicial review. During the New Deal, however, a second strategy emerged for advancing civil liberties through litigation—one that entailed vindicating rather than invalidating government interests. Over the course of the 1930s, the state began to pursue civil liberties enforcement through its prosecutorial arm, by bringing transgressors to justice in the federal courts.

On January 3, 1939, Frank Murphy succeeded Homer Cummings as Attorney General of the United States. As mayor of Detroit from 1930 to
1933, Murphy had been a strong advocate for the unemployed. In 1937, he was elected governor of Michigan. Shortly after he took office, he refused to call in state troops to break a sit-down strike by the fledgling UAW. That decision was influential in the subsequent rise of the CIO. As Murphy explained the affair, workers in Michigan had been angry at the failure of employers to abide by the Wagner Act, as well as the prevalent use of industrial espionage to defeat unionization. In seizing control of industrial property, thousands of misguided but “honest citizens” had acted to “defend[] their own rights against what they believed to be the lawless refusal of their employers to recognize their unions.” Murphy emphasized that he had never condoned sit-down strikes, and he had advised union representatives that they were illegal and imprudent. He nonetheless believed that in the face of widespread disobedience, it was necessary to “weed out the cause,” not merely to “enforce the law.”

Murphy brought the same sensibilities to his duties as Attorney General. He was intimately familiar with the work of the La Follette Committee in his home state and elsewhere, and he was convinced that the abridgement of workers’ “civil liberties” by employers and their government collaborators was a major source of class strife. But Murphy’s commitment was not limited to workers’ rights. He considered civil liberties to be fundamental to every part of life, “social, political, and economic.” They extended to such far-ranging ideals as “the right of self-government, the right of every man to speak his thoughts freely, the opportunity to express his individual nature in his daily life and work, [and] the privilege of believing in the religion that his own conscience tells him is right.” The American model of civil liberties represented a crucial compromise between governmental regulation, which was “necessary for an orderly society,” and the unbounded freedom of nature. More basically, the rights to speak freely, to practice one’s religion, to assemble peaceably and to petition government for the redress of grievances were essential to a functioning democracy. They applied with equal force to “the business man and the laborer.”

Here, then, was the progressive vision of civil liberties, grafted onto a prosecutorial model of civil liberties enforcement.

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96 Statement of Honorable Frank Murphy, Attorney General of the United States, Before a Sub-Committee of the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States Senate, in National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Md., Record Group 60, General Records of the United States Department of Justice, Records of the Special Executive Assistant to the Attorney General, 1933–40, Subject Files, 1933–1940 (hereafter Attorney General Papers), box 5, entry 132, folder Murphy (Attorney General—Items about Him).

97 “Civil Liberties,” radio address by Hon. Frank Murphy, National Radio Forum, 27 March 1939, Attorney General Papers, box 5, entry 132, folder Civil Liberties.
From his first day in office, it was clear that Murphy would make civil liberties a priority. Shortly after his confirmation, his special assistant in charge of public relations helped him arrange a radio program on the protection of civil liberties by the Federal Government. He told Roger Baldwin that the subject was “one of the things that interest[ed him] most keenly,” and that the opportunity to pursue it was one of the “great satisfactions” of his service as Attorney General. Indeed, he was “anxious that the weight and influence of the Department of Justice should be a force for the preservation of the people’s liberties.”

On February 3, one month after he was sworn in, Murphy’s office made an announcement. Within the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice, a new entity had been established, to be known as the Civil Liberties Unit. Headed by former Assistant U.S. Attorney Henry A. Schweinhaut, its principal function was to prosecute violations of the constitutional and statutory provisions “guaranteeing civil rights to individuals.” In particular, it would pursue cases of beatings and violence, denial of workers’ rights under the NLRA, and deprivation of freedom of speech and assembly. Murphy explained that in a democracy, the enforcement of law entailed the “aggressive protection of the fundamental rights inherent in a free people.” The Civil Liberties Unit, consistent with the recommendations of the La Follette Committee, would undertake “vigilant action” in ensuring that those rights were respected. For the first time, it would throw the “full weight of the Department” behind the “blessings of liberty, the spirit of tolerance, and the fundamental principles of democracy.” In Murphy’s estimation, the creation of the Civil Liberties Unit was “one of the most significant happenings in American legal history.”

