Seminar Probes the Intersection of Law and Cognitive Science

Are psychopaths legally insane? Should addiction be a mitigating factor in criminal defense? Has someone given their consent if they’ve been lied to?
Students are digging into these questions as they explore the legal relevance of topics in cognitive science, which investigates the human mind and how it processes information and experiences.
The “Law and Cognitive Science” seminar is co-taught by Gideon Yaffe, the Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld Professor of Jurisprudence at Yale Law School and professor of philosophy and psychology, and Joshua Knobe4, professor of philosophy, psychology, and linguistics at Yale University. The seminar aims to familiarize students with empirical research in cognitive science that can provide insights to lawyers.
“I think it’s really important to be doing evidence-based thinking about legal reform,” Yaffe said. One question the class is considering, for example, is whether there should be a defense from criminal liability for addiction.
“The answer to that question turns on what’s going on in the minds of addicts when they make decisions. And what we know about that comes from empirical work in psychology and cognitive science and neuroscience,” Yaffe said. “Being able to use those tools is important, and I don’t feel that it’s a standard part of legal education to learn how to do that.”

Students discussed a related question about psychopathy and whether it should be treated as a mental illness for purposes of assessing the insanity defense.
“There’s a lot of interesting cognitive scientific work about what’s going on when psychopaths make decisions to harm other people, and whether those are in any way mitigating,” Knobe said.
Another set of readings examined the psychological decisions people make about the mental states of others. Annika Russell ’27 found this topic especially interesting, as it explored how people sort real-world mental states into the four mens rea categories of the Model Penal Code (MPC), which requires jurors to determine a criminal defendant’s state of mind.
“Given the profound influence the MPC has on modern criminal law, it would be a grave oversight not to explore whether jurors can accurately and reliably sort mental states into the MPC’s categories that are used to determine criminal culpability,” she said.
In addition to covering traditional topics in law and cognitive science, the seminar also explores newer research, such as the relationship between the legal concept of consent and the lay understanding. This includes work by social psychologist Roseanna Sommers5 ’18, who studied with Yaffe and Knobe while at the Law School. She now teaches at the University of Michigan Law School and works in the growing field known as experimental jurisprudence, which uses empirical techniques from the social sciences to study legal concepts.

“Sommers and others have done a whole series of studies trying to understand what people mean when they say someone consents to something,” Knobe explained. “For example, if you lie to someone and they say yes, did they really consent? If they lack certain cognitive capacities, did they consent?”
Julius Hattingh ’25 LLM said he is taking the seminar because he is interested in how the law influences people’s perceptions of themselves and their interactions with one another, beyond simply prohibiting or requiring particular acts. “I usually think about this theoretically, but I had heard of experimental jurisprudence and wanted to learn more about it,” he said.
Hattingh also found the discussion about mental states to be particularly interesting.
“At times there are pretty striking divergences between how core legal concepts, like categories of mens rea in criminal law, actually align with how laypeople perceive the world. This approach to studying law and legal concepts is illuminating,” he said.
This seminar has shown me the numerous ways cognitive science can — and should — inform our contemporary legal debates.”
—Annika Russell ’27
Russell said the seminar is a valuable opportunity to explore the many areas where law and cognitive science intersect. She took classes in cognitive science, neuroscience, and psychology as an undergraduate but was told her interest in these fields was incompatible with a career in law.
“This seminar has shown me the numerous ways cognitive science can — and should — inform our contemporary legal debates,” she said. “Today, the limited attention paid to neurolaw as a subfield does not reflect an inherent incompatibility, but an untapped opportunity.”
Yaffe and Knobe hope the seminar equips students with a foundation to use cognitive science to address difficult legal questions. “Whenever they run across a legal issue, whether it has anything to do with the class or not, I hope they will think about how they can use cognitive science to investigate it,” Yaffe said.