Federalism and community security: policing as a federal affair

Catalina Pérez Correa

“Cada cuadra, cada pueblo, cada ciudad, tiene la única autoridad legítima para decidir quién se encarga de su seguridad”.
“Every block, every town, every city has the only legitimate authority to decide who is in charge of its security”

Julian LeBarón

On the 11th of December 2006, ten days after President Felipe Calderon was sworn in to government – after one of the most competitive (and questionable) presidential election in Mexican history – he announced the first “joint operation” to fight organized crime. The National Defense Ministry initiated its participation in this operation with 4,260 army and air force elements. On the 4th of January 2007, the federal government sent 3,500 army elements to Tijuana. “Since Juan Soldado’s era, military forces had not come to substitute civil authorities in this urban area. The soldiers disarmed the municipal police forces and locked up its members inside their own installations.”

1 I am grateful for the help and comments from Karen Silva, Fernanda Alonso, Alejandro Madrazo.
2 This operation was based on the coordination between the Ministry of Defense, the Navy, the Federal Ministry of Public Security and the Attorney General's Office to deal with organized crime and was known as “Anuncio sobre Operación Conjunto Michoacán”. See Presidencia de la República (The Presidency). Anuncio sobre Operación Conjunta Michoacán, México, December 2006. Available at: http://www.presidencia.gob.mx/2006/12/anuncio-sobre-la-operacion-conjunta-michoacan/
3 Juan Soldado was a soldier accused and executed by ley fuga in Tijuana, Baja California in 1938. He was charged with raping the daughter of one of the leaders of the workers’ movement that tried to prevent the closure of casinos in Tijuana. After his execution, his guilt was questioned and due to the remorse, the people turned him a saint. Today, illegal immigrants pray to him and ask for his help in order to cross the boarder safely, obtain visas, wealth, etc. See Raphael, Ricardo. El otro México: un viaje hacia el país de las historias extraordinarias, Editorial Temas de hoy, México, 2011. P. 49-51
operations in Tijuana, Guerrero, Chihuahua, Durango and Sinaloa. The operation in Guerrero initially included participation of 6,388 soldiers, and the Sierra Madre Joint Operation (Chihuahua, Durango and Sinaloa) had the participation of 9,054. Throughout this presidency, the number of operations to fight organized crime has increased significantly. Likewise, the number of deployed military forces has increased throughout the national territory.

The deployment of federal forces has had multiple consequences. On the one hand, there has been an exacerbation of the violence in the country, including the incidents of the illegitimate use of force against civilians. This is made especially clear when evaluating the participation of the army and marine in combat tasks against drug trafficking are studied. At the same time, the growing violence has generated a critical situation in local public security institutions. Among these issues has been the disappearance of said local forces. On the other hand, the use of federal forces for security tasks has diminished the population’s trust on this institutions as well as polarizing the population. Finally, the use of federal forces has broken the vertical division of powers that enables control of the use of power from the States towards the federal government (and vice versa).

Despite the many criticism that have been made towards federalism, this paper

---


5 The federal forces are those under direct command of the federal executive government, namely: Army, Navy, Air Force and Federal Police. Since their involvement in the war on drugs has been more prominent, I will mainly use data related to the Army and Navy.
makes an effort to rescue it not only as a model of a vertical control of powers but, more importantly, as a way of promoting self-governance, citizen participation and local security. While federalism as an organizational model of the state does not guarantee self-governance or citizen participation, it may, help improve security at the community level. In this regard, the government's strategy has destroyed, rather than benefitted, that which makes security possible.

In the first part of this paper, the effects that the use of federal forces (especially the army and navy) has had in regard to violence and crime while carrying out public security tasks is analyzed. The second part, presents the main arguments for and against federalism as a model that ensures the creation of governments that are attentive to their public, that promote innovation, prevent excesses in the use of power and that serve as a means of promoting self-governance and participation. In the third part, a proposal for self-government as a way to strengthen and ensure safety is compared to the current centralized police model.

I. Violence and federal forces

a. Violence

During the last six years, Mexico has seen a steady increase in the number of crimes, especially violent crime. The rate of intentional homicide in the country increased from 9.7 per 100,000 inhabitants in 2007 to 17.9 (per 100,000 inhabitants) in 2010. While the increase has occurred in almost all states, the largest and most dramatic increases, have been concentrated in a dozen states (Chihuahua, Baja California, Durango, Sinaloa, Nuevo Leon, Tamaulipas,
reversing the downward trend of the last two decades. In January 2012, authorities reported a total of 47,453 deaths spanning the last six years, directly related to organized crime, while NGOs claimed that the number rose to more than 80,000 deaths. According to Eduardo Guerrero in 2007, 53 municipalities in the country recorded at least one execution per month. In 2008, the figure rose to 84 and in 2009 to 131. By 2010 there were 200 municipalities that met this criteria. In all, there was an increase of 277% in the number of executions recorded between 2007 and 2010. Also, between 2007 and 2010, bank robberies increased by 90%, extortion by 100%, car theft with violence by 108% and kidnappings by 188%. Nationally, the number of organizations signing “narcomantas” nearly tripled from 2007 to 2008 and then more than doubled between 2009 and 2010. This violence has been concentrated in some municipalities and regions, especially in the States of Chihuahua and Baja California. Ciudad Juarez, Chihuahua, currently has a rate of 229 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants while in the span of one year, 1,222 people were killed in Tijuana, Baja California.