98 Gordon Dean, Memorandum for the Attorney General, 27 January 1939, Attorney General Papers, box 5, entry 132, folder Murphy (Attorney General—Items about Him) (suggesting Murphy speak with the director of America’s Town Meeting of the Air); Gordon Dean, Memorandum for Miss Bumgarnder, 27 January 1939, Attorney General Papers, box 5, entry 132, folder Murphy (Attorney General—Items about Him) (“The Attorney General knows all about the Lawyers Guild and that it is the liberal national lawyers’ group.”).

99 Frank Murphy to Roger Baldwin, 3 February 1939, ACLU Papers, reel 168, vol. 2070.

100 Order No. 3204, Office of the Attorney General, 3 February 1939, Attorney General Papers, box 22, e132, folder Civil Liberties.


102 Ibid.

103 Press Release, 3 February 1939, Attorney General Papers, box 22, entry 132, folder Civil Liberties.

104 Frank Murphy to Franklin D. Roosevelt, 7 July 1939, Attorney General Papers, box
At the first nationwide gathering of U.S. Attorneys in Washington, D.C., Murphy enjoined federal prosecutors to wield their power responsibly—to enforce the civil rights statutes “not just for some of the people but for all of them,” “no matter how humble.” Civil liberties, he told them, were more important than at any previous time in history. The Depression had brought with it “the usual demands for repression of minorities,” and it was up to the federal government to stave off the rampant incursions.

Murphy’s plans for the Civil Liberties Unit were ambitious. Among other functions, it would alert local officials that the federal government would not tolerate arbitrary and abusive conduct, alone or in conjunction with private interests. It would also raise awareness and influence public opinion. Murphy was adamant that the federal government could “take the initiative,” but it could not “do the whole job.” The problem was partly jurisdictional; some rights inhered in individuals as residents of the separate states, and they could not be vindicated by federal authorities. The threats to American freedom came not only from city ordinances and the arbitrary exercise of state power, but from mob murder, lynchings, and vigilante violence. More basically, however, “the great protector of civil liberty, the final source of its enforcement” was the “invincible power of public opinion.” The courts could provide a remedy for lawlessness, but they could not prevent its taking hold.

In the immediate term, the Civil Liberties Unit had a concrete program. It would study and evaluate (and eventually prosecute under) the potential constitutional and statutory provisions applicable to civil rights enforcement, including laws prohibiting kidnapping, peonage, and mail fraud. The most important of the potential causes of action, at least for the time being, were under Title 18, Sections 51 and 52 of the criminal

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5, entry 132, folder Murphy: 6 Months Report.
106 “Murphy Tells Aides To Guard Civil Rights,” Washington Post, 20 April 1939.
107 In 1940, Solicitor General Francis Biddle told the Junior Bar Conference that this deterrent effect was the most important function of the Civil Liberties Unit. “Civil Rights Protection,” Buffalo Daily Law Journal, 14 September 1940.
108 “Civil Liberties,” radio address by Hon. Frank Murphy, National Radio Forum, 27 March 1939, Attorney General Papers, box 5, entry 132, folder Civil Liberties.
109 Order No. 3204, Office of the Attorney General, 3 February 1939, Attorney General Papers, box 22, entry 132, folder Civil Liberties; “Memorandum for the Attorney General Re: Tentative Proposal for Attorney General’s Conference on Civil Liberties,” 23 February 1939, Attorney General Papers, box 22, entry 132, folder Civil Liberties. Frank Murphy and Senator Robert Wagner were also on the program. Program, National Conference on Civil Liberties in the Present Emergency, 13 October 1939, Jackson Papers, General Correspondence, cont. 3.
code. The Department expected to make generous use of the statutes, though it recognized their limitations. Section 52 was applicable only to deprivations of civil liberties under color of State laws. It also suffered “from the malady of old age”; after many years of disuse, it was likely to face significant resistance. Section 51 was similarly limited in its usefulness. It was passed to rein in the Ku Klux Klan, “and by reason of that fact, together with its severe punishment, it [was] a somewhat difficult statute, for psychological reasons, to prosecute under.” Moreover, although it permitted prosecution for violation of constitutional rights, few constitutional provisions could be construed to limit private action. Finally, both sections faced an additional obstacle, in that both criminalized conduct in violation of rights “secured by” the Constitution or federal statutes. Defendants were apt to argue that Section 51 applied only to rights “created,” not “guaranteed,” by the Constitution, and that the rights of free speech and assembly preexisted the federal government. In light of these obstacles, the Civil Liberties Unit expected to make recommendations for “some modern legislation on civil rights.”

