- 9:30AM to 11:00AM
For drop-in sessions, Catherine can offer empathic listening, personalized meditation, guidance on EFT tapping etc. — you do not have to have a specific agenda.
Join the Liman Center for a discussion about the conditions of confinement for individuals in prison during this pandemic era, and the efforts underway to preserve health, safety, and constitutional rights.
Do you think you are interested in pursuing a public interest career or working for your first summer in a non-profit or government law office? Norma D’Apolito, CDO’s Public Interest Director, will give an introductory overview of public interest law careers and opportunities, including the 1L summer internship application process. Join to learn about the many public interest career paths, get insights on ways to incorporate public interest in your professional life, and identify public interest resources.
E. Tendayi Achiume, YLS '08 is Professor of Law at UCLA School of Law, and Faculty Director of the UCLA Law Promise Institute for Human Rights. She is also a Research Associate with the African Centre for Migration and Society at the University of Witwatersrand. The current focus of her work is the global governance of racism and xenophobia; and the legal and ethical implications of colonialism for contemporary international migration.
Join Roberta Kass and Amber Handman, from Seltzer Fontaine Legal Search Consultants in Los Angeles, for a meeting on the current state of the California hiring market.
Zoom links will be emailed out on October 14 for students who have signed up for a timeslot in CMS.
ABSTRACT: "For many years, most scholars have assumed that the strength of reputational incentives is positively correlated with firm size. Firms that sell more products or services were thought more likely to be trustworthy than those that sell less because larger firms have more to lose if consumers decide they have behaved badly. That assumption has been called into question by recent work that shows that, under the standard infinitely repeated game model of reputation, reputational economies of scale will occur only under special conditions, such as monopoly, because larger firms not only have more to lose from behaving badly, but also more to gain. This article shows that reputational economies of scale exist even when there is competition and without other special conditions, if the probability that low quality is detected is positively correlated with the quantity of the good or service sold. It also shows that reputational economies of scale exist, under some circumstances, in a finite-horizon model of reputation. Reputational economies of scale help explain why law and accounting firms can act as gatekeepers, why mass market products are more likely to be safe, why firms are less likely to exploit one-sided contracts than consumers, and why manufacturers market new products under the umbrella of established trademarks."
We will be discussing electoralism. Please read the following two articles if you will attend the discussion: What Can Elections Do? (https://bostonreview.net/politics/justin-h-vassallo-what-can-elections-do) and The Lure of Elections: From Political Power to Popular Power