---

10 Loc. Cit.
11 Messages left in public, signed by criminal organizations
13 Chihuahua, Baja California, Durango, Sinaloa, Nuevo León, Tamaulipas, Guerrero, Michoacán, Nayarit, Morelos. Loc Cit.
14 According to the ‘Consejo Ciudadano para la Seguridad Pública y Justicia Penal’, Ciudad Juárez is the most dangerous city in the World for the third year in a row. See: Cacho, Ricardo y Sarre, Miguel, Policía y Fuerzas Armadas en México: un camino hacia la paz y la seguridad humana a la luz de la Declaración de Santiago, México-Madrid, 2012, p. 1. As a comparison, El Salvador, one of the most violent countries in the world, had a homicide rate of 71/100,000 in 2010.
15 Ibidem. P. 2
Citizens have not been the only ones to feel the increase in the number of homicides; the number of police officers killed has also increased. According to the Ministry of Public Security, from December 2006 to June 2011, "2,886 security elements belonging to the three levels of government were killed due to executions, confrontations and attacks against authorities. Municipal police forces have the highest number of deaths reported with 45% (1,296 officers) killed in clashes."\(^{16}\)

Both the federal government, as well as the U.S. government, have argued that the increase in violence is either a legacy of the PRI governments\(^ {17}\) or attributable to the struggles between rival cartels or gangs fighting for the control of territories and routes.\(^ {18}\) In April 2011, for example, Michele Leonhart, the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency administrator, declared that the violence in Mexico was strong evidence that the war on drugs was having a positive effect. Drug traffickers “are like caged animals, attacking each other”\(^ {19}\), Leonhart told reporters. This perspective has led the government to classify most homicides as gang rivalry and to dismiss the need to investigate the killings.\(^ {20}\) However, it is difficult to understand how the government can come to this conclusion

\(^{17}\) See: http://www.presidencia.gob.mx/el-blog/el-tercer-mito-falso-que-la-presencia-de-la-autoridad-detone-sistematicamente-la-violencia/
\(^{18}\) A summary of the official standing can be read at: Villalobos, Joaquín. “Doce mitos de la guerra contra el narco”, en Revista Nexos, Enero, 2010 Also see: http://www.proceso.com.mx/?p=280244
\(^{19}\) See: http://www.proceso.com.mx/?p=267096
\(^{20}\) According to the Human Rights Watch, Neither Rights nor security, “Government officials consistently dismiss victims’ allegations as false and cast the victims as criminals—even as ranking officials publicly profess a firm commitment to upholding human rights. (...) Calderón has also repeatedly asserted that 90 percent of the people killed in drug-related violence are members of criminal groups.” Ver: Human Rights Watch, Neithor Rights nor security. Killings, Torture and Disappearances un Mexico’s “War Drugs”, Human Rights Watch, México, 2011, pg. 9 available at: http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/mexico1111webcover_0.pdf
given that federal authorities have only investigated a fraction of those murders to begin with. According to a report by Human Rights Watch: *Neither Security Nor Rights*:

“Of the 35,000 killings the government says were tied to organized crime from December 2006 to January 2011, the federal prosecutor’s office registered 13,845 killings. (According to the Mexican Constitution, if indeed these killings were all tied to organized crime, federal prosecutors have the power to investigate and prosecute them.) The office provided conflicting information as to the number of those cases it was investigating—first reporting it had opened 1,687 homicide investigations, and three months later saying it had only opened 997 investigations. In these cases, only 343 suspects have been charged. And according to statistics provided to Human Rights Watch by the federal judiciary in response to a public information request, federal judges have only convicted defendants for 22 homicides and other injuries tied to organized crime.”

From an academic standpoint, alternative theories have been proposed to explain the increase in violence. Several studies, link federal interventions, especially intervention by federal forces, with the escalation of violence. Fernando Escalante, for example, suggests a numerical relationship between the use of federal forces (including the joint operations) and the increase in the number of homicides. In another text, Mauricio Merino corroborated the relationship reported by Escalante: "The States with military operations have homicide levels at the same level as those in some of the most violent countries in the world, such as Venezuela and Colombia; the States ‘with violence but no military operations’ are located at similar levels than those in Russia, while the rest of the country seems to be at similar levels of nations such as Costa Rica and Lithuania. (…) There seems to be a pattern more or less shared by all States (Nuevo Leon and Tamaulipas are exceptions) where there is an immediate increase in the number of homicides."

---

21 Id, p. 15
homicides after the start of joint operations, then a stabilization in the homicide rate in the coming months leading to a final increase towards the end of the series”. Outside of Mexico, a recent study by the International Center for Science in Drug Policy (ICSDP) concluded that the relation between violence and the intensity with which prohibition is applied to substances is positively related. According to the study, the more energetically the policy is implemented (measured, for example by expenditure on combating drug crimes) the greater number of homicides committed. The number of anti-narcotics operations carried out to implement the drug policy can also measure the harshness with which the policy is implemented.

As mentioned before, throughout the present administration (2006-2012), the number of joint operations has grown significantly (see Table 1). In some operations, federal security forces (army, navy and federal police) have participated alongside local forces (State and municipal), while in others, only federal forces – mainly the army (Ministry of National Defense, SEDENA) and recently the Navy (Navy Department, SEMARNAT) – were involved with the goal of tackling organized crime.

24 306 random articles that empirically analyze the relation between the enforcement of prohibitive policies on drugs and the existing violence were evaluated in the study. See: International Centre for Science in Drug Policy (ICSDP), Effect of Drug Law Enforcement on Drug-Related Violence: Evidence from a Scientific Review, ICSDP, Canada, 2010, available http://www.icsdp.org/docs/ICSDP-1%20-%20FINAL.pdf
25 Note that table 1 shows the number of operations implemented specifically to combat drug trafficking
Table 1. Operations implemented to fight drug trafficking.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Operations implemented by the Ministry of National Defense</th>
<th>Number of Operations implemented by Navy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>1 (only December)</td>
<td>6,590</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>12,744</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>27,926</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>34,283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>34,830</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>16,543&lt;sup&gt;28&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The presence of federal forces has increasingly been felt throughout the country. In addition to increasing the number of operations, the number of military elements deployed in the country has also increased (see Table 2).

Table 2. Average number of elements deployed yearly

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Yearly average of elements deployed by the Ministry of National Defense</th>
<th>Yearly average of elements deployed by the Navy&lt;sup&gt;30&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>32,074</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>37,253</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>45,000</td>
<td>9,226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>45,106</td>
<td>9,506</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>48,650</td>
<td>8,118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>49,650</td>
<td>8,056</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 2011&lt;sup&gt;31&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>49,650</td>
<td>8,763</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>27</sup> Navy Department. Fifth government annual report (*Quinto informe de Labores*), Mexico, 2011.
<sup>28</sup> Data only until the month of June.
<sup>30</sup> Navy Department Op. Cit. The numbers are from the month of September to September of the stated year. The numbers correspond to the average displaced elements monthly during this period.
<sup>31</sup> These numbers are not updated. As a response to a public information petition, folio number 0000700150911, October 21, 2011, the Ministry of Defense gave the same distribution of elements was in effect as for the previous year.
There are several hypotheses to explain the link between the federal government’s intervention and the increase in violence. Some studies claim that the removal of key players (leaders of the drug gangs or other gangs), unhinge the informal arrangements in place, creating power voids and incentives for other groups to enter and compete for space.32 Another explanation is that violence is the natural consequence of having large, unregulated markets (representing huge profits) that operate without either rules or special courts established to resolve disputes.33 With no established rules, the competing groups use violence to protect their interests and resolve conflicts. This explanation, however, does not account for the variation over time in terms of the number of crimes.

Escalante’s hypothesis is directly linked to the use of federal forces. According to this author, the replacement of local forces by federal forces alters local and informal arrangements.34 Escalante argues that part of the local police’s role is to organize and enforce informal arrangements. By removing or marginalizing local police, arrangements disappear but informal markets do not. This creates uncertainty and the violent outcomes that the figures show.

---

33 These markets include not only drug markets but also informal trade in general, representing a significant income for those who govern them informally. See: International Centre for Science in Drug Policy. Op. Cit. P. 15-17 See also: Escalante, Fernando. “La muerte tiene permiso” Op. Cit.
b. State violence

Regardless of the causal explanations between the deployment and presence of federal forces and the increase in violent crime, it is important to highlight a specific phenomenon of violence: the use of force by the state against the general population. This “legal” violence has also substantially risen with the increase of interventions by the federal government in the States. This can be seen in two aspects: (rising) accusations of human rights violations committed by the army and navy and a notorious increase in the use of lethal force against civilians.

As shown in Table 3, the increase in the number of federal operations and their presence in the States has been accompanied by an increase in the number of accusations for human rights violations made against these institutions.35

35 The reasons for the accusations vary. For example, in 2011, 2,540 investigations were opened (against all authorities) for a "lack of legality, honesty, loyalty, fairness and efficiency in the performance of duties, obligations and commissions." In 2009, 1,527 complaints were files for this same reason and in 2010, 2,222. In 2011, there were 1,774 complaints of "arbitrary detention". In 2009, 1,289 complaints were filed for this reason and in 2010, 1,197. In 2011, 1,626 complaints were filed with allegations of "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment." In 2009, 1,105 investigations were initiated for this reason and in 2010, 1,179.
Table 3. Alleged human rights violations\textsuperscript{36}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total number of complaints filed (all authorities)</th>
<th>Number of claims</th>
<th>% of total</th>
<th>Number of claims</th>
<th>% of total</th>
<th>Number of Authorities identified as alleged offenders</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>5475</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>487</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>5244</td>
<td>367</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td>499</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>6004</td>
<td>1,230</td>
<td>20.5%</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>493</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>6083</td>
<td>1,791</td>
<td>29.4%</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>477</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>6916</td>
<td>1,415</td>
<td>20.4%</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
<td>509</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>10,392</td>
<td>1,695</td>
<td>16.3%</td>
<td>495</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
<td>556</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>40,114</td>
<td>6,680</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
<td>8,33</td>
<td>2.07%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As shown in the first column, Total number of complaints filed, the increase in the number of complaints (accusations) received by the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) has not been widespread. While the total complaints received during this period (2006-2011) increased by 89.8%, the increase in complaints reported to the Ministry of National Defense (SEDENA) and the Navy Department (SEMARNAT) was 831% and 1962% respectively. It is also worth noting that by 2008, 20.5% of complaints received by the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) were against the Ministry of Defense. For the first time since the creation of the NHRC, out of the 493 possible authorities, the Ministry of Defense came first as the most signaled authority of alleged human rights violations (in 2006, for example, the Ministry of Defense was not even in

\textsuperscript{36} National Human Rights Commission (CNDH). Inform of activities. CNDH. Years: 2006-2011.
the top 10). As the Table shows, in 2009, almost 30% of allegations pointed out the Ministry of Defense as the responsible authority of a violation or abuse. In 2011, the Ministry of Defense continued being the authority that received the most claims of human rights violations.

Although it is important to note that only a fraction of these complaints resulted in recommendations (97 recommendations to the Ministry of Defense and 17 to the Navy Department during this period), it is also true, as noted earlier, that Mexican institutions are not known for their efficient response to citizen complaints. The accusations, in any case, show a growing dissatisfaction with the army. Even though army evaluations are at their highest in the region (see Graph 1), its perception has decreased in Mexico since the beginning of operations against drug trafficking. Perception surveys (Latinobarómetro) show that trust placed in the armed forces has declined significantly since the start of administration. As shown in Graph 1, while in 2006, 28% of the population claimed to have high levels of trust in the armed forces, in 2010 this number had dropped to 19%. Also in 2006, 21.2% of the population said they had "little trust" in the armed forces while for 2010, 29.4% reported little trust (within the range of "no trust" the difference is less). Nonetheless, Mitofski reports that in 2011, the army remains the third best-

37 The National Crime Victimization Survey (Encuesta Nacional de Victimización), has recently added the navy in the list of authorities evaluated. In 2011, the Navy obtained 50% of answers signaling "strong trust in the institution" and 28% "somewhat trust the institution". In the same survey, the army obtained 46% of "strong" trust and 28.4% of "some trust". National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI). Encuesta Nacional de Victimización y Percepción sobre Seguridad Pública (ENVIPE). INEGI, México, 2011. In the case of police forces, the surveys do not differentiate between local and federal police forces.

evaluated authority (after the church and Universities) in terms of trust while the police, senators and congressmen are the worst rated\textsuperscript{39}.

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{levels_of_trust.png}
\caption{Levels of trust towards armed forces (strong level of trust)}
\end{figure}

The second troubling aspect of the violence that the state exercises against the general population is the increased use of lethal force. The number of civilians killed by the army, and officially acknowledged today, amounts to over 3,200 people, while the navy currently recognizes a balance of 280 dead civilians (See Table 4). (The table also shows the increasing number of arrests carried out by armed forces against drug trafficking and organized crime).

Table 4. Relation between detainees and persons killed in confrontations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Persons detained by the Ministry of National Defense</th>
<th>Persons detained by the Navy Department</th>
<th>Persons killed in confrontations with the Army</th>
<th>Persons killed in confrontations with the Navy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>3,687</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>6,438</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>9,302</td>
<td>306</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>9,137</td>
<td>452</td>
<td>734</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>12,465</td>
<td>1297</td>
<td>2,165</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>41,029</td>
<td>2384</td>
<td>3,203</td>
<td>280</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the text: *Uso de la fuerza letal. Muertos, heridos y detenidos en enfrentamientos de las fuerzas federales con presuntos miembros de la delincuencia organizada*, we found evidence that the armed forces more often use lethal force than police forces. By measuring the number of ‘combatant civilians’ killed in clashes over the number of ‘combatant civilians wounded, we found that institutions that make up the armed forces (army and navy), often cause more deaths in confrontations (see Table 5). While the federal police force has a fatality index of 2.6 (i.e., 2.6 deaths for every wounded), the

---

40 “The detentions made by military personal were of in flagrante criminals detected during the permanent campaign against drug trafficking and in compliance with the Federal Code for Weapons and Explosives (…) it is the ministerial authorities that determine if the acts pertain to Health Crimes or Activities of Organized Crime. Response to petition of information, file number 0000700011312. Ministry of National Defense. México, November 2011.
44 By armed forces I refer to the army, the navy and the air force. In this study the air force is left out because it does not play a strong role in the drug war.
46 The civilian opposition refers to those individuals that confront the army or navy.
47 This indicator only considers in its denominator the "opponents" wounded and not the unharmed detainees. The case fatality rate analyzes the result of using lethal force. Whenever it is used, it is expected that balance of both dead and wounded exists. If the death toll is a lot higher than the number of injuries, there is reason to be concerned about the existence of an excessive use of lethal force.
army has an index of 9.1 (i.e. 9.1 deaths for every wounded) and the marine an index 17.3. 48 Data provided by the Ministry of Defense 49 also gave evidence of a rise over time in the fatality index of the army. Based on these numbers, the fatality index was 2.78 in 2008, while in 2010 the number rose to 6.8 (deaths per wounded). 50 In other words, a hypothesis can be formed signaling that the army becomes more lethal as it increases its participation in drug trafficking combating tasks.

Table 5  51

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Fatality index: Alleged offenders killed over alleged offenders wounded</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Federal Police</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>17.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal Policy and Army</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security Forces</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

By studying the specific regions of the country, we also found significant variations. According to statistics provided by the Ministry of Defense, for example, in

48 A similar study was conducted by Ignacio Cano in Sao Paulo, Brazil. Cano reported a fatality index of the Sao Paolo police of 2.06 in 2006, which decreased to 0.55 in 2010 after the intervention of civil and international agencies. Cano also found significant variations in the rate of mortality depending on whether the confrontation happened inside or outside of the favelas and if opponents were white, mulatto or black. The index rose significantly within the favelas and for mulattoes and blacks. See: Cano, Ignacio. “Racial bias in police use of lethal force in Brazil.” Police and Practice Research, 11:1, 2010. P. 31-43.
49 We calculated two fatality indexes. The first was constructed from information obtained from press. The second was constructed with information provided by the Ministry of Defense via access to information. For more on the methodology see Silva, C., Perez Correa, C. and Gutierrez, R., op. The date here shows the index constructed from the press.
50 We could not obtain information on the federal police or the navy in order to compare changes in the fatality rate.
Tamaulipas, Nuevo Leon and Guerrero, where federal forces have the highest participation, the fatality index was significantly higher than in the rest of the country.\textsuperscript{52} Finally, by measuring the ratio of those killed versus those arrested in clashes, we found an overall rate of 1.24 civilian deaths per civilian opponents arrested. Again this number increases with time. While in 2009 there were more than two detainees for every death (0.42), in 2011 the relationship was reversed with nearly two deaths per detainee (1.99). Once again, Tamaulipas and Guerrero have higher values for 2011 than the rest of the country, with almost three deaths per detainee (2.82) and more than three deaths per detainee (3.24) respectively.\textsuperscript{53}

Brutus, one of the Anti-Federalists, wrote in 1788:

"I have always been, and always shall be against a standing army of any kind; to me it is a terrible thing, whether under that of a parliamentary, or any other designation; a standing army is still a standing army by whatever name it is called; they are a body of men distinct from the body of the people; they are governed by different laws, and blind obedience, and an entire submission to the orders of their commanding officer, is their only principle; the nations around us, sir, are already enslaved, and have been enslaved by those very means; by means of their standing armies they have every one lost their liberties; it is indeed impossible that the liberties of the people in any country can be preserved where a numerous standing army is kept up. Shall we then take our measures from the example of our neighbours? No, sir, on the contrary, from their misfortunes we ought to learn to avoid those rocks upon which they have split."\textsuperscript{54}

\textsuperscript{52} In Tamaulipas, the army fatality index was 12.6 in 2010 and 10.5 in 2011. In Nuevo Leon the index was 7.3 and 6.99 respectively. In Guerrero it was 6.3 in 2010 and 6.4 in 2011. See: Silva, C., Perez Correa, C. y Gutierrez, R., Op. Cit.
\textsuperscript{53} Loc. Cit.
\textsuperscript{54} Brutus, The Antifederalist Papers. No. VIII, January 1788 http://www.constitution.org/afp/brutus08.htm
Mexican federal forces were deployed arguing the need to control violence in the country. However, as shown in this section, the federal government's growing intervention in the States has had counterproductive results. One of the main conclusions observed from the study done on the fatality index was that the use of armed forces in security tasks seems to bring with it the use of force designed under a logic of war.\(^{55}\) The armed forces (army, navy and air force) are designed and trained to perform functions different to those of public safety; they perform functions of war and national security, not police work. Perhaps it was unrealistic to expect a different result to that found, given its design, training and institutional objective. The costs of federal government intervention, however, are not only seen in terms of violence. As shown in the following sections, the strategy has also had significant costs in terms of pluralism, democracy, good governance and community safety.

II. Federalism\(^{56}\), centralism and public security

As noted in the previous section, the use of federal forces by the Mexican government was justified on the grounds of an alleged need to combat drug trafficking


\(^{56}\) In this text, when mentioning federalism, I mean the model of decentralized government, as opposed to centralism. When saying federal government, I mean the central government, as opposed to state or local governments.

It should be noted that in Mexico, the “federalists movement” refers to the defense of the decentralization movement unlike in the United States, where the Federalists were those who advocated a centralized government. This has to do with the historical fact that in Mexico we started out with a centralized government controlled by the Spanish crown. The effort was then to decentralize power, while the U.S. started out as a Confederate government seeking unity.
from a federal standpoint and what was then presumed as an escalation of violence. The reasons offered to justify federal interference, however, have been modified over the six-year administration as security problems have grown. Today, the federal government’s intervention in the States is based on the need to tackle organized crime, affirming that it has become a threat to national security. Organized crime today also justifies the need for legal and constitutional reforms that will give greater powers to the federation and faculties into States security issues.

The effects that the security strategy imposed on the States by the federal government, brings us to the question, the reasons or circumstances that justify the intervention of the federal government in local jurisdiction. Regarding security and crime, what matters of law belong to the federal government and which to the states? In what ways and for what reasons can the federal government intervene in the local arena? Can the line drawing of jurisdictions resolve the tension between federal and local governments and help prevent excess from one or the other? In the following pages, I will present some of the main arguments that have been given to defend federalism versus centralization and some of the criticisms made to federalism. Despite these criticisms and despite the limitations the model has, this text rescues several aspects of federalism that can contribute to achieving public security in communities.

58 For example, last February, the Defense Minister made a calling to recognize that security in the country “is seriously threatened by the interference of organized crime” See:
http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2012/02/10/politica/005n1pol
59 This is one of the main incentives to pressure the approval of the National Security Law. See:
Federalism has been advocated on the basis of three main arguments: 1) it promotes efficient and innovative governments, attentive to citizen’s demands; 2) it protects individual freedoms and serves as check for authoritarian governments, and 3) it allows citizens’ participation and self-government. The following sections explain each of these arguments, focusing especially on the third.

1) Promotion of an efficient and innovative government, attentive to citizens’ demands

Federalism has been advocated as a model that better serves the interests of citizens and one in which the government is more attentive to the demands of the population –this given the proximity of citizens with their authorities-. It has also been advocated as a model that better promotes innovation in public policies by allowing trial and error testing in different problem solving strategies.60 Under this last model, the state is equated to a firm or corporation that offers different options and competes with other localities to attract more business or clients.61

In terms of the existence of governments more attentive and responsive to the demands of the population, it has been noted that while it is potentially true that smaller governments (with authorities nearer to their constituents) can best know and meet the needs of the population and respond accordingly, it is also true that the existence of multiple levels of government make it difficult to monitor public officials at all levels and

hold them responsible for their actions.\textsuperscript{62} Thus, federalism has the potential to create government officials difficult to control.

Regarding innovation, Susan Rose-Ackerman has noted that if innovation implies risks taking for local officials (as is often the case for innovation) or to the voters, local governments will prefer to wait for other governments to innovate and test policies before adopting them.\textsuperscript{63} Thus, rather than encouraging innovation, government division will promote inaction at local levels.\textsuperscript{64} If this prediction is in fact true, in terms of public safety and criminal law, as in other areas, local governments have very few incentives to innovate public policies and will more likely assume the status quo.

2) Protection of individual freedoms and the deterrent for authoritarian governments or tyrannies.

Federalism has also been promoted as a way to check and control possible abuses in the use of state power. This principle, developed by the Federalists, is one of separation of powers and of a system of checks and balances that allows for one branch of government to limit another.\textsuperscript{65} In this model, State and federal government(s) can

\textsuperscript{62} See: Galle B. & Leahy J. Op. Cit. “Government that is smaller, divided, and closer to the population is said to enhance democracy and better protect rights, but multiple tiers of government also reduce transparency and make it harder to hold officials at all levels to account for their decisions.”


\textsuperscript{64} “While decentralization may bring government "closer" to the people, it can also create additional disincentives for innovative activity because of spillovers and the lack of sorting by risk preferences” Ibídem. p. 616

\textsuperscript{65} “(...) the general government will at times stand ready to check the usurpations of the state governments; and these will have the same disposition towards the general Government. (...) If their rights
challenge abuses using other government instances (vertical control of power).66

Against this argument it has been said that it is usually State governments, more than the Federal government, who abuse their power(s), usually imposing decisions that suppress or weaken certain groups. According to Schapiro, U.S. history shows that the considerable abuses of power, such as racial discrimination, come from the States and not the central government. In this sense, he concludes that federalism presents a bigger problem than a solution by permitting the States greater autonomy and opening the gates to possible abuse in the exercise of their power.67

Schapiro's criticism however is imprecise and weak outside the US context. Even though both States and the Federal government rely on a centralized judicial power (and a single constitutional body), to limit the use of power; control (and abuse) usually operates in both directions (the problem discussed in this text is precisely one in which there is excessive federal power against State governments). The criticism, however, inadvertently points out one of the main problems of federalism: the dichotomy between pluralist values and universalism.68 Federalism, by promoting local elections, favors the coexistence of a plurality of values, values with which we can agree or disagree. These are invaded by either, they [the people] can make use of the other, as the instrument of redress.” Hamilton, Alexander. Federalist paper no. 28, 1787.

66 “To the extent that it can check the abusive exercise of government authority, federalism promotes a central goal of liberal political theory. States could act as loci of resistance to abuses of federal authority”. Schapiro, R. Op. Cit. p. 272.
67 Ibidem, p. 273
68 The principle of universalism does not deny the existence of different perspectives, and it does not assert that political participants must put their private complaints to one side when they come to politics. The belief in universalism affirms instead that some perspectives are better than others, and that that claim can be vindicated through discussion with those initially skeptical.” Sunstein, Cass, “Beyond the Republican Revival”, 97 Yale Law Journal 1539 1987-1988, 1574.
values, can refer to fundamental values (or interests), -those which we no not think can be open to deliberation -, such as those related to the inclusion of all groups in deliberation process, the rights concerning due process, etc., or to non-fundamental values –with which we may or may not agree but can accept differences. When it comes to fundamental values, there is little room for pluralism. That is why Trushnet argues that federalism is valuable not because it promotes a plurality of values but because it offers a framework for developing a Universalist ethics of consensus and tolerance.

Regarding the specific issue of public safety and criminal law, federalism represents serious problems in narrowing the limits where criminalization is concerned.  

---

69 I borrow here the definition proposed by Mark Tushnet: “Fundamental interest, as I understand them, are values that a person believes must be implemented if the society in which he or she lies is to be regarded as minimally just. These are not merely personal values, the way of life that the person sets for himself or herself. Instead, they are values that must be generally implemented for all if the society is to be, in the person’s view, minimally just. Non-fundamental interests, in contrast, are express values a person holds, but that a person acknowledges can be reasonably rejected by others.” Tushnet, Mark, “Federalism as a cure for democracy’s Discontent”, en Allen, Anita and Regan, Milton, Debating Democracy’s Discontent, Oxford, 1998, p. 310.

70 In this regard Roberto Gargarella writes that "Judges should abstain from providing an input on issues that should decided by the majority, democratically, such as (typically) the economic plans to be put in place. On the other hand, however, judges would be responsible for ensuring that democratic discussion is possible. For example, this would be done by preventing discrimination against groups (when, for example, the participation of certain political parties in the electoral process is not allowed women’s vote, etc.); favoring the creation of an informed public opinion (by assuring certain opinions are not censored, by guaranteeing the right of assembly); preventing the imprisonment of someone without just cause, and so on." See: Gargarella, Roberto. La democracia deliberativa en el análisis del sistema representativo. Recovered from: http://www.insumisos.com/lecturasinsumisas/la%20democracia%20deliberativa%20en%20el%20analis%20del%20sistema%20repres.pdf

71 Tushnet, M., Op. Cit. “The unrealized possibilities of federalism, that is, are not that it offers a framework for sustained pluralism, but precisely that it offers a framework for the development of a universalist ethic.”

72 Due to the constraint space of this text, we cannot analyze which behaviors can justly be punished by the state. Without fully Refining harm and by adding other elements which should be taken into account, I propose J.S. Mill’s stance which states that: “The only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it would be better for him to do so, because it will make him happier, because, in the opinion of others, to do so would be wise or even right.” John Stuart Mill, quoted by Braithwaite y Pettit. See Braithwaite, John and Pettit, Philip. Not Just Deserts: A republican Theory of Criminal Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1998 p. 93.
Which, if any, are the fundamental values that justify criminalization? Which are the acceptable forms of punishment? It seems important, especially in the Latin-American context, where decisions on security are usually aimed at expanding crime control mechanisms, to set clear limits to the punitive functions of the States (and federal government). It would be relevant, for example, to set clear limits on criminalization of certain behaviors on the merits of moral grounds as well as to limit the criminalization of victimless crimes.

3) Citizen participation and self-government.

Federalism has also been favored as a better option in terms of enabling self-government and citizen participation. In very simple terms, in a republican, democratic and representative government,73 citizens should be able to participate freely and equally in the deliberation processes of matters that affect basic aspects of their lives, including decisions of security and crime. Self-government and citizen participation promote equality among the members of the community and improves the quality of the deliberation and decision process.74

73 Article 40 of the Mexican Constitution states that “The Mexican people willingly constitute themselves as a representative, democratic and federal Republic integrated by States which are free an sovereign in order to organize their internal regimes, but which are also united as a Federation established under this Constitution’s principles”. At the risk of oversimplifying the significance of differences between different models of republicanism and different authors here use some features described by Cass Sunstein, who emphasizes the importance of political participation and limits on government power. See: Sunstein, Cass, Op. Cit. Also see Sunstein, Cass., The Partial Constitution, Harvard University Press. Cambridge, 1993.

74 In Mexico, as noted by Robert Gargarella, this principle was advocated by the radical constitutionalists. Ponciano Arriaga for example wrote that "the laws are wiser in proportion to the higher number of legislatures." Ponciano Arriaga, 1857, quoted by Gargarella, Roberto, Los fundamentos legales de la desigualdad, El constitucionalismo en America, 1776-1860, p.24. See also, Gargarella Roberto, Notas sobre el Constitucionalismo Radical en México (1857), Revista de la Facultad de Derecho de México, UNAM, 2007.
Citizen participation, however, supposes the establishment of local deliberation procedures, equal conditions between parties, equal access to political procedures and certain conditions that guarantee citizens the right to participate in said procedures. It has been argued that by reserving certain decisions (or matters) for the States and municipalities, federalism allows for greater opportunities in citizen participation at a local level. It is important to note, however, that this participation is only of value if it results in changes to public policy. Also, as aforementioned, an advantage of federalism is that it allows diversity among localities by promoting a plurality of values.

Contrary to federalism, centralism has been criticized because it violates the possibilities that lead to citizen participation. Firstly, when making decisions from a federal level, the possibility of local deliberation is cancelled. Secondly, it creates a situation of inequality between parts (especially between members of the federal...
government and members of local governments), which, as noted by Sunstein, obstructs access to the political process, creating less democratic and representative governments.82

Thirdly, it constructs citizens who far from being participative are taught to be obedient.

Several objections have been made to the arguments in favor of federalism. First, as noted by Schapiro, the political participation that federalism supposedly promotes cannot work in States as large as the existing ones. In this regard, to ensure real citizen participation, powers need be attributed to the municipality level or lower, which would make the organization and functioning of the nation more difficult and slow.83 Also, as mentioned earlier, if public deliberation does not result in the creation of public policy, it loses its value. So deliberation has to be closely linked with public policy making and some mechanism(s) must exist to ensure the translation of deliberation into policies.

Mark Tushnet in addition emphasizes that in order to use federalism as an instrument to promote participation (and construct local public policies), it is essential that small jurisdictions be enabled to make decisions that are not overturned by larger jurisdictions.84 This, again, also works when addressing non-fundamental values. As noted above, federalism has strong limits as far as the construction of policies where fundamental values are at play. For States and municipalities, federalism only contributes an opening where policy non-related to fundamental values can be decided. But this is

82 “A representative government requires parts to be equal. The lack of equality between the parts, obstructs their access to the political process, making government less representative”. Sunstein, Cass, “Beyond the Republican Revival”. Op. Cit. p. 1552
83 Schapiro, R. Op. Cit. pág. 271 “republican values may not thrive in such large areas as that of current states. Opportunities for active engagement remain attenuated. To ensure real opportunities for citizen participation, decisions must be made in counties, towns or cities. The central government, just as well as the states, could allocate decisions to localities.”
not a minor issue. The line between what is fundamental and what is not stagnant but an
ongoing exercise of the judicial branch and, to a large extent, of the legislative one.\textsuperscript{85}
Secondly, the operational aspects of federalism, i.e. those that do not deal with
fundamental values, have important implications in the use of state power and should not
be left aside. This can be seen in the area of security and criminal law, as shown in the
following section.

Despite the criticisms made towards federalism, several points make this system’s
defense important. In the first place, federalism remains a valuable tool in terms of
vertical control of powers in order to curb the excess of government exercise (either local
or federal). Although the line between what is properly federal and State jurisdiction is
not static, it does not imply that any division is valid. Regarding public security, there are
important arguments for limiting the intervention of the federal government, such as the
violence generated by using federal forces in the States. Moreover, the adoption of a
centralized system has direct (and negative) repercussions in the possibilities of achieving
safety within communities.

III. Federalism and Public Security: fragmentation and self-government at a street
level.

One of the constant criticisms made to the federalist model has to do with the

\textsuperscript{85} For example, Schapiro states that there is a core of powers reserved for the federation, another core
reserved for the States and a periphery for concurrent matters. Federalism, for him, becomes a line drawing
exercise to set the boundaries between the core and periphery, between the federal and the local. “‘This
dualist perspective lends itself well to spatial metaphors. A core and a periphery of state power exist, and a
core and a periphery of federal power exist. At the peripheries, concurrent state and federal control is
permitted, but a core remains, free from intrusion by the other government. Federalism then becomes an
exercise in line-drawing, determining which kinds of activities belong to the state or federal regions and
deciding where the boundary lies between core and periphery” ver Schapiro, R. Op. Cit. p. 251
fragmentation that results from a decentralized system of government and with the small political areas necessary to achieve meaningful self-government and citizen participation. In terms of public security, it has been noted that fragmentation leads to operational problems. Several crimes (such as drug trafficking, human trafficking, child pornography, etc.), involve organizations that operate in more than one State. The pursuit of these organizations is difficult without a strategy and police managed by the federal government. Adding to this, it has been argued that a fragmented model of police (e.g. a police force for each municipality) is more inefficient than a centralized one, because it requires more resources than a centralized model, and is potentially more vulnerable to corruption\(^{86}\) (although it has also been argued that a model of centralized police is more risky in terms of corruption because it has no exit option)\(^{87}\). Because of this, many parts of the world have adopted centralized models of police.\(^{88}\)

In Mexico, due to the mistrust, inefficiency and corruption of local police, the replacement of local police by a single State police, the federal police or, in extreme cases, the army; has been proposed (and exercised).\(^{89}\) In other words, in terms of

---


\(^{87}\) Ibidem. P. 120

\(^{88}\) Examples of countries with centralized police models include France, Italy, Finland, Israel, Thailand and Denmark.

\(^{89}\) In several parts of the country, there have been mass police resignations, where for fear of organized crime, officers are turning in uniforms and weapons. In these cases, municipalities asked the federal government for help. On December 6, 2011, for example, the director and all other members of the police of the municipality of Tepecoacuilco, Guerrero, resigned when a commando attacked the police headquarters located in the Town Hall early that morning. On August 2011, the 26 members that made up the municipal police of Asunción, Chihuahua, located 150 km from Ciudad Juarez and the border with the United States, resigned their position, delivering their weapons and uniforms to the City Hall. This happened two days after two municipal officers were executed and one week after the police headquarters were attacked by two vans with gunmen. In April and May 2011, the full preventive police of the municipalities of Zacatecas, Teúl of Ortega, Joaquin Amaro, Tabasco, Florence and Tepetongo Benito Juarez resigned. Also in Zacatecas that
policing, an increasingly centralized model has replaced the fragmented local one.90

Although centralized models of policing are not irreconcilable with democratic regimes, vertical organizations are often less democratic and give less space to citizen participation.91 Several authors, however, have noted the importance of citizen participation for the construction of local security. For example, the importance of community participation in the daily tasks of the police and the need for public support has been noted.92 The importance of social participation in some forms of community policing has also been emphasized. Thus, a centralized model of policing may undermine the possibilities of achieving security at the community level. In community policing model, on the other hand, security is understood to derive from the community and can be understood, as a very present form of self-government as well as a version of federalism.

In the model of community policing, there is a mutual and routine monitoring
between individuals of the community.  

93 This is described as “A process in which a public polices itself through routine and largely unorganized mutual monitoring and surveillance, with general readiness to counter transgressions (and to support victims).”

94 In order for this model to be effective in reducing crime people should be willing to challenge transgressors, act as witnesses, provide information to the police, etc.

This model, however, stands in contrast with the federal strategy to centralize security. It also seems difficult under current social conditions. The willingness to participate in these forms of government depends fundamentally on the legal institutions that administer justice. If people fear for their safety (because they do not trust the existing institutions or they do not other citizens to protect them) they will be unwilling to challenge strangers. Thus the model relies strongly on existing security institutions, including the police to act promptly and effectively; on trust between individuals and between individuals and the authority. Community policing, in this sense, does not imply the disappearance of formal institutions, but instead poses a scheme of cooperation in which formal and informal institutions are mutually dependent and operate jointly.

The model also depends on a minimum level of community stability, which has

---

93 Peter Somerville, Understanding Community Policing, Policing: an International Journal of Police Strategies & Management, vol 32, no. 2, 2009, 261- 277 P. 262 “Routine surveillance by people going about their daily business tends to reduce the incidence of transgressive, anti-social or criminal behaviour. In this view, crime is the result of three factor coming together: “a likely transgressor, a suitable target (or victim) and the absence of effective intermediaries either to ‘handle’ the transgressor or to ‘guard’ the target or victim.”


95 This is especially a problem in places where there is no trust in public security institutions or in the administration of Justice. “Effective intermediaries means that “people are prepared to challenge strangers, step forward as witnesses and so on, only where they feel confident of their own safety and a reasonable level of trust in criminal justice institutions. (…) Informal social control depends crucially on trust, which can be understood in Kuhmann’s terms as the willingness to assume risk.” Somerville, P. Op. Cit. p. 262
also been negatively affected by the increasing violence in the country. By 2010, it was estimated that about 230,000 people in Mexico had been displaced from their homes because of the occurring violence. (In 2011 alone, more than 110,000 people were displaced from their homes for this reason). This has led to greater instability and increased insecurity at the community level. With high levels of movement at the community level, social control mechanisms are weakened and the confidence among community members is undermined. As more members leave their towns, the possibilities of community participation are also reduced.

Community policing involves deliberation processes that facilitate a decision making process based on the perceived needs of the community regarding public security. This implies that decisions regarding budgets and the allocation of the resources to certain matters should not be primarily taken by the central government but rather should reflect the wishes of the community. Finally, although the proposed model takes into account the limitations of horizontal regulation, it relies on the possibility of communication between authority and community members and on the possibility of having constant evaluations of the decisions and actions of the authority by the community.

99 Ibídem, p. 265. "Regulating communications from the police to the public and regular feedback from the public to the police about community conditions and the effectiveness of policing interventions. A criticism to this model is that only a minority of community members are usually envolved in this process.”
This way of providing public security seems to better promote the values of the Federal Republic described in the previous section. While it is theoretically possible to have this in a centralized police model, in practice, the centralized model has had the opposite effect. As noted above, the model of self-policing depends on trust, communication, assessment and cooperation between citizens and authority; elements implausible in vertical models, an even less so where notoriously violent police enforcement exists.

**Conclusions.**

The deployment of federal forces throughout the country has involved a transgression of the federal balance. This is undesired, not only because it involves the violation of basic democratic values (such as inclusion, participation and equality), but also because it has meant a detriment to public safety. By weakening the possibilities for citizen participation in security tasks, the centralism that has emerged in Mexico, has weakened the possibilities of achieving security at community level.

As shown in this text, in some parts of Mexico, federal security forces have replaced local ones. This has been associated with increased violence in the country. This increase can be partly explained by the use of security forces trained for operating in contexts of war. However, it can also be attributed to the local breakdown generated by the replacement of local security forces by federal security forces and by the replacement of local criminal laws by federally decided ones. As suggested by Fernando Escalante,
the emergence of federal forces has nullified local agreements that governed the local informal markets (drug, informal trade, etc.) as well as other informal arrangements that provided social control. Moreover, mass displacement in the country has led to greater instability, has weakened social controls and has increased insecurity at the community level.

This text has made an effort to highlight the importance of federalism, not only as a model of vertical control of State powers, but more importantly, as a way of promoting self-governance and citizen participation. As shown in this text, both elements, in addition to being valuable in achieving democratic and representative societies, are essential for the fulfillment of security within communities. While federalism, as an organizational model of the state does not guarantee protection of individual liberties against the use of power, it does facilitate the security mechanisms needed for a more representative, democratic and therefore safe society.
Bibliography


Brutus, The Antifederalist Papers. No. VIII, enero 1788  
http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2012/02/10/politica/005n1pol


Gargarella, Roberto, *Los fundamentos legales de la desigualdad, El constitucionalismo en America, 1776-1860*, Ed. Siglo XXI, 2005

Gargarella, Roberto. *La democracia deliberativa en el análisis del sistema representativo*. Recuperado de:  


Hamilton, Alexander. Federalist paper no. 28., 1787.


Madison, James. Federalist paper no. 51, 1788.


Secretaría de la Defensa Nacional. Respuesta a solicitud de acceso a la información pública, número de folio 0000700011312.


Secretaría de Marina. Respuesta a solicitud de acceso a la información pública, número de folio 0001300006712, Marzo 2011.


Secretaría de Seguridad Pública. Respuesta a solicitud de acceso a la información pública, número de folio 0002200165311. Diciembre 2011

Silva, Carlos; Pérez Correa, Catalina y Gutiérrez, Rodrigo. “Uso de la fuerza letal. Muertos, heridos y detenidos en enfrentamientos de las fuerzas federales con presuntos miembros de la delincuencia organizada”, por publicarse en Revista de Antropología Social, México.


Villalobos, Joaquin. “Doce mitos de la guerra contra el narco”, en Revista Nexos, Enero, 2010

Internet:

monterrey.milenio.com/cdb/doc/impreso/8542068

www.presidencia.gob.mx/el-blog/el-tercer-mito-falso-que-la-presencia-de-la-autoridad-detone-sistematicamente-la-violencia/

www.proceso.com.mx/?p=280244

www.proceso.com.mx/?p=267096

www.secretariadoejecutivo.gob.mx/es/SecretariadoEjecutivo/Delitos_del_Fuero_Comun_de_Mayor_Impacto_Graficos_Presentados_en_la XXX_Sesion_del_CNSP