Within its first month of operation several hundred complaints were referred to the Civil Liberties Unit, including lynchings, interference with meetings, illegal police practices, deportations, and voting rights violations. The Department also contemplated prosecutions under Section 51 for violations by employers of the Wagner Act. That program seemingly received judicial sanction with the Supreme Court’s decision in *Hague v. CIO*. Schweinhaut regarded *Hague* as a strong endorsement of the Civil Rights Act. The Court’s interpretation of the jurisdictional

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110 The peonage laws would in fact prove more useful, in light of the state action requirements of Section 51 and 51. See Risa Lauren Goluboff, *The Lost Promise of Civil Rights* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007).

111 Memorandum for Mr. Dean, Attorney General Papers, box 22, entry 132, folder Civil Liberties. On the origins and implications of this interpretation of “secured by” in the Civil Rights Acts of 1870 and 1871, see Lynda Dodd, “Constitutional Torts in the Forgotten Years” (forthcoming).

112 Gordon Dean to Leigh Danenberg, 6 March 1939, Attorney General Papers, box 22, entry 132, folder Civil Liberties. For example, the Unit was considering recommending legislation that would allow the federal government to seek injunctive relief as an alternative to criminal action. “This would overcome the difficulties pointed out above and would also free the case of local prejudice on the part of citizenry from which jurors must be selected.” “Memorandum for Mr. Dean,” Attorney General Papers, box 22, entry 132, folder Civil Liberties.

113 Gordon Dean to Leigh Danenberg, 6 March 1939, Attorney General Papers, box 22, entry 132, folder Civil Liberties.

114 Joseph Matan, Memorandum to Assistant Attorney General Brien McMahon, 14 May 1937, Attorney General Papers, box 22, entry 132, folder Civil Rights.

115 Lewis Wood, “Hague Ban on C.I.O. Voided by the Supreme Court,” *New York*
private action provisions were a seeming invitation for criminal
prosecutions under Sections 51 and 52.\textsuperscript{116} The Department of Justice read the Court’s decision in \textit{Hague} to mean that “if a Federal statute otherwise constitutional gives a private right to a citizen, Section 51 will serve for prosecution of any group of persons who attempt to take it away from him.” This reasoning arguably applied to private acts of violence affecting statutory rights “under the recently extended commerce clause.” The NLRA was the most prominent such example,\textsuperscript{117} and the CIO quickly announced that it would “request the Department of Justice to take steps for criminal prosecution of all who interfere with its organizing activities by violating the civil rights of workers.”\textsuperscript{118} Over the coming years, the Department vigorously pursued the new strategy, albeit with uneven results.\textsuperscript{119}

\section*{III. The Uncertain Stakes of Civil Liberties Enforcement}

In 1920, most Americans decried civil liberties as a cover for subversive activity. Liberty, they insisted, did not mean license; neither public policy nor the First Amendment countenanced subversive speech. A mere two decades later, a broad range of government actors and private organizations openly endorsed civil liberties. In 1939, an estimated two thousand people attended the ACLU’s National Conference on Civil Liberties, representing a wide array of political and economic views.\textsuperscript{120} As a test of rights mobilization, the interwar civil liberties movement looks like

\textit{Times}, 6 June 1939.

\textsuperscript{116} Justice Stone’s opinion implicitly rejected the narrow interpretation of Section 51 in \textit{United States v. Cruikshank}, an 1876 case growing out of the mob murder of more than a hundred black Republicans in Reconstruction Louisiana. The defendants were convicted of conspiracy to deprive citizens of the United States of their rights to assemble and bear arms, among other charges. The Supreme Court reversed the convictions on the theory that such rights were not protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Stone’s opinion suggested that \textit{Cruikshank} was no longer good law. \textit{Hague}, 307 U.S. at 526.

\textsuperscript{117} Ibid. (citing \textit{Hague} as well as the Pennsylvania System case, which arose under the 1930 Transportation Act). Its curtailment by employers was the theory of the Harlan County case. The Harlan case itself never reached the court, because it was nolled as part of a negotiated settlement.

\textsuperscript{118} Lewis Wood, “Hague Ban on CIO Voided by the Supreme Court,” 6 June 1939 (quoting Lee Pressman).


\textsuperscript{120} Board Minutes, 16 October 1939, ACLU Papers, reel 189, vol. 2233.
an unmitigated triumph.

And yet, the diffuse rhetorical convergence on civil liberties glosses over fundamental differences in the ways that different actors understood their underlying objectives. With the Constitutional Revolution, the sharp institutional distinctions in civil liberties enforcement had begun to fade. By contrast, the distance between the various conceptions of civil liberties’ substantive sweep was steadily expanding.

In spring 1937, the same season in which the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the NLRA, the tide began to turn against labor’s substantive agenda. Following a potent CIO organizing effort involving a wave of powerful sit-down strikes, employers’ groups organized to mobilize public opinion against worker lawlessness and to pressure local police and administrators to enforce the law. Some specifically invoked the language of “civil rights.” 121 Increasingly, public and political figures expressed concern at unions’ aggressive attitude, and momentum was seeping from the congressional labor agenda. The economy had contracted sharply as a result of Roosevelt’s fiscal policy, fueling frustration and desperation by industry and workers alike. 122

The Wagner Act, newly secured by the Supreme Court from constitutional attack, was suddenly open to legislative challenge. Republican opponents of the New Deal reached out to Southern Democrats, who feared that active intervention in labor disputes would open the door to federal interference with Jim Crow. To make matters worse, the AFL attacked the NLRB for favoring the CIO and undermining labor voluntarism. New Deal Democrats responded by citing the violent and unlawful suppression of labor by employers, relying heavily on the findings of the La Follette Civil Liberties Committee.

By the summer of 1938, however, neither Congress nor the public considered the Committee to be a credible source. The staff was regularly fielding demands that it investigate labor unions in addition to employers. One outraged citizen, voicing widely shared anti-union sentiments, insisted that “people read the News Papers and know that if strikers did not attack

121 “Partial Report of Proceedings, Meeting, Organization Committee, National Committee of One Thousand on Civil Rights,” La Follette Committee Papers, 50.25, box 86, folder March 1937. Archibald Stevenson, who had been intimately familiar with the ACLU ever since his Lusk Committee days, helped organize the National Committee of One Thousand on Civil Rights to combat sit-down strikes.

men hired to protect plants, there would be no fighting.”\footnote{J.C. Pinkney to Robert La Follette, 2 February 1937, La Follette Committee Papers, 50.25, box 85.} Another, who claimed to have known the elder Senator La Follette as well as Samuel Gompers, lamented the nation’s decline into “anarchy” and urged the Committee to present a “true picture of all sides.”\footnote{George Porter to Robert La Follette, Jr., 5 February 1937, La Follette Committee Papers, 50.25, box 85.} In a move that captures the growing incompatibility between the substantive vision of civil liberties and its alternatives, one correspondent suggested that the committee investigate President Roosevelt for his court-packing plan.\footnote{Fidler to Robert La Follette, Jr., 25 February 1937, La Follette Committee Papers, 50.25, box 85.}

In March 1939, the work of the La Follette Civil Liberties Committee drew to a close. Its extensive findings over years of congressional hearings culminated in a bill “to eliminate certain oppressive labor practices affecting interstate and foreign commerce.” Had it passed, it would have made anti-labor espionage, munitions, private police, and strikebreaking punishable by fine or imprisonment. William Green and John L. Lewis both supported the bill.\footnote{Debate on the bill centered on the supposed Communist threat to American industry. Amendments proposed by North Carolina Senator Robert R. Reynolds prohibited all companies from hiring aliens in excess of 10 percent of their workforces or from employing “any Communist or member of any Nazi Bund organization.” The Senate bill, thus amended, passed by a vote of 47 to 20. The House version was buried in committee. Auerbach, “La Follette Committee,” 454.} So, “heartily,” did Attorney General Murphy, who believed “that the Federal Government has a definite role to play in the preservation of civil liberties.”\footnote{Statement of Attorney General Murphy before the Senate Committee of Education and Labor, re: Bill S. 1970, Attorney General Papers, box 6, entry 132.} By 1939, however, a sweeping congressional endorsement of the substantive vision of civil liberties was bound to fail. Instead, the La Follette Committee yielded the spotlight to Martin Dies, Jr.’s House Committee on Un-American Activity. Among the many insinuations made by that Committee was that the La Follette Committee’s civil liberties work was corrupted by Communist influence.\footnote{The hearings of the Special Committee on Un-American Activities were convened on August 12, 1938 by Representative Martin Dies of Texas. On the relationship between the Dies Committee and civil liberties, see Auerbach, “La Follette Committee,” \textit{Journal of American History}, 450 (“The Dies Committee, more than any single institution, abetted the charge that the La Follette Committee’s origins, composition, and direction evidenced affinity for communism.”).}

As for the NLRB, it was evident that the agency’s patent partiality toward labor would not last. Within the NLRB, the fate of the substantive
vision of civil liberties is more or less reducible to the fate of industrial democracy in the United States. Congress justified the Wagner Act on the basis of industrial stability as well as workers’ rights, but the historical evidence points strongly to the primacy of the latter in early understandings and enforcement.\footnote{Forbath, “Thirteenth Amendment.”} Much ink has been spilled over the question whether and when the NLRB’s state-centered approach to labor relations dulled organized labor’s radical edge.

The principal threat to labor’s substantive civil liberties came from private sources, that is, employers. In combating private abuses, industrial unions had hitched themselves to the enforcement powers of the state. The AFL and CIO divided fiercely over how much discretion to afford the NLRB, for reasons that were both pragmatic and ideological.\footnote{See Christopher L. Tomlins, Law, Labor and Ideology in the Early American Republic (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992).} In practice, the AFL’s attitudes toward state enforcement often overlapped with industry’s, as its support for amendments to the Wager Act during the late 1930s makes clear. In this it also intersected the radical vision, though bread and butter unionism was a far cry from revolution. The AFL’s anti-statism was roundly denounced by New Dealers, but in retrospect, the CIO’s approach seems equally naïve. Whatever the causal chain, the NLRB of the mid-1940s put more stock in stabilizing production than in equalizing the bargaining power between workers and their employers.

In 1947, after a wave of powerful labor activity in the wake of World War II, Congress would pass the Taft-Hartley Act over President Truman’s veto. By then, there was broad-based agreement that the labor movement had grown too strong and too reckless. A few holdouts, including the ACLU, denounced Taft-Hartley as a “direct violation of labor’s rights” and cautioned that the act’s provisions were “fraught with peril to the maintenance of civil liberties in labor disputes.”\footnote{“Civil Liberties Union Condemns Labor Bill,” 16 June 1947, New York Times.} It described the popular desire, expressed in the 1946 elections, to break free of the “irritating shackles” of state control and to reinstate “the presumably sound leadership of private business.” The new skepticism toward state economic regulation had “produced an atmosphere increasingly hostile to the liberties of organized labor, the political left and many minorities.”\footnote{“Setback Reported for Civil Liberties,” 3 September 1947, New York Times.} Congress was reintroducing by statute some of the very same restraints on labor’s rights to strike and picket that the Supreme Court, before 1937, had imposed on constitutional grounds.
And yet, on some accounts, the dramatic legislative retrenchment that defined Taft-Hartley was little more than an afterthought. Early on, as radicals had predicted, changing political winds led to changes in personnel at the NLRB, which in turn tempered the agency’s pro-labor stance. To be sure, the NLRB continued to police employers’ unfair labor practices, and the right to organize was firmly entrenched. Union density would not peak until the 1950s, and it would take decades for labor to register the depth of its subsequent decline. Still, by 1947, the substantive vision of civil liberties had long since lost its bite.

In the Department of Justice, too, civil liberties enforcement took a dramatic turn in the wake of the New Deal. In 1941, the Civil Liberties Unit was renamed the Civil Rights Section. Although the terms “civil liberties” and “civil rights” were often used interchangeably during this period, the new nomenclature reflected a shift in the unit’s priorities from industrial labor to race. During the 1940s, the CRS focused on economic injustice or African Americans, eschewing the type of formal equality arguments that would mark the NAACP’s litigation strategy in the run-up to Brown. v. Board of Education. Still, the claims the CRS took up were those of desperate black farmworkers, not the powerful unions of the new labor regime. Rescuing the country’s most vulnerable workers from conditions close to slavery fundamentally threatened America’s racial hierarchy, a goal of patent historical importance. Nonetheless, the CRS considered its new commitments, like its new name, to be less “radical” and more politically palatable than its earlier path.

In any case, the continued validity of the state action doctrine made earlier proposals to pursue claims against individual employers for interference with labor activity unfeasible. The Fourteenth Amendment did not reach individual action, as the CRS well understood. The state action requirement expressed in such cases as Cruikshank and Wheeler meant that Section 51 was inapplicable to “the great mass of civil liberties cases” the

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133 Notably, its project was premised on the Thirteenth Amendment, not the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth.

134 Goluboff, Lost Promise, 112. Goluboff’s work on the Civil Rights Section is crucial here. See also Richard D. McKinzie, Oral History Interview with Eleanor Bontecou, 5 June 1973, Washington, D.C. (explaining that the peonage cases were successful because they were in line with public opinion).

135 As Assistant Attorney General O. John Rogge told the ACLU’s National Conference on Civil Liberties in October 1939: “No matter how much the content of the due process clause has been expanded, rights under the due process clause are not protected against mere individual action, on the standard interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment as a restriction on State action only.” “Civil Rights Conference,” Civil Liberties Quarterly (September 1939), 1, ACLU Papers, reel 167, vol. 2061.
Department would otherwise have pursued. In 1939, Assistant Attorney General O. John Rogge reported that the Criminal Division was evaluating those cases to determine whether they represented “sound law.” If they did not, the Civil Liberties Unit would have “no hesitation” in asking the Supreme Court to overrule them.\footnote{Address by O. John Rogge, National Conference on Civil Liberties, 14 October 1939, Attorney General Papers, box 22, entry 132, folder Civil Rights.} The Supreme Court, however, declined the offer, and a legislative solution was by that time off the table.\footnote{See Screws v. United States, 321 U.S. 91 (1945).} Even if authorization were possible, CRS reservations may have stood in the way. Robert Jackson, Murphy’s successor as Attorney General (and his future colleague on the Supreme Court), was skeptical of a state-centered approach. “Compared with [the] rather narrow powers to advance civil rights,” he reflected, “the possibilities that the Department of Justice by misuse of power will invade civil rights really gives me more concern.”\footnote{Robert Jackson, “Messages on the Launching of the ‘Bill of Rights Review,’” Bill of Rights Review 1 (Summer 1940): 35.}

It was in the courts that the progressive, substantive, and radical visions of civil liberties coexisted longest. Ironically, even as they clashed in the legislative and administrative arenas, the various civil liberties constituencies made common ground in the courts—where, for the first time, robust First Amendment protection for labor activity seemed plausible.

In 1940, the Supreme Court handed down two monumental decisions on labor and free speech. In \textit{Thornhill v. Alabama} (invoking footnote four of \textit{Carolene Products}), the Court upheld the right to picket as an expression of ideas.\footnote{Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 95 (1940). Ibid., 102–03.} The decision established that “the dissemination of information concerning the facts of a labor dispute” was within the realm of “free discussion” protected by the Constitution.\footnote{Ibid., 102.} As in \textit{Senn v. Tile Layers Protection Union}, the Court stressed the public communicative function of picketing. Even if its effect was to induce action in others, picketing was speech.\footnote{Ibid., 104.} The court observed: “Free discussion concerning the conditions in industry and the causes of labor disputes appears to us indispensable to the effective and intelligent use of the processes of popular government to shape the destiny of modern industrial society.” In \textit{Thornhill}’s lesser known companion case, \textit{Carlson v. California}, the Court declared that “publicizing the facts of a labor dispute in a peaceful way” were likewise entitled to constitutional protection against abridgement by a
Thornhill and Carlson were argued in the Supreme Court by, respectively, Joseph Padway, AFL general counsel and a member of the ABA’s Committee on the Bill of Rights, and Lee Pressman, CIO general counsel. Padway, who had argued Senn, had good reason to be optimistic about vindicating labor’s rights in the judiciary. In his brief, Pressman cited Hague for the proposition that “danger to the state arises not from the picket line but from the vigilantes who would suppress the picket line by force and violence.” Pressman had long expressed skepticism toward the judiciary, but he had come to believe that the First Amendment might offer a counterbalance to its protection of property rights. Despite his general antipathy toward a “legal approach to labor action,” he saw great potential in “the growing realization and acceptance of the fact that labor action is nothing more or less than the exercise of constitutional rights” to freedom of speech and assembly.

The constitutional status of labor’s most effective methods—including mass picketing and the secondary boycott—was, however, far from secure. A rapid contraction of First Amendment protection for labor activity followed on Thornhill and Carlson’s heels. In its 1941 decision in Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, the Supreme Court upheld a state-court injunction against picketing by a union that had engaged in violence and destruction of property, explaining that “utterance in a contest of violence can lose its significance as an appeal to reason and become part of an instrument of force.” Under such circumstances even peaceful expression could be constitutionally curtailed, Justice Frankfurter explained for the Court. To the extent that labor doubted that judicial review would reliably serve its interests, its fears were well founded. Indeed, from the perspective of the ACLU’s foundational goals, the modern First Amendment turned out to be an abject failure. Radical propaganda retained its protected status, but the right to organize quickly fell out of the realm of ideas.

By the early 1940s, a new, liberal vision of civil liberties

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143 Lee Pressman to Arthur Garfield Hays, 10 February 1939, reel 169, vol. 2080.
144 Quoted in Gilbert J. Gall, Pursuing Justice: Lee Pressman, the New Deal, and the CIO (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 108. He was optimistic that the “simple protection of these constitutional rights will solve many of the complicated legal problems that are involved in the exercise of labor’s right to picket and to boycott.” Gall traces the use of the civil rights statutes by the DOJ’s Civil Liberties Unit to Pressman’s urging. Ibid., 109.
145 See Jim Pope, book manuscript, chapter 12 (on file with author).
commanded substantial, though not absolute, consensus. That vision shared the radicals’ call for a neutral state. It shared the progressives’ concern for robust policy debate. It shared the conservatives’ reliance on judicially enforceable rights. Only substantive civil liberties were entirely excluded from its domain.

It is tempting to suppose that the judiciary was responsible for the taming of civil liberties, as adherents to the substantive view had predicted. But attention to civil liberties enforcement in its alternative institutional venues complicates that assumption.

The question whether courts are conducive to the protection and enforcement of rights is, of course, an intractable one. Judicial enthusiasts cite the ability of courts and constitutional victories to reshape cultural understandings, resist popular pressures, energize potential supporters, and effect dramatic and stable legal changes at relatively low cost. Naysayers counter that litigation privileges individual over collective rights, de-radicalizes social movements, alienates the organizational base, favors wealthy parties and repeat players, and drains resources that could be spent more productively on organizing, lobbying, and other activities. No doubt there are many examples to marshal on behalf of both views.

For their part, scholars of popular constitutionalism evaluate the influence of public opinion on judicial decisions construing constitutional rights. In doing so, they assume—often implicitly, and sometimes explicitly—that legislative and administrative actors are inherently more responsive to popular pressures. By the same token, the countermajoritarian difficulty presumes that the laws and policies subjected to judicial review more closely approximate democratic consensus.

The history of New Deal civil liberties enforcement intervenes in these debates by challenging the assumption that the judicial forum is altogether distinctive in its conception of rights, or that the tradeoffs entailed in constitutional litigation are limited to its purview. In the late New Deal, economic contraction, hostility toward labor, and the rise of totalitarianism abroad all abetted the liberal civil liberties vision. The concurrent embrace of that vision across institutions suggests that the new paradigm owed less to institutional considerations than to political and ideological change. Indeed, a capacious account of civil liberties lasted longest in the judiciary. Today, even as First Amendment scholars lament

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147 For example, Cass Sunstein has argued that legislators are better suited to implement positive rights. Cass R. Sunstein, The Partial Constitution (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993).

148 Bruce Ackerman, We the People (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991).
the judiciary’s stubborn adherence to a free marketplace of ideas, labor law scholars query whether unions would not have fared better in the courts.  

I do not mean to overstate this claim. At the height of the New Deal, many advocates and activists regarded Congress as the institution most responsive to majoritarian impulses and the judiciary as the most insulated, with administrative agencies somewhere in between. They doubted the will or power of the courts to create substantive rights, and they assumed that administrative actors were more apt to invoke state power on behalf of rights claimants against private abuse. In the face of contending constitutional claims, they called upon Congress to curtail employers’ use of economic weapons, with the hope of tipping the constitutional balance from property to speech and association and from the rights of employers to the rights of labor. While these assumptions and aspirations were largely based on New Deal political alignments, it may be that some have generalizable significance. And yet, the story of civil liberties between the Depression and World War II confirms a truism of labor advocacy in the Progressive Era: namely, that courts, no less than administrators or legislatures, are creatures of the state.

CONCLUSION

If institutional differences in civil liberties enforcement were less apparent than New Dealers might have predicted, neither were they inconsequential. The effects on civil liberties of domestic economic conditions and an imminent World War no doubt dwarfed the impact of institutional distinctions. Still, outside the labor context, tangible differences emerged.

In the years after the Constitutional Revolution, administrators sought out ways to increase access to competing ideas without adjusting their balance. In 1938, President Roosevelt introduced a discounted postage rate to facilitate the circulation of printed matter. ACLU Attorney Morris Ernst, who persuaded Roosevelt to adopt the program, proclaimed that it “permitted a flow into the market place of great additional diversity of points of view.”

In 1946, the FCC adopted new standards for granting

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150 By contrast, the ACLU believed that judicial tenure insulated judges against lobbying from strong special interests. That is, judges were freer than legislators to follow public opinion. Accordingly, the ACLU often organized efforts to influence judges through letter-writing campaigns by prominent citizens.
151 See Fred Rodell, “Morris Ernst, New York’s Unlawyerlike Liberal Lawyer is the
and renewing radio licenses, which required stations to allocate time for the discussion of “important public questions” and to cover all sides of controversial issues. In practice, of course, such requirements served to increase access by disfavored and marginal speakers; popular and commercial speakers were likely already to have ample access. The radio industry denounced the measures as censorship, but the ACLU disagreed. If the government sought to withhold radio licenses based on its assessment of the content of programming, it explained, the station owners had recourse to the courts. As things stood, “[t]he standards fixed provide[d] for more speech, not less.”

Today, even circumscribed interventions in the marketplace of ideas are constitutionally suspect. With few exceptions, the model of civil liberties that has prevailed in the Supreme Court has disclaimed any role for the state in adjusting access, as First Amendment theorists have long lamented. Together with Congress, administrative agencies from the FTC to the FEC have sought to temper the effects of economic disparities and financial interests on the quality of expression. The Supreme Court has denounced such efforts as distortions in the market. Citizens United and McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission are only the most recent iterations of a phenomenon that critics of the liberal civil liberties vision foretold before the Second World War. As Nathan Greene (co-author with Felix Frankfurter of The Labor Injunction) cautioned in relation to employers’ anti-union propaganda, much speech amounts to “a protected commodity in a monopoly market.”

Recent cases notwithstanding, the liberal vision of civil liberties that has reigned in the courts is not strictly “negative,” in the ordinary sense. It promises broad access to the channels of communication and even, occasionally, demands government assistance in securing a forum for

Censor’s Enemy, The President’s Friend,” Life, 21 February 1944. The measure was justified on the basis that “in this democracy of ours, unlike the dictatorship lands, we are dedicated to the ever increasing extension of a free market in thought as a means to the perpetuation of our national ideals. As they burn books abroad, we extend their distribution.” Announcement by National Committee to Abolish Postal Discrimination Against Books, Oscar Cox Papers, Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library, Hyde Park, N.Y., Alphabetical File, Douglas-Ernst, box 9, folder Ernst, Morris; Ernst, “Memorandum for Special Meeting,” 5–6.


153 “Civil Liberties and the NLRB,” International Juridical Association, reprinted from speech by Nathan Greene, 8 March 1940, 5 (emphasis in original), Sugar Papers, folder 54:17.
speech. In isolated instances, it has gone so far as to require private parties to open their property to public discussion. But in clashes between competing ideas, it steadfastly refuses to tip the scales.

In an era when radical revolution seemed possible—when the goal of labor activity was the general strike, not a union contract—minor differences like these would have seemed inconsequential. Proponents of the radical civil liberties vision naively hoped that a naked right to agitate would pave the way to substantive change. Implicit in their position was the confidence that even in an unfettered marketplace, their agenda would prevail. By the 1940s, employers understood that no free exchange in ideas existed. They understood that a right to free speech would almost invariably favor those with superior resources.

On this view, it was not that New Deal institutions de-radicalized the labor-friendly civil liberties visions; it was the liberal civil liberties vision that de-radicalized the New Deal state. That is, what was determinative was ideological contestation and compromise, not institutional enforcement.

Then again, a young Roger Baldwin might have suggested that the radicals’ mistake was to trust in state institutions at all. The notion that the Supreme Court could have stretched the First Amendment to encompass labor’s most coercive tactics seems fanciful in retrospect. Even prospectively, many within the labor movement considered the judicial strategy to be misguided. At the dawn of the New Deal, the architects of the modern civil liberties movement had pitted the administrative enforcement of civil liberties against labor’s collective power rather than the courts. Theirs was not liberal constitutionalism, administrative constitutionalism, or even popular constitutionalism. They defended civil liberties as rights prior to the Constitution, enforceable by “economic power and organized pressure alone.”

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154 For example, it requires limited access to public forum and police protection against hecklers.
157 Resolutions, Conference on Civil Liberties under the New Deal, 9 December 1934, ACLU Papers, reel 110, vol. 